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This dissertation investigates issues
raised by these two questions:
(i)

what kinds of propositions are ordinarily
expressed by uses of

sentences that contain proper names; and
(ii) what kinds of beliefs are

ordinarily on the minds of speakers when they
use sentences that contain
proper names?

It

develops

a

new view about the connections between

beliefs, linguistic behavior, and propositional
content, one that

explicitly denies that the kinds of propositions
typically expressed by
uses of such sentences are the objects of the beliefs
typically on the

minds of the speakers who use them.
Chapter

I

presents both the Mi Ilian and the the description theories

of proper names, and reviews the advantages and
disadvantages of each.

Chapter II critically evaluates Dummett’s defense of the description

theory against the Modal Objection.
Chapter III introduces Kripke's puzzle about beliefs and proper
names,

it shows that Kripke’s puzzle is not solved by the theory of

proper names recently presented by Devitt.

It

"consistency solutions" proposed by Chisholm,

critically evaluates the
Harrison,

Noonan,

Chapter IV continues the discussion of Kripke's puzzle.

and Over.

It

critically evaluates the "inconsistency solution" proposed by Marcus.

viii

It

examines

a

con^entary on the puzzle by
Lewis.

Finally, it presents an

"inconsistency solution" based on
views suggested by the
Lewis
commentary.
Chapter

V

compares my view about the
connections between beliefs,

linguistic behavior, and propositional
content to the "naive view"
and
the "Russel lean view.”
It applies my view to solve
two major problems
for the Millian theor-y of proper
names.
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CHAPTER

I

TWO THEORIES OF PROPER NAMES*
THE MILLIAN THEORY AND THE
DESCRIPTION THEORY

Our uses of proper names and the
sentences in which they occur
give
rise to at least two philosophically
significant questions. First,
what

kind of proposition, singular or
general, is expressed by an ordinary
use
of a sentence that contains a proper
name ?
Second, what kind of belief
1

is ordinarily on the mind of a
speaker when he uses a sentence that

contains

a

proper name?

A theory of the meaning of proper
names will

attempt to answer the first question; that

is,

will attempt to say what

kinds of propositions are ordinarily expressed
by uses of sentences that

contain proper names.

A central

thesis of this dissertation is that we

have been ill-served by our failure to observe
the distinction between
these two questions and misled by the assumption
that when we answer the
first question we have, thereby,

also answered the second question.

Section One

There are two major kinds of theories of the meaning of proper names.
A

given theory is

a

Millian theory if it entails that ordinary uses of

name sentences express singular propositions

2
.

A

given theory is

a

description theory if it entails that ordinary uses of name sentences
express general, or qualitative, propositions.

According to the Millian theory,
to.

4

Whatever it means to say that

a
a

proper name means what it refers

name means what it refers to, there

is widespread agreement that it entails two significant theses.

1

First,

.

2

that a name means what it
refers to, is held to entail
that names which
co-refer are everywhere substituable
both salva veritate and
salva

liSnmcatiose.

After all, if names mean
what they refer to, then
names
that refer to the same thing
mean the same thing.
Second, that a name
meanS “ hat
refers to ls
to entail that when an
apparent proper
name lacks a referent, uses of
sentences in which it occurs
do not

U

'

express propositions, lack
propositional content, and do not say
anything
either true or false. After all,
if the meaning of a proper
name is its
.

referent,

then

name with no referent is

a

a

name with no meaning.

These two theses of the Mi Ilian theory
are the source of its three

major problems.

These problems have led philosophers
to seek

alternatives to the Millian theory.

This, in turn, led to the

development of the description theory.
The first of these problems is the
problem of significant (or non-

trivial),

true,

identity sentences.

Sentences

(1)

Hesperus is Hesperus,

(2)

Hesperus is Phosphorus,

and

differ in cognitive significance.
(1)

A

need not be disposed to assent to

(1975),

(1)

is not

speaker who is disposed to assent to
(2).

According to Gottlob Frege

cognitively significant, whereas

(2)

is

cognitively

significant
This raises
theory,
(2)

a

problem for the Millian.

For, according to the Millian

since 'Hesperus’ and 'Phosphorus' codesignate,

sentences

(1)

and

express the same proposition, have the same propositional content,

and say the same thing.

In cases where the sentences involved express

3

different propositions, the
Million could always account
for differences
in cognitive significance
by means of differences
in propositional
content.
However, when, as in the case
of (,) and (2), the
sentences
involved (purportedly) express the
same proposition, such an
account is

unavailable.

In fact,

one could argue from the
standard explanation-

from a divergence in cognitive
significance, to a divergence in

propositional contenW-to the conclusion
that
the same proposition,

oodesignate.

(1)

and

(2)

do not express

despite the fact that -Hesperus’ and
-Phosphorus-

The Millian theory leaves us in need
of an explanation of

how sentences like (2) can be both
true and cognitively significant.
It is useful to regard the

sentences as

a

problem of significant, true, identity

species of the more general problem of the
apparent

failure of the substitute ity of codesignating
proper names.

This

general problem derives from evidence which
is usually taken to show
that,

contrary to the Millian theory of meaning,
codesignating proper

names are not everywhere interchangeable both salva
veritate and salva
significations.

Such evidence is of two kinds,

and one of the two is

parasitic on the other.
The first kind of evidence is that

a

speaker who is disposed to

assent to such as sentence as
(3)

Hesperus is visible

may not be disposed to assent to,
such

a

sentence as
(4)

in

indeed may be disposed to dissent from,

Phosphorus is visible,

spite of the fact that 'Hesperus* and

'Phosphorus'

codesignate.

Arguing from the usual explanation of such phenomena, philosophers have

14

concluded that

(3)

„

and (4) do not express
the same proposition.

The second hind of
evidence Is that speakers
sometimes report on the
doxastlc state of others by
saying such things as 'S
believe that

Hesperus is visible and does
not believe that
Phosphorus is visible.'
If
such reports are ever true,
then, according to a very
natural analysis of
belief ascription sentences-namely:
r
S believes that
is true if

f

ly if the belief relation
relates the designatum of

proposition expressed by

(4)

(4).

Again,

to the

then one and the same person
may believe

the proposition expressed by

expressed by

'S'

and

(3)

but not believe the proposition

such evidence would seem to
prove that

(3)

and

do not express the same
proposition.

The second kind of evidence is
parasitic on the first kind of

evidence in as much as one's evidence
that such reports are true is
that
speakers who are disposed to assent to
sentences like

disposed to assent to,
sentences

like

(3)

need not be

indeed are often disposed to dissent
from,

(4).

The third major problem for the Millian
theory is the problem of

apparently true, negative existential sentences.
(5)

Sentence

Pegasus does not exist

certainly seems true; nevertheless, if the Millian
theory is true,
does not express any proposition.

(5)

This is because 'Pegasus' lacks a

referent and the Millian theory entails that sentences
containing non-

referring names do not express propositions.

Millian

is prepared

unless the

to say that a sentence like (5) can be true even

though it fails to express

not true.

Therefore,

a

(true)

proposition,

he must hold that

(5)

is

5

Another problem for the
Hilllan theory is raise*
(6)

Pegasus has wings,

(7)

Pegasus does not have wings.

sucb sentences as

hy

and

It is

reasonable to think of

(7,

as the denial of
(6).

that one of the two is true
and the other false.

Hill ian theory, however, since
-Pegasus' lacks

a

and to maintain

According to the
referent,

neither

(6)

nor (7) expresses a proposition;
and, therefore, unless the
Millian is
willing to say that sentences like
(6) and (7) can have
truth-values

without expressing propositions,
he must concede the
counter-intuitive

result that neither

nor

(6)

(7)

is either true or false.

Section Two

The description theory was developed
to solve these three problems.

According to
speaker uses
description. 5

a
a

"standard version" of the description theory,
when
proper name, he associates it with some
definite

According to the standard version of the
description

theory of the reference of proper names, the
referent, if any, of
use of a proper name is the object,

definite description. 5

if any,

given

a

designated by its associated

According to the standard version of the

description theory, the proposition, if any, expressed by
a

a

sentence that contains

a

a

given use of

proper name is the proposition, if any,

its

user would express were he to use the sentence that results
from the

sentence he in fact used when the name it contains is everywhere
(therein) replaced by its associated definite description.

This standard

6

version of the description
theory admits solutions
to each of the three
problems described above.
According to the description
theory,

a

speaker who assents to

Hesperus is Hesperus

(1)

but not to
(2) Hesperus is

Phosphorus

does so because he associates
-Hesperus’

definite descriptions.

Suppose,

and

-Phosphorus- with different

for example that he associates
the name

-Hesperus- with the definite
description -the celestial body
called the

Evening Star- and the name -Phosphorus'
with the definite description
-the

celestial body called the Morning

description theory,

if he were to use

Star.-

(1)

Then,

according to the

he would use it to express the

proposition expressed by
(1

)

The celestial body called the Evening
Star is the
celestial body called the Evening Star,

and if he were to use (2) he would use it
to express the proposition

expressed by
(2

The celestial body called the Evening Star is
the
celestial body called the Morning Star.

)

For such a speaker,

(1)

and

(2)

do not express the same proposition.

This allows the description theorist to give the
standard account of why
such

a

speaker assents to

(1)

but not to

(2):

he assents to (1) because

he believes the proposition he would use it to express and
he does not

assent to

(2)

to express.
in

because he does not believe the proposition he would use it
In this way the description theory explains the difference

cognitive significance between

(1)

and

(2).

7

The description theory also
explains apparent failures
of
(3)ity.
substitutiv

As in the case of (1)
k
and
;

(?)

Q speaker
*
a
i

who assents to

Hesperus is visible

(4)

but not to

Phosphorus is visible
does so, according to the description
theory, because he associates
'Hesperus'

and

'Phosphorus' with different definite
descriptions.

speaker may use

Such a

to express the proposition he
would express were he

(3)

to use
(3

but use

(4)

(4

Thus,
(3)

)

The celestial body called the Evening
Star is visible,

to express the proposition he would
express were he to use
)

The celestial body called the Morning
Star is visible.

according to the description theory, such

a

speaker may assent to

be cause he believes the proposition he
would express were he to use
(5)

(3),

but not assent to

(4)

because he does not believe the proposition he

would express were he to use

(4).

Apparently,

the description theory

explains why coref erential proper names are not interchangeable
both
sal va veritate and sal va signif icatione

.

According to the description theory,"^ when

a

speaker uses sentence

Pegasus does not exist,
he associates the proper name ’Pegasus' with some definite
description,
say,

’the winged

horse of greek mythology,' and he thereby expresses the

proposition he would have expressed had he used
(5’)

The winged horse of greek mythology does not exist.

One need then only refer to a theory of definite descriptions, such as
O

Bertrand Russell's,

for an account of how sentence (5) can express a

8

proposition, and

a

true proposition at that,
even though its grammatical

subject, 'the winged horse of
greek mythology,’ does not
designate
anything.
In this way, while it may
not completely eliminate
the
problems caused by negative existential
name sentences, the description
theory at least subsumes them under
problems we already have quite
independent of our theory of proper
names.

The description theory offers a
similar solution the the problems

raised by sentences which contain
so-called "non-referring names."

According to the description theory,
(6)

a

speaker who says

Pegasus has wings

associates 'Pegasus’ with some definite
description,

say,

'the winged

horse of greek mythology,' and thereby
expresses the proposition he would

express were he to say
(6')

The winged horse of greek mythology has wings.

Similarly, if such
(7)

a

speaker were to say

Pegasus does not have wings,

he would express the proposition he would express
were he to say
(7

Again,

)

The winged horse of greek mythology does not have wings.

the description theorist then refers to his theory of definite

descriptions for an explanation of how

(6')

and

(7')

can express

propositions even though 'the winged horse of greek mythology' does not

designate anything.

.

9

Section Three

The major problems confronting
the description theory
have been
stated in articles by Saul
Kripke? and Keith Donnellan, 1°
among others."
The objections involve theses
common to most description
theories of
proper names.
First, there is the thesis
that speakers who use
proper
names associate them with
definite descriptions. Foilowing
Donnellan. we
will say that such a description
backs the speaker's use of
the name he
used, and I shall refer to this
thesis as the "Backing Description
Thesis."

Second,

there is the thesis that the
proposition a speaker

expresses by his use of

given name sentence is the
proposition he would

a

express were he to use the sentence
that results from substituting
the
name's backing description for the
name everywhere the name occurs
in the
original name sentence.

I

will call this the "Synonymy Thesis."

The No Description Objection to the
description theory is directed at
the Backing Description Thesis.

Kripke, Donnellan, and David Kaplan,

among others, have claimed the speakers
often use proper names without

being able to supply definite descriptions
to serve as backing
descriptions.

In fact,

it seems possible to construct cases where
the

speaker does not have enough information to be in
backing description.

a

position to supply a

Such a case would refute the Backing Description

Thesis
The second major objection is the Wrong Description Objection.

takes one of two forms.

One form involves cases where a speaker

associates the name he uses with

designate anything

— this

It

a

definite description that fails to

despite the intuition that his use of the name

10

did refer to seething.

The other for™ l„ volves
oases where a speaker

associates the name he uses
with

a

definite description that
designates

a

certain object-this despite
the intuition that his
use of the name
referred to a certain other
wp
ouj
obiect
ect.
i
^
We w-i
will
consider one version of each
form of the Wrong Description
Objection.
•

i

.

Suppose that our speaker says
(8)

Russell authored "On Denoting,"

and that he associates the
name -Russell' with the definite
description
'the author of The Pri ncipia .'

reference,
if any,

the referent,

According to the description theory
of

if any,

of his use of -Russell- is the
person,

designated by the description -the
author of The Principia .'

According to the description theory
of meaning, when he said

(8),

our

speaker meant what he would mean were
he to say
(8’)

The author of The Principia authored
"On Denoting."

Of course,

such

anything;

The Principia had two authors.

a

speaker’s backing description does not
designate

Therefore,

if the description

theory of reference is true, our speaker’s
use of 'Russell' lacked
referent.

Kripke and Donnellan have maintained that
such

succeed in referring to something.
descriptions, sentence

(8')

is

false; it asserts, among other things,
Therefore,

theory of meaning is true, our speaker expressed
(8).

expressed
are right,

a

speaker does

On a standard analysis of definite

that The Pri ncipia had but one author.

he used

a

a

a

if the description

false proposition when

Kripke and Donnellan would argue that such
true proposition when he used

(8).

a

speaker

If Kripke and Donnellan

then this form of the Wrong Description Objection refutes the

description theory.

11

To consider the other form
taken by the Wrong
Description Objection,
we will suppose that our
speaker uses (8) while
associating the name

ussell

with the definite description
'the author of The
Tractatus .
According to the description theory
of reference, our speaker
referred to
1

Wittgenstein and, according to the
description theory of meaning,
our
speaker meant what he would mean were
he to
say

(8”)
and,

so,

The author of The Tractatus
authored "On Denoting,"

spoke falsely.

is counterintuitive.

Kripke and Donnellan would say that
each result

If they are right,

this form of the Wrong

Description Objection apparently refutes
the description theory.
The third objection is the Modal
Objection.

modal objection:

through

alethic and epistemic.

single example.

a

(9)

There are two kinds of

We shall consider both kinds

Suppose that our speaker says,

If Aristotle existed, then Aristotle was
a philosopher,

and that he associates the name 'Aristotle’
with the definite description
'the

last great philosopher of antiquity.'

Our intuitions inform us that

what our speaker says is both contingently true (here
is the alethic
notion) and true a posteriori (here is the epistemic
notion).
to the Synonymy Thesis, however,

when our speaker used

(9),

According

he expressed

the proposition he would express were he to use
(9')

In

If the last great philosopher of antiquity existed, then
the last great philosopher of antiquity was a philosopher.

contrast with

Therefore,

(9),

(9')

is both necessarily true and true a priori. 12

contrary to the Synonymy Thesis, when our speaker used

he

(9)

did not express the proposition he would have expressed had he used

(9').

The final objection is the Attitude-Context Objection. It trades on

feature of the description theory discussed by Russell in this passage

a

12

from his lectures on logical
atomism:

^

thing as anothar° person mems”
by
*
*
lake
Tate"
f"'
for example,
the word 'Piccad i 1 i v
uQ
Piccadill y
attach quite a different
mea^i^g^to Th^w^d*
could be attached to it by a
person who had neverYeen
London:
and, supposing that you
travel to foreign parts and
100 11111'' y ° U WU1 00nvey
to y°ur hearers
^'
entire! v^dTff”
propositions from those in your
mind.
0 956,
*

»

»

.

^

f^

tT^

P

195-196)

According to Russell, unless they
agreed to do so in advance, it
would be
a coincidence for two speakers
to associate the same backing
descriptions
with the names they use. If Russell
is right about this, and there
is

little reason to think he is not, then,
if the Synonymy Thesis is true,
it would be a coincidence for two
speakers
to express the same

propositions with the name sentences they
use.
Now,

Smith,

suppose that Jones has been to London and
seen Piccadilly.

To

Jones says
(10)

Piccadilly is very busy.

Later, recalling this incident, Smith says
to a third party
(11)

Jones believes that Piccadilly is very busy.

Smith has never been to London.

He associates the name ’Piccadilly' with

the definite description ’the place represented by
these [his] mental
images.’

past,

The images in question were originally acquired many
years

while watching

forgotten.

a

travelogue, and episode Smith has long since

According to the Synonymy Thesis,

when Smith said (11),

he

expressed the proposition he would have expressed had he said
(11’)

It

Jones believes that the place represented by these
[Smith's] mental images is very busy.

would certainly be

safely assume that

it

a

coincidence if (IT) were true,

is false.

Still, (11) is true.

and we may

Furthermore,

1
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Jones-s utterance of

he says

(

11

);

(

10 ) is good evidence for
the claim Smith makes when

however,

Jones's utterance of

(

10 ) is not good evidence
for

the claim Smith would make were
he to say (IT).

Such results seem

incompatible with the Synonymy Thesis.
Faced with such results, one might
try to reformulate the
Synonymy
Thesis.
A natural refomulation is:
when a speaker uses a name
sentence,
he expresses the proposition he
would express were he to use the
sentence

that results when:

(i)

every name in his sentence that does not
occur in

the that-c lause of an attitude ascription
sentence embedded in his

sentence is replaced by the definite description
he associates with it;
and (ii) every other name in his sentence
is replaced by the definite

description associated with it by the subject of
the immediate attitude

ascription sentence in which it occurs.

According to this formulation of

the Synonymy Thesis, when Smith says
(11)

Jones believes that Piccadilly is very busy,

he expresses the proposition he would express were
he to say
(11

1

)

Jones believes that the-F is very busy,

where 'the— F' is the definite description Jones associates with
Piccadilly.'

Like

(

11 ),

(

11 ")

will be true.

This

formulation of the

Synonymy Thesis might seem to avoid the Attitude-Context Objection.
However,

it raises a myriad of problems.

Suppose that Smith says
(12)

Plato believed that Socrates was wise.

One problem for the second formulation of the Synonymy Thesis is raised
by the possibility that Socrates was not called 'Socrates' by Plato or

any of their contemporaries,

and that either no one was called 'Socrates'
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or that Plato used
.Socrates' as a name for

slow wlttedJ 3

If the secon(j

then in the case where no
one,

s«eo„e he yarded

.

formulat on of the Syno
not even Socrates,

^

as rather

^

y

was called 'Socrates,

Smith falls to express any
proposition by his use of

(12).

If the

Synonymy Thesis as presently
formulated Is true, then in
the case where
Plato used 'Socrates' as a name
for someone he had little
regard for.
Smith succeeds in expressing
a proposition by his use
of (12); however,
the proposition he expresses
is false.
Either result is unacceptable.
Another problem for the second
formulation of the Synonymy Thesis

involves the apparent presupposition
that there is

a

definite description

which is the definite description
to be substituted for
occurs in an attitude context.

a

name that

Suppose, for example, that Plato
really

did use 'Socrates' as a name for
Socrates.

At various times in his life

Plato probably associated a variety of
different definite descriptions
with the name -Socrates,

Furthermore,

let us assume that just once in

his life Plato was misinformed about
Socrates, and, as a result, just

once associated the name 'Socrates' with
not designate Socrates.

Now,

a

definite description that does

which of the many definite descriptions

that Plato associated with the name ’Socrates'
is the definite

description that Plato associated with the name 'Socrates'?
of course,

is that none of the many is,

strictly speaking,

The answer,
the one.

Apparently, then, we need some way of choosing one from among
the many,
and it is difficult to think of a non-arbitrar
y way of making the choice.
We could decide to regard the definite description Plato
associated with
'Socrates' in the majority of cases as "the right one."

single one of the many fills the bill.

But maybe no

Perhaps one was associated more
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than any of the others,
although not in the majority
of cases. We could
regard the most associated
as .'the right one..'
But there could be
ties
or an extremely close
second or even third.
Perhaps number of times
associated is too crude a measure,
and we should look
for the one
definite description Plato
regarded as the most significant
one.
Of

there could still be ties,
or, failing that,
third.

close second or
One could resort to Searle's
strategy (perhaps conceived
for
a

other purposes) of using the
disjunction of all associated
definite
descriptions. 1 ^ This might work in
the case of (12); however,
suppose
that, rather than (12), Smith
says
(13)

Plato believed that Socrates was

a

fool,

and that the one definite
description which Plato associated
with
’Socrates* that did not designate
Socrates designated

thought was

a

fool.

In such a case,

under the present proposal, Smith’s

use of (13) would express a true
proposition.

That seems wrong.

Finally, we might try to solve the problem
with

problem with

(13),

'Socrates'

(12),

and avoid the

by appealing to the conjunction of all
associated

definite descriptions.
assuming,

someone who Plato

This strategy would fail, however, if, as
we are

Plato just once associated

a

definite description with

that does not designate Socrates.

For then,

the conjunction

of all associated definite descriptions would not
designate anything.

Unless we can decide which of the many definite descriptions
is "the
right one," the second formulation of the Synonymy Thesis
leaves us at
loss when it comes to saying what Smith means when he uses
sentence

a

(12).

The second formulation of the Synonymy Thesis also runs into
problems

with regard to the evidence

a

speaker has for the claims he makes when he
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uses an attitude ascription
sentence whose that-clause
contains a proper
name * C ° nSlder tHe
might have for the claim
he makes when
he uses sentence (12).
First, Smith could have
evidence that Plato said
or otherwise produced a
token of something that
translates either as
'Soorates was wise- or as something
that entails that Socrates
was wise.

««*

—

he regarded as this kind of
evidence.

could have evidence from

a

Second, Smith

third party, for example Aristotle,
that Plato

believed that Socrates is wise.

We regard this as good evidence
because

we assume that it is ultimately
grounded in the first kind of evidence.

For our present purposes,

let us assume that Plato really said
or wrote

(something that translates as) -Socrates
was wise’ and that Smith has
good evidence that this is so.

Now, unless Smith knows what definite

description Plato associated with -Socrates'
when Plato said -Socrates
was wise,' and we will assume that he does
not, there is no general
proposition,

q,

such that q is expressed by a sentence of
the form -The-F

was wise- and because Smith has good evidence
that Plato said -Socrates
was wise’ Smith has good evidence that Plato
believed q.

Really, given

his evidence that Plato said -Socrates was wise," all
Smith has evidence
for is the claim that there is a general proposition,
q, such that q is

expressed by a sentence of the form -The-F was wise- and Plato
believed
q.

So, when

Smith says

(12)

Plato believed that Socrates was wise,

if he means what he would mean were he to say

(12')

Plato believed that the-F was wise

(where ’the-F’ is the definite description,

with the name ’Socrates'),

if any,

that

Plato associated

then Smith is making a claim that he is not

.
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entitled to make.

Nevertheless, when Smith uses
02) he is making

claim that his evidence entitles
him to make.

a

Apparently, then, when he

uses 02),

Smith does not express the
proposition he would express
were
he to use 02').
This shows that the second
formulation of the Synonymy
Thesis does not succeed in avoiding
all of the problems that the
first

formulation has with attitude ascription
sentences.
A final

problem with the second formulation
of the Synonymy Thesis is

generated by sentences like
(13)

Our
a

Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle believed
that Zeno was
wise

intuitions inform us that when Smith uses
sentence (13) he expresses

true proposition,

and one that attributes a common belief
to Socrates,

Plato, and Aristotle.

But, unless Socrates,

Plato, and Aristotle

associated the same definite description with
the name

'Zeno,'

the second

formulation is unable to specify the propositional
content of Smith’s use
of sentence (13).

It is

implausible that all three philosophers

associated the same definite description with the name
'Zeno,' and we

will assume that they did

not.

As an alternative to reformulating the

Synonymy Thesis still another time, let us consider the strategy
of
treating

as short

(13)

(13')

If

(13)

is

for the

following conjunction:

Socrates believed that Zeno was wise, Plato believed that
Zeno was wise, and Aristotle believed that Zeno was wise.

just a truncated

version of

(13'),

formulation of the Synonymy Thesis is true,

then,

if the second

when Smith used sentence (13)

he meant what he would mean were he to use
( 1

3

T

*

)

Socrates believed that the-F was wise, Plato believed
that the-G was wise, and Aristotle believed that the-H
was wise,

.
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where 'the-F,' 'the-G,' and
'the-H' are the
respective definite
descriptions Socrates, Plato,
and Aristotle
associated with the proper

name ’Zeno.’
This strategy carries all
the burdens of the second
formation of
the Synonymy Thesis and
has the additional
disadvantage of not preserving
our intuition that Smith’s
use of (13) expresses a
proposition that
attributes a shared belief to
Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle.
The preceding discussion
clearly indicates that the
second

formulation of the Synonymy Thesis
is no better suited to
handle attitude
ascription sentences than is the
first formulation of the
Synonymy
Thesis

Section Four

Each of the rival theories of
proper names faces serious challenges.

The Millian theory faces the problems
generated by significant, true,

identity sentences; apparent failures
of the substitutivity of

codesignating names; negative existential
sentences; and non-referring
proper names.

The description theory is confronted
by the No

Description, Wrong Description, Modal, and
Attitude-Context objections.
In this dissertation neither the No
Description Objection nor the

Wrong Description Objection receive the attention
that is given to the
Modal Objection.
Chapter

V.)

cases where,

(The Attitude-Context Objection is discussed
in

The No Description Objection purports to show that
there are

contrary to our pre-theoretic intuitions, but according to

the description theory,

no proposition is expressed by a speaker's use of
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a

name sentence.

The Wrong Description
Objection purports to show
that
there are cases where our
intuitions info™ us that
a speaker's use of a
name sentence expresses a
proposition which is not about
the object the
description theory says the
proposition he expressed is
about.
There are
a variety of strategies
that a detenmined description
theorist might
combine in an attempt to show that
these "deviant" cases-cases
where the
speaker either lacks a description
or has a wrong description-are
very
rare, so rare as to suggest
that we should consider retaining
any
apparent intuition they deviate from 16
.

In this regard,

the Modal Objection is quite
different.

It purports

to show that the description theory
is always at odds with certain
of our

pre-theoretio intuitions.

For, according to the Modal
Objection, the

description theory never correctly identifies
the (kind of) propositions
we express by our ordinary uses of name
sentences.

This holds, according

to the Modal Objection, even when the
speaker backs his use of a name by
a

correct definite description.
Another reason for giving the Modal Objection
more attention is that

attempts to rebut it have generated considerably
more literature than the
combined literature generated by attempts to rebut
either the No

Description Objection or the Wrong Description Objection.

Many

philosophers explicitly endorse some form of Michael Dummett's
defense
against the Modal Objection 16
.

In contrast, there is no single, widely

held, and clearly stated defense against either the No Description

Objection or the Wrong Description Objection.
In

Chapter II of this dissertation, defenses of the description

theory against the Modal Objection are stated, explained, and critically
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evaluated.

Considerable attention is
devoted to Du^ett's’?
defense
The conclusion is reached
that none of the various
defenses. Duett's
included, is acceptable.
.

Having considered, and
rejected, an attempt to
defend the description
theory against the Modal
Objection. „e shift our
attention to objections
to the Millian theory.
The Million theory faces
two Minds of problems.
One kind of problem facing
the Millian theory involves
the theory's
apparent mis-identification of
the propositions expressed
by uses of
certain sentences. This kind
of trouble is generated by
the problem of
significant, true, identity sentences
and by the more general
problem of
the apparent failure of the
substitute ity of coreferential n^es.
For,
according to the Millian theory of
meaning, uses of sentences
(1)

Hesperus is Hesperus

(2)

Hesperus is Phosphorus

and

express the same proposition.

Many philosophers maintain that there
is

overwhelming evidence that this is not

so.

The second kind of problem

facing the Millian theory involves the
theory’s apparent inability to

specify propositions to be the propositions
expressed by uses of certain
(7)

kinds of sentences.

This is the trouble raised by negative
existential

sentences and by sentences that contain non-referring
names.
according to the Millian theory of meaning, uses of
sentences
(5)

Pegasus does not exist,

(6)

Pegasus has wings,

and

Pegasus does not have wings,

For,
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fail to express propositions.

Many philosophers hold
that there

abundance of evidence to the
contrary.

1ls
,

an

We will concentrate
on the first

kind of problem for the
Millian theory.

Recently, Krlpke'8 po Sed

According to Kripke,

a

pu22le about belief and
proper

,

solution to his puzzle will
abed light on the

general problem of the apparent
failure of substitutiv ity of
coreferential names. The problem of
significant, true, identity

sentences is

a

species of the general problem
of the apparent failure of

substitutivity of coreferential names.

If Kripke is right,

and a

solution to his puzzle does shed light
on these problems, then his
puzzl<
is germane to our concerns.
For, if „ e discover a solution
to Kripke's
puzzle, we may thereby discover a solution
to one of the two major

problems confronting the Millian theory.
In Chapter

III Kripke's puzzle about belief
and proper names is

stated and explained.

In addition,

several proposed solutions to

Kripke's puzzle are presented and critically
evaluated.

The conclusion

is reached that none of the proposed
solutions is acceptable.
In

Chapter IV the outline of

presented.

a

solution to Kripke's puzzle is

The solution is based on a view about the connection
between

belief, linguistic behavior, and propositional content that
is suggested
by certain remarks David Lewis

1

^

makes in his corrmentary on Kripke's

puzzle.
In Chapter

V,

solutions consistent with the Millian theory are

presented to the problem of significant, true, identity sentences and to
the problem of the apparent failure of the substitutivity of

codesignating names.

They are based on the view used to solve Kripke's
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puzzle.

T he chapter ends with a
brief discussion of the
relative merits

of that view and its rival
(from Chapter IV).
To conclude this introductory
chapter,

let us consider certain
other

assumptions and restrictions that
will guide this inquiry.

will assume that there are
basically two kinds of
propositions:
singular and general. I will assume
that normal assertive
utterances
I

(or

uses) of declarative sentences
(of English) express
propositions and are
either true or false in virtue of
the truth or falsity of the

propositions they express.

I

will assume that belief is

a

2-place

relation, one that holds between
persons and propositions.
that sentences of the form

world

w)

I

will assume

r

S believes that

if and only if (at w)

f

are true (at possible

the object (actually) designated
by

'S'

stands in the belief-relation to the
proposition (actually) expressed by
I

will assume that there are possible worlds
and that

it makes

sense to talk about the truth or falsity of
propositions (and,

deriv itively,

of uses of sentences that express them)
relative to, or at,

possible worlds.

Finally,

distinct and F is

a

I

will assume that if objects

wherein

x

y

and y are

uniquely identifying set of properties such that

it is possible that x exemplifies every member
of F,

possible that

x

exemplifies every member of

exemplifies every member of

exemplifies every member of

F,

F

and

then w and

w'

F,

then,

(i)

and (ii) it is

if w is a world

is a world wherein y

w'

are distinct.

This inquiry is restricted by the following methodological principle:

accept no view that entails that there are essences and that we are

acquainted with, or express, essences when we use proper names to refer
to things.

Some philosophers, Roderick Chisholm 20 and Lewis, 21 come to
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™ind irrmediatel
1

^

y.

inter6Sted ln

Have expressed stro„
g rese

„ ations

about any suoh

ho„ mu=h of what needs
to be done In this
area

can be done without resort
to such entities.
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Notes

I

WU1

assume that there are at
least two Kinds of
propositions:
general, or qualitative,
propositions and singular, or
particular,
propositions.
I win also assunle
that slngular

^^^

general propositions do not,
have individual s-for example,
rocks, trees,
Planets, and people-as constituents.
The general/singular
distinction,
as applied to propositions,
is widely used and reasonably
clear.

I

wU1

assume that it is clear enough
for me to appeal to it in
what follows.
2

Keith Donnellan, Saul Kripke,
and Ruth Baroan Marcus,
among others,
favor the Millian theory of meaning.

^Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell,
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Peter
Strawson, John Searle, Diana Ackerman,
Roderick Chisholm, Michael
Dummett, and Alvin Plantinga, among
others, favor, or favored, the

description theory of meaning.
4

The following characterization of the
Millian theory borrows from

many other characterizations, but, most
notably,

from the one given in

Kripke (1979).
5

Like the preceding characterization of
the Millian theory of

meaning,

this characterization of the description theory
of meaning draws

on many sources.
In a

One of the clearest is that given in Kripke
(1980).

departure from terminology handed down from Russell,
with the

help of David Kaplan (1975), we shall speak of proper names
as referring
of definite descriptions as denoting

,

definite descriptions as designating.

and of both proper names and

,

0
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In this respect,

Frege's treatment differs
from the Russel lean

treatment described here.

quotation marks,

For Frege,

'exists,'

induces an oblique context.

like 'believes' and

In this regard,

Leonard

Linsky wrote:
S
ex Pli=itly deal with
the matter [ie
the matter Of
!
of negative
existential name-sentences
]
we oan “"struct the Fregean
'
account of negative
:
lan e ua 8 es which was presented
in
chanter 1
ob 1 i qu e

’

V"

n

(mVp''m
As

given in Russell

9 In
1

esasus

Kripke

In

(1

979,

^iiTit .^r.. d8 “
P

’

denotes what 13

(191 0,

„

1975).

1980).

Donnellan (1966,

1972)

Interesting reviews of some of the basic
objections to the

description theory may be found in Salmon
(1981,
(1981, p.
12

At

p.

23-32) and in Devitt

13-23).

least it is both necessarily true and true

two interpretations offered by

descriptions:

a

a

priori on one of

standard theory of definite

its so-called "small scope" reading.

It also has a "large

scope" reading which is neither necessarily
true nor true a priori.

Michael Dummett (1973,

1981) has fashioned a defense of the description

theory that exploits this fact.

That defense is considered in detail in

Chapter II.
13

in

This is suggested by

Kripke (1980,
14

.

p.

a

version of the Wrong Description Objection

68-70).

This is similar to the "cluster of descriptions" view presented in

Searle (1967).

5
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1

Two strategies come to
mind.
tention,

One,

„ hloh has reoeived
S urprlsln gly

ls briefly discussed
by Castaneda
(1979,

tries to explain wby
speakers
to specify them on demand.

*o

p.

do have backing
descriptions

155 ).

He

tunable

Another is to rely on
descriptions which

mention the name-type of the
name-token used.

This approach is
suggested
by the theory of descriptions
presented by Harrison
(1982), which is

discussed in Chapter
For example:

Noonan
17

18
19

PO
21

(1981),

and

II. and

again in Chapter III.

Leonard Linsky (1977), Brian
Loar (1981), Harold

Steven Schiffer

In

Dummett (1973,

In

Kripke (1979).

In

Lewis (1981

In

Chisholm (1981).

In Lewis (1981

).

).

1981

).

(1

977).

CHAPTER

I

I

DUMMETT 'S DEFENSE OF THE
DESCRIPTION THEORY AGAINST
THE MODAL OBJECTION

In this chapter we

will consider responses
to the Modal Objection
to
the description
theory-responses that try to
preserve sane version of

the description theory
of the meaning of proper
names.'

The greater part

of the chapter is devoted to
developing and evaluating
Dummett's 2
response; however, four other
responses are briefly considered.

Section One

Before we consider the responses
to the Modal Objection, we
review
both that part of the description
theory it purportedly refutes
and the
basic strategy behind it.
The Modal Objection purportedly
refutes the description theory of

meaning.

The description theory of the
meaning of proper names consists

of two theses.
speaker uses

a

First, there is the Backing Description
Thesis:

proper name,

when a

he associates it with a definite
description.

Second, there is the Synonymy Thesis:

when a speaker uses a sentence

that contains a proper name, he expresses
the proposition he would

express were he to use the sentence that results
when the name is

replaced by its associated definite description
everywhere it occurs in
his sentence. ^

By way of an illustration,

suppose that our speaker

associates the proper name ’Aristotle’ with the definite
description ’the
last greater philosopher of antiquity’ when he says
'Aristotle was

philosopher.'

According to the description theory,
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when he used

a

28

'Aristotle w as

a

philosopher,, he expressed
the proposition he
would have
expressed had he used 'The last
great philosopher of
antiquity was a
philosopher .
'

The various versions of the
Modal Objection typically
involve such
modal properties as:
being true at w, being false
at w, being

—

SSarUy-

world).

—

’

and

^

£22iibly true (where „ is

a

specific possible

The strategy is to show, by
appeal to our pre-theoretic

intuitions, that the name sentence
under consideration and the

description sentence it is allegedly
synonymous with do not share all
of
the same modal properties.
It is reasonable to hold
that two sentences
are synonymous only if they share
all of the same modal properties.

Thus,

if the name sentence and its
associated description sentence do
not

share all of the same modal properties,
they are not synonymous.
By way of illustration, let w,
be a possible world where both

Aristotle and Plato exist; where Plato was
the last great philosopher of
antiquity; and where Aristotle was not a
philosopher.

It is reasonable

to maintain that as we use them 'Aristotle
was a philosopher' is false at
W
1

and 'the last great philosopher of antiquity
was a philosopher' is

true at w,.

So it follows that 'Aristotle was a philosopher'
is not

synonymous with ’The last great philosopher of antiquity
was

a

philosopher,' even when the person using the former associates
'Aristotle' with 'the

last great philosopher of antiquity.' 4
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Section Two

There are several ways to
respond to the Modal
Objection that do not
require the respondent to abandon
the description theory
of meaning.
One way is to deny that
'Aristotle was a philosopher'
and 'The last
great philosopher of antiquity was
a philosopher' do not
share all of the
same modal properties. -Since 'The
last great philosopher of
antiquity

was

a

philosopher’ is true at w,,

maintain that 'Aristotle was

a

this response requires its
proponent to

philosopher’ is true at w,.

Part of

Dummett's response to the Modal Objection
includes this response.

However, Dummett does not maintain that
this reply is generally

applicable.

He seems to hold that it works only
for certain names and

their associated definite descriptions; the
balance of what he says

suggests that he regards such name-description
pairs as rare exceptions.
To say that they are the rule, rather than
the exception, flies in the

face of contemporary philosophical opinion and
wide-spread,

intuitions.

pre-theoretic

Therefore, although we shall consider it in more detail
when

we take up Dummett's response, until then, we will
assume that this

response is unacceptable.
A second way to respond is to maintain that speakers
do not associate

proper names with definite descriptions (which express properties)
that

involve (the properties expressed
they use when they use names.

by)

the predicates of the sentences

According to this response,

the preceding

version of the Modal Objection rests on the faulty assumption that our
speaker associated ’Aristotle' with 'the last great philosopher of
antiquity' when he said

'Aristotle was

a

philosopher.'

Necessarily,

.
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something is the last great
philosopher of antiquity
o„l y if it is
philosopher.
According to

a

this response, when
he said 'Aristotle
was a
Philosopher, our speaker must
have associated 'Aristotle'
with s^e

other definite description.

Such a definite description
as 'the founder

Of the Lyceum' might fill
the bill.
There are at least two major
problems with this response.
One is
that many people, philosophers
in particular, associate
'Aristotle' with

definite descriptions that are
necessarily satisfied by an
object only if
the object is a philosopher.
When we introduce Aristotle
to our
students,
It is

we are prone to say things
like 'Aristotle was a
philosopher.

difficult to reconcile this response
with our own behavior.

A

second problem is that it is easy
to imagine cases where the
response's
restriction is almost certainly
violated. We introduce Aristotle
to our

students by saying 'Aristotle was the
last great philosopher of

antiquity.

Later that day one of them tells

saying 'Aristotle was

a

philosopher.

student associating -Aristotle' with

a

friend about Aristotle,

It is difficult to imagine the
a

definite description that is not

necessarily satisfied by an object only if
the object is

a

philosopher—

especially when our student is ignorant of how
careful he must be
order to avoid the Modal Objection.

in

We will assume that this response is

untenable
The three responses that remain are all (either)
stated (or discussed
in the

literature) in terms of the technical notion of rigid
designation

Before we consider these responses,
it will be to our advantage to see
what rigid designation comes to.

.
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The expression .'rigid
designator" was introduced
into the
contemporary philosophical
lexicon byy Kripke
pRe
In M
Naming and Necess ity
(1980a), Kripke said:
•

*

1

possible world

i t°

design
g a

^sig^

Later

if

tL^T^sa^^T^

if in every

Uat^^ ttfcL?

°P

Kripke (1980a) wrote:

*

Although the idea is now a
familiar one I U in1 Slve
a
brief restatement of the
idea of rip-in a
““
intuition about names that
underlies it.
Consider:
•

,

(D

^

’

.

Aristotle was fond of dogs.

f

s

rs::e re\;-\sTt

-^-

such that, as a matter of fact,
(1) is true if and onlv i f h P
was fond of dogs.
The thesis of rigid designation
is Jimp 1 ^points aside that the same
paradigm applies to the
(1 >
lk d
count erf actual
I?
situations.
That is, (1) truly describes a
counterfactual
a
° nly if thS aforemen tioned man
would have been
?onH
ond or°a
of dogs, had that situation obtained.
(Forget the
counterfactu 31 situations where he would
not have existed.)

“

—ibes

^

Kripke gives us two accounts of rigidity.
a

term,

'd,'

rigidly designates an object,

(actually) designates

then

*d»

object,

y,

w,

designates
if

»

d»

x;

x

if and only if (i)
'0(

),' '0(d)'

and only if at w

x

f

d*

if and only if (i)

for any possible world, w,

if

x

»d'

exists at

at w; and (iii) for any possible world,
w, and

designates

rigidity goes like this:

form,

(ii)

x,

The first goes as follows:

a

y at w,

term,

f

d

then
,»

y is x.

The second account of

rigidly designates an object,

(actually) designates

x;

and

(ii)

for

is true at a possible world, w, where

has the property

being

a y

x

x,

any sentence

exists if

such that 0(y)

.

Kripke
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regards these two accounts
as (at least extensional
1 y) equivalent; so
shall we.
T»o t hl „ gs about these
accounts are worth noting.

First, neither
that a singular term is
a rigid designator
only if lt is a proper
name.
For all these accounts
say. demonstratives
and indexicals might
be
rigid designators.
Furthermore, according to
these accounts, certain

entans

definite descriptions (provided
they designate) are rigid
designators.
Provided there is a number two.
the definite description
'the even prime
number*

is

a

rigid designator.

A second thing to notice
about the above accounts is
that, when we

talk about what a singular term
designates (or the truth-value
of a
sentence) at a world, we do not
mean to be talking about the
designatum
of the term (or the truth-value
of the
sentence) as it is used by that

world's inhabitants.

Instead, we are talking about
the designatum of the

term (or the truth-value of the
sentence) as we use it to designate
an
object in (or make an assertion about)
that world.
When we want to talk
about the designatum of a term (or the
truth-value of a sentence) at a

world, as used by that world's inhabitants,
we will say so explicitly.

Knpke tells

us that proper names are, but that most
(if not all) of

the definite descriptions their users
associate with them are not, rigid

designators.

'Aristotle was

w 1> Arlst °tle is not

antiquity was

a

a

a

philosopher' is false at w, because,

philosopher.

at

'The last great philosopher of

philosopher’ is true at w, because at w, the last great

philosopher of antiquity, namely Plato, is

a

philosopher.

Kripke would

say that 'Aristotle was a philosopher' and 'The last
great philosopher of

antiquity was

a

philosopher' fail to have all the same modal properties

:
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because the singular

tern,

that occurs in the
former is. whereas
the

Singuiar ter m that occurs
in the Utter is
not.

a rlgid designator
.
of the three remaining
responses to the Modal
Objection focuses
on a class of definite
descriptions which-the
respondent seems to
think derive their rigidity
from the names they are
associated with
because they make reference
to. or are about,
those names. This response
is the basis for a version
of the description theory
recently proposed by
Bernard Harrison (1982) in his
article "Description and
Identification."
e

According to Harrison, one
advantage of his version of
the
description theory, over rival
versions of the description
theory, is
that his, unlike its rivals,
accommodates the intuition that
proper names
are rigid designators.

This, he claims,

is because this theory
restricts

the definite descriptions that
a speaker may associate
with the names the
speaker uses to a class of rigid
definite descriptions. Harrison
calls

members of this special class of
definite descriptions "referentiallyidentifying descriptions." 5

To evaluate Harrison's claim,

consider one such description and show
that it is not

designator

a

I

will

rigid

^
.

According to Harrison, the following definite
description, his

favorite example of

a

referential ly-identifying description, is

a

rigid

designator
D:

[The] woman whose name S saw inscribed in the
register.

Harrison sets D codesignative with the proper name
'Pamela Andrews';
'Pamela Andrews' is the name S saw inscribed in the
register.
the person D designates.
(1)

Let a be

We will consider the following sentences:

Pamela Andrews is from Bristol,

.
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and
<2>

0 36 " ame S Sa “ inS
= ribed

frLTristol

Because 'Pamela Andrews'
rigidly designates

world Where

a

exists Just in case, in such

If D rigidly designates
a,

l"

.

a,

a

th. register is

sentence (1) is true at
a

world, a is from Bristol.

then sentence (2) is true
at

exists just in case, in such

a

a

world where

a

world, a is from Bristol.

In specifying possible
worlds w

2,

w

3,

and

w„

we will assume that a

realllis, but that Ackerman, Anscombe,
and Marcus really are

not,

from

Bristol
W

2 is a

possible world like the actual world
except that

in w

2 S

looks at a different register,
one bearing the name -Diana
Ackerman' at
the place where the register S
in fact looked at bears the
name 'Pamela
Andrews.'

In w ,
2

as in the actual world,

designates Diana Ackerman.

the name 'Diana

Ackerman’

Sentence (2) is false at w
2 ; sentence

(1) is

true at
W

3

is a possible world like the actual
world except that in w^ the

name S sees on the register is ’Elizabeth
Anscombe,’ it having been

entered on the register at the place where S
actually saw the name
’Pamela Andrews.’

In W3,

as in the actual world,

Anscombe’ designates Elizabeth Anscombe.

Sentence

the name ’Elizabeth
(2)

is not

true in w
3

sentence
w

4

(1) is
a

true at W3.

possible world like the actual world except that the

inhabitants of w^ use the name ’Pamela Andrews’ as
Marcus.

;

a

name for Ruth Barcan

(The claim that proper names are rigid designators in no way

entails that the name ’Pamela Andrews' could not have been given to Ruth
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Barcan Marcus.)

Sentence

(2)

is not true at w
4;

sentence

( 1 )

w4 .

is

true at

We have examples to
support the contention
that Harrison’s

referentially-identifying description,
0 , is not a rlgld
deslgnator
the passage that foliows,
Harrison explains why
he takes D to be
rigid:
.

register"

1

th^t IT n"

.

element" ?f direct d

^

lnSCribed] in the

6 60 ^
possib le wor
Icis^^The^ame^in^th^registe^eithe^h^^^^
either has a bearer
^
or it does not: but if iild
1
other, is the indiv idual
“2
the"
rl
'
plcks out
in all possible worlds.
Of course
seen a
different name in the register- hut in
!

S
<

simply pick out

(Harrison,

^ ££ “

'

^

a

1982,

different [person],
pp.

322-323)

e

0"

uaily rigidly.
rTg^y

Harrison makes two major claims
in the preceding passage.

claim is that

D is free of

elements capable of characterizing
different

individuals in different possible
worlds.
described three worlds where D
picks out
it

in fact picks out.

The first

Against this claim,
a

I

have

different woman from the woman

This is possible because D is
capable of the same

variations as
O':

D

'

The woman who is named by the
token S saw inscribed in the
register S looked at.

contains no fewer th an three elements
capable of the sort of variation

Harrison says D is free of; they are:

'the register

token S saw inscribed in the register
S looked

at,'

S

looked at,- -the

and -the woman who is

named by the token S saw inscribed in the
register S looked
Harrison's first claim exhibits

a

at.'

simple technical misunderstanding of

definite descriptions.
The second of the two major claims made in the
above passage is that
in a world where S saw a different name in
the register,

D would rigidly
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Pl0k ° Ut
e

3

diff6rent U

“ an

d ° lal " °° mmitS

-

“3 iS »”*> «

-H,

t0

-

not

f

E11Zabeth
a

rigid designator.

^dly

Harrison's

^ ^^ ^^

; ;;
different
woman. namely Elizabeth
Anseombe.
“3 D

w

therefore,

3 »

designates

a

Qf

tn., moreover,

However, the claim thaf
that

it

that D

u

m
•

w
rigidly designates
3
Elizabeth Anseombe is both
false and no help to
Harrison.
The claim is no help
to Harrison because,
even if true, it would
establish only that D has
this property: being
possibly rigid, whe reas
Harrison means to show that
D is rigid; that is,
D has this property
being rigid.
The two properties are
distinct and the former
does
not

entail the latter.
The claim U.e„
is false:

when

rigid in W3.

I

I

that in «

3

specified W3,

D

rigidly designates Elizabeth
Anseombe)

I

neither said nor implied that
D is

neither said nor implied that

actually has (i.e„

bei^

n on-rigi d)

actually lacks <i.e„ being rigid).
possible world exactly like W

3

D

"loses" a property it

or that it "acquires" a
property it

Of course, one could specify
as

except that D is rigid; however,
this

would merely serve to show that D
is possibly rigid.

claim reveals

a

Harrison's second

philosophical misunderstanding.

We may conclude that D is not
a rigid designator.

Similar reasoning

will show that none of the
referentially-identifying descriptions
Harrison uses to illustrate his theory
is
A fourth response to Modal

a

rigid designator.

Objection is exhibited by the theory of

proper names proposed by Alvin Plantings
(1978) in his article "The

Boethian Compromise."

Therein,

Plantinga proposed that we restrict the

definite descriptions speakers associate with
proper names to definite

37

descriptions that are rigid
designators.

(This view is not
Harrison’s
Harrison proposes that we
restrict the associated
definite descriptions
to referential I _identifying
y
descriptions; then he
claims that
referential ^-identifying
descriptions are rigid
designators. Plantings
proposes that we restrict the
associated definite
descriptions to
definite descriptions that are

rigid designators.)

To see how this response
is supposed to work,

let us suppose that

-d-

is a definite description
that rigidly designates
Aristotle; and that,

when our speaker says -Aristotle
was a philosopher.' he
associates

Aristotle

with

-d.'

According to the description
theory,

use of -Aristotle was a
philosopher' is synonymous with

philosopher.-

Since

-d-

rigidly designates Aristotle,

-d

-d

our

speaker’s

was a

was a

philosopher’ is true at world w, if and
only if at w, Aristotle is

philosopher.

Like -Aristotle was a philosopher,’

is false at w,.

-d

a

was a philosopher-

So this response apparently avoids
one version of the

Modal Objection.
Plantinga’s view is really much more
elaborate than the preceding

discussion suggests.

However, because we are going to rule
this response

unacceptable, we will not digress to explain
its added complexities.

We

avoid further discussion of this response for
two reasons.
First,

response.
and

there are strong, apparently decisive, objections
to this
These have been stated in recent articles by Diana
Ackerman 7

David Austin

8
,

and in a talk by Kripke 9
.

These objections pose

serious difficulties to any theory similar to Plantinga’s.
Second, the claim that speakers associate proper names with
definite

descriptions that are rigid designators apparently commits us to the view
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th

"

(there are

proper names.

and> We

w lth

when He use

Un essence

is th. sort of
property that would
be
expressed by a rigid dpfim't-o
s
aeiinite description.
Wherp
wnere xvie
is an object and
F is
a property, F is
an essence of x if end
on ly if necessariiy,
if x exists
,
then x has F: and
auu necessarily,
neces^ari 1 u rfor any
fu
if
y,’
v haa
has pF » the " y is X.)
y
,

n

,

phi iosophers,

.

Some

Chishoim- and Lewis" are
exampies, have express.
doub ts

about the plausibility of

a

theory that carries such
a

comment.

We

are i„tereste d in seeing
whether or not the d escri
P tion theory can be
way that does not commit
us to the view that
(there are
essences and) we are acquainted
with essences when we
use proper names.
We are now in a position
to state the central
question we are
considering in this chapter,
it

is:

Short of requiring that speake
rs use proper names only
when
they associate them with
definite d escriptions that are
rigid
designators, is there an acceptable
response to the Modal
Objection?
One response has not yet been
considered.

It

is

Dummett’s.

That

response is the topic of the balance
of this chapter.

Section Three

We will consider issues raised in

dialogue.

a

contemporary philosophical

The dialogue’s major participants are
Kripke and Dummett;

Leonard Linsky plays a noteworthy
supporting role.
The underlying issue of the dialogue
is whether or not Frege and

Russell were correct in their analyses of the
meanings of ordinary proper
names.

The primary focus of the dialogue is the claim
that proper names

are synonymous with the definite descriptions
their users associate with

"*

-b>

»

61r a3S0 ° lated d8finlte
d

tanSHlge (Dummett,

—

-“* *“

—

^«ons.

.........
... ...

In Frege:

^
„„„
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~

P hll0S0Dhv

Dummett argued
sued that Krim,
Kripke's arguments
do not
establish Krlpke's conclusion:
In Names and n
Descriptions (Linsky,
1976),
Linsky offered arguments
strikingly similar to
Dummett'sJ2 i„ hls
preface
Nanung .and N^essi^,
Kripke replied to Du.ett.
kecentiy, ln
Interpretation of Freg£s Philosophy
(Dummett, 1981), Dummett
replied
to Kripke's reply.
1973),

,

~

1

Will state and explain the
major arguments and
counter-arguments

that structure this dialogue.

I

win

ar g ue that

Duett's defense of

the

claim that proper names are
synonymous with their associated
definite
descriptions is unacceptable both
because it fails to preserve
our

intuitions about sentences that
contain proper names and because
it runs
into special problems with
negative existential sentences,
non-referring
proper names, and belief ascription
sentences.

Initially, we limit the scope of
our inquiry by restricting
ourselves
to just those cases-real or
imagined-where speakers who use the
proper
name 'Aristotle' associate it with
the definite description 'the
last
great philosopher of antiquity.'
We will consider the thesis
that the
proper name 'Aristotle' is synonymous
with the definite description 'the
last great philosopher of antiquity.'
Our first argument against this
thesis is similar to arguments Kripke
gives in Naming and Necessity .
If 'Aristotle' is synonymous with
'the

last great philosopher of

antiquity/ sentence
(3)

Necessarily,
philosopher

if Aristotle existed, then Aristotle was a

y
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is synonymous with
sentence

»>»
philosopher.

a

Sentence

r. -

Philosopher of antiquity
was

§

seems false.

(3)

After all, Aristotle
could have existed and
«ied in early childhood,
havin g never ta.en up
philosophy. Sentence (A)
13 OPSn t0 tU° n ° n - eqUlVa
lent interpretations. It
contains a definite
description, and definite
descriptions induce
scope-ambiguities.
The two

non-equivalent interpretations of
sentence

are formally represented

(4)

by

(V)

- (CixGx]:

(y=x )—

Ey

[ixGx]:

Px

)

and
(4

n)

[

ixGx

MEy

] :

(Where

’L’

later,

is a typographical

a

Px).

’Gx’

variant of

interpretation of

(4);

scope interpretation of
and

(3)

it

(4’)

’«.’

(4);

(4”)

it is false.

is synonymous with (4),
(4).

unlike

does not have

However, unlike
a

and 'M,' which appears

formally represents

’Px’

’x

is a

-x

ii

last great

formally represents the narrow-scope

is true.

ambiguous than
(3)

’a,'

formally represents

philosopher of antiquity.’)

(4),

—

is a typographical variant
of

philosopher’ and

correct,

(y=x)

(4),

formally represents the wideIf the Synonymy Thesis is

then
(3)

(3)

is

should be no less

unambiguously false;

true interpretation.

Therefore,

the

Synonymy Thesis is false.
Dummett and Linsky have responded to the above sort
of argument.
Their responses are very similar, and we will treat them
as
response.

^

The response has two parts.

a

single

We turn now to the first part.

)
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Against Kripke,

Dummett and Linsky
maintain that, even if
the
preceding argument were
successfui in re f u ng
the thesls
•Aristotle, is synonyms
with -the last great
philosopher of antiquity
there are similar theses
about pro^r names and
their associated
definite
descriptions for which similar
arguments fail.
fail
p
For
example, Dummett and
Linsky claim that the thesis
unesis that
Fhatn
Samt Anne’
is synonymous with
’the
mother of Mary' is not refuted
by such an argument.

^

«

.

.

.

To see why Dummett and
Linsky think this is so,
consider
<5>

arily

*

mother

^

Salnt Anne eXisted

-

«<•" Saint Anne was a

and
(6)

Necessarily, if the mother of
MarvY existedd
of Mary was a mother.

An argument similar to the
one above,

’

then the
the "other

but designed to refute the
thesis

that -Saint Anne' is synonymous
with -the mother of Mary,'
would depend
upon the claim that (5) is, but
(6) is not, unambiguously false.
Dummett
and Linsky agree that

(6)

is not unambiguously false
and also that (5)

has a false interpretation.

true interpretation.

However, both maintain that

According to Dummett and Linsky,

two non-equivalent interpretations.

(5)

(5),

also has a
like

(6),

has

Thus we find Dummett claiming:

there is . . .an equally clear sense in
which we might
rightly say, ’Saint Anne cannot but have been
a parent
’

(Dummett,

1973,

p.

113)

Similarly, Linsky writes:
Consider the statement, ’It is necessary that Saint
Anne is
mother’ (more colloquially, ’Saint Anne could not
but be a
mother’).
It is certainly true in one sense.
(Linsky, 1977,
a

p.

55

If IXimmett and Linsky are right about this, then
we are not yet entitled

'
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to conclude that 'Saint
Anne' Is not synonymous
with 'the mother
of Mary.
We will consider two replies
to this part of the
response to our

original argument.
is ambiguous,

it

to deny that

The replies are:

Is not

has

(5)

first, to argue that,

ambiguous In the "same way"
as

(6

);

need to explain what Is meant by
saying that
(

(6)

Is a scope-ambiguity.

(6 )

interpretations of
6 ')

second,

(

First, we

is not ambiguous In the

5)

affects the Issue at hand.

All parties to this dispute agree that

(

5)

Second, we need to explain how
(5>'s not being

6 ).

ambiguous in the same way as

ambiguity in

and,

(

true interpretation.

a

If we adopt the first reply,
we need to do two things.

same was as

even if

(

(

6

)

is ambiguous and that the

The non-equivalent

are formally represented by

6)

L([ixMx]:

Ey

(y=x) -*

[ixMx]:

M

1x

)

and
(

6

")

[ixMx]

(Where *Mx» represents
a

mother.')

(

6 '),

(

6 ),

is true;

(

6 ),

is false.

(

L(Ey (y=x)

:

’x

M-,

).

is a mother of Mary’ and *M

»

1x

’x

is

which represents the narrow-scope interpretation
of

6 "),

which represents the wide-scope interpretation of

Dummett and Linsky aver that

(5),

like

equivalent interpretations and that the ambiguity in
of the (alleged) fact that proper names,

(

(

5)

They recommend
L([s]:

(Ey

(y=s)

—Ms]:

6 ),

has two non-

is a consequence

like definite descriptions,

induce scope-ambiguities.

(5')

represents

M

ls

)

to represent the narrow-scope interpretation of

(5),

and

v

c
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(5”)

[s]:

L(Ey (y =3 )

m

1s

)

to represent the
wide-scope interpretation
of

(

5

).

To say that (5) is
not ambiguous in the
same way as

that

(

^

5 .)

of

<5">

represent legltlmate>

ambiguity in

(5)

is

a

(

6

6 , is

to deny

non _ equlv ale „ t
lnterpretatlons

legitimate in the same way
that

non equivalent
interpretations of

(

(

6

and

',

C

6 ")

are legitimate

1-0
that is,
tnat
is
to adeny that the

):'

scope-ambiguity.

Certain passages of Naming
and Necessity could
be taken to suggest
npke holds that, in addition to
the metaphysical, or
logical,
sense of ’necessarily,*
there is an epistemic
sense of 'necessarily.*™
Citing this semantic ambiguity,
Kripke could hold that
(5 )
is true only
if the occurrence of
’necessarily* therein is taken
to express an
^P^ ^^

m od 3 1 it v.
3n d false if*
y, and
if rnot.

i

Kripke could then offer
sentence
•

*

(5"')

It is ajirlori that if
Saint Anne existed, then ^amt
Saint
Anne was a mother

as a true interpretation of
(5).

He could then maintain that,

restrict ourselves to interpretations
of

expresses an alethic modality,
one,

but

(

6)

(

Anne'

5 ) has

(

is

(6 )

(6 )

when we

where 'necessarily'

just one interpretation, a false

One could argue

to the denial of the thesis
that

synonymous with ’the mother of Mary.'

The argument would go as follows.

When we restrict ourselves to just

the alethic sense of ’necessarily,’
sentence

However,

and

5)

has two non-equivalent
interpretations.

from this difference in (5) and
'Saint

i

it is not the case that,

(

5)

is unambiguously

false.

when we restrict ourselves to just the

alethic sense of ’necessarily,’ sentence

(

6)

is unambiguously false.

when we restrict ourselves to just the
alethic sense of 'necessarily,'

sentence

(5)

is,

but sentence

(

6)

is not,

unambiguously false,

then

If,
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ence

(5)

^

i. not synonymous
with sentence
(6).

Flnally , because
atnt Anne- is synonymous
with -the mother or
Mary. 0 n ly if
sentence (5,
lS Syn0ny”° US Wlth
SenUnCe <6> ’
-o-l-e that .saint Anneis not
synonymous with -the mother
of Mary.'

“

This is the first way
for Kripke to repiy
to Dummett and L i„
5 ky.
us now consider the
second

Ut

way.

Kripke can always reject
the claim that
interpretation.

He could maintain
that,

unambiguously false.
original argument,

(5) has a true

strictly speaking.

(5)

is

He would then be free
to give an argument,
like our

against the thesis that
-Saint Anne' is synonymous

with ’the mother of Mary.’
An obvious problem for
this reply is that it
conflicts with the

sincere testimony of Duiett
and Linsky that, as they
understand (5). it
has a true interpretation.
If Kripke were to reply
i„ this way. he would
have to explain why some
philosophers mistakenly claim that
(5) has a
true interpretation.
Such an explanation can be
given in terms of (5"’).

Kripke could
maintain that philosophers who.
like Dummett and Linsky. say
that there
is a sense in which (5) is
true, do so because they have
confused it with
(5

).

If (5"’) is true, it would be
quite natural for one who

confused

(5)

with (5'") to say that

(5) is true.

We should pause to note that the
two replies, though similar, are
distinct.

Both

involve sentence

as a true interpretation of
the second reply,

(5)

(5),

(5'").

The

first

reply regards

the second reply does not.

does not have

a

(5"')

According to

true interpretation and those who

think it does do so because they mistake
it for

(5’").

The second reply

1
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would permit us to argue
that -Saint Annenne and
not synonymous,
'the

nthk e

mother of Mary’ are
in the very
wav that we
y same way
argued that -Aristotleand

last great philosopher
of antiquity- are not
synonymous.

reply would not.

The first
It would require us
to argue that when
we restrict

ourselves to the alethio
sense of -necessarily,'
unambiguously false.
<

6>

This,

are not synonymous;

’Saint

Anne’

is

and,

in turn,

(5),

but not

(6)

allows us to conclude
that

therefore,

is

,5, and

that it is not the case
that

synonymous with ’the mother
of Mary.’

Dummett and Linsky anticipate
that Kripke will adopt
the second of
the two replies above.
Let us see what they have
to say against it.
Linsky writes:
If a similar account
can be given of the
tne oamt Anne and
Homer casp^ ’ ho r-;
Li.e., v
Kripke] will have protected
..
his main
thesis about proper names against
the threatened
counterexamples.
I wish to emphasize
the condition expressed in
1 *1
11
doubt
•

-

-\

.

KST

*

-

This is all Linsky has to say
against the second reply.

He is doubtful

that Kripke can give an adequate
account of this epistemic sense of
-necessarily.'

However, Linsky does nothing more than
express his

doubts; he gives no argument to persuade
us to share them.

Let us turn

to Dummett.
Dummett attacks the second reply in the
following passages:
Kripke
.
wants to give an entirely different
explanation of the phenomena when it relates to
proper names.
In this case, he acknowledges no role
for the notion of scope:
and so he explains the ambiguity by saying
that we are
concerned, under the two interpretations, with
different modal
notions, different kinds of possibility.
(Dummett, 1973,
.

p.

.

115)

... we have one and the same phenomenon occurring both
proper names and definite descriptions. ...
In the case
of definite descriptions, Kripke explains the phenomenon
in
for
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terms of the notion
of scoDe
Fnr*
names
hand, he considers
0n the oth er
the notion of
lna PP lic *>le. and
therefore invokes a
distinction^ b W en tW
° kinds of
possibility.
(Dummett! 1 973'
n6)
p

L

^

’

kT*

.

Dummett apparently holds
that the second reply
vlolate3

methOdOlOgl0al " aXl " S be y0 „ d necessity.15

related

»™t. multiplying

THe firSt

^

The second raaxim

^^

g

Phenomenon receive a single
kind of explanation.
The second reply does
not violate the first
maxim

multiply ambiguities beyond
necessity.
ambiguity in
proper names.

:

ambiguities

it does not

Dummett would explain
the alleged

in terms of scope-ambiguities
allegedly induced by
So, he exnlaind
D
n
Plains fh
the

(5)

alleged ambiguity in

(5)

an ambiguity already
required to explain other
phen^ena.

in

terms of

If the second

reply postulates an ambiguity,
where on is not already
required, then
multiplies ambiguities. If it
multiplies ambiguities to explain

it

something already adequately
accounted for in terms of some
antecedently
available device, then it multiplies
ambiguities beyond necessity.
However, the second reply explains
the alleged ambiguity in
(5) in terms
of the already available distinction
between kinds of necessity.
The
second reply does not multiply
ambiguities; therefore, it does not

multiply ambiguities beyond necessity.
the first maxim.

The second reply does not violate

Furthermore, unless we are certain
that Dummett's

explanation is correct, and this is by no
means obvious, we cannot be
certain that this is not a place where,
if we did multiply ambiguities,
we would be multiplying them beyond
necessity.
It

maxim.

is by no means clear that the second
reply violates the second
It

is by no means clear that the second reply
ignores the

recommendation that

a

single kind of phenomenon receive

a

single kind of
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“

*

»• -“*•“>

-

«>

-.

.......

...

>1M

of phenomenon.
If

in

(5)

(5)

and

is a m blguous.
(6)

Nevertheless,

wMoh

the ambiguuies

are examples of the
e same kinH
u
kind of phenomenon:

cases of ambiguity.
(7)

then there ls a sense
ln

both are

But so are (6) and

Jones is going to the bank.

there is

a

clear sense in which

examples of the same kind of
phenomenon.
scope-ambiguity,

a

and

(7)

are not

The ambiguity in

kind of "syntactic ambiguity."

because it contains a word,

(7 )

is

(6)

is a

ambiguous

namely 'bank., which has more
than one sense;

the ambiguity in (7) is a
"semantic ambiguity."

that the alleged ambiguity in

semantic ambiguity,

(6)

(5)

Until we are certain

is a syntactic ambiguity,

we cannot say for certain
that (5) and

rather than a
(6)

are

examples of the same kind of phenomenon,
in the sense of -same kind
of
phenomenon- intended in the second
maxim.
If Dummett assumes that
(5)

and

(6)

sense,

are examples of the same kind of
phenomenon,

in the intended

then he has begged the question against
the second reply.

Let us summarize our findings regarding
the first part of the

response Dummett and Linsky give to our
original argument.

They claim

that a similar argument fails to refute
the thesis that ’Saint Anne’ is

synonymous with ’the mother of Mary.’
(5)

They say that this is because

Necessarily, if Saint Anne existed, then Saint Anne
was
mother

is not unambiguously false.

a

We formulated two replies to this response.

The first reply is that, although

(5)

has a true interpretation given by
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<5,,,)

lf Salnt *““•

when we restrict ourselves
to interpretations
of
IS taken to express
an alethic modality,
(5) is

then Saint

(

5 ) where -necessarily.

unanimously

second reply is that

no

that those

5

false.

The

is,

strictly speaking,
unambiguously false, and
think it has a true
interpretation do
(

)

so because they

confuse it with (5-,.

We considered two
objections to this reply
and

found neither very compelling.
for the alleged ambiguity
in

We are left with two rival
explanations

( 5 ).

So far,

nothing has been said to

suggest that one is better than
the other.

Even if this part of the
response were successful, it
would not
undermine the original argument
against the synonymy of -Aristotleand
'the last great philosopher
of antiquity.' It is designed
to demonstrate
that such an argument cannot be
generalised to show that proper

names are

never synonymous with definite
descriptions.

Indeed, there may be a

class of proper names which are
synonymous with their associated
definite
descriptions.
Dummett offers one in -Saint
Anne';

offers

a

Odjrssey').

Linsky concurs and

second in -Homer' (and -the author of
the Iliad and the

This meager supply can be of little
consolation to anyone who

claims that proper names are always synonymous
with their associated
definite descriptions.

Let us consider the second part of the
response

to our original argument.

Recall the original argument.
(3)

Sentence

Necessarily, if Aristotle existed, then Aristotle was
philoso pher

is unambiguously false, sentence

a

.
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phlloso P her of
of antiquity was

antiquit y^then
a philosopher

great’ll
P l]oso
o'* Pher

is not.

Therefore, contrary to the
thesis that
at ’Aristotle
Ar istotle* is
synonymous
With 'the last great philosopher
of antiquity,' ( 3 ) and
», are not
synonymous
•

Dummett and Linsky note that

(4”)

[ixGx]:

•

L (Ey (y=x)

—>

p x ),

which represents the wide-scope
interpretation of

unambiguously false.
Synonymy Thesis.

(«),

is,

like

(

3 ),

With this in mind, they modify
the original

The original Synonymy Thesis
is that a speaker who uses

'tiWV expresses the proposition
he would express were he to
use

’iSCd/NV

name

where

is

the definite description he
associates with the

The modified Synonymy Thesis is
that when such a speaker uses

'N.'

’0(N),’

-d-

he expresses the proposition he
would express were he to use

’p(d/N),’ Where ’0(d/N)' is interpreted
so that

'd'

the scope of any modal operator in
16
’0(d/N).’

Let us see how our

does not fall within

original argument fares against the modified
Synonymy Thesis.
Unlike the original Synonymy Thesis, the
modified Synonymy Thesis
does not entail that

(3)

and

Synonymy Thesis entails that

(4)

are synonymous.

(3)

and the interpretation of (4) formally

represented by (4”) are synonymous.

Instead the modified

Our original

argument depended on

the claim that (3), unlike the sentence it was said
to by synonymous
with,

is unambiguously false.

an argument will

Because (4") is unambiguously false, such

fail against the modified Synonymy Thesis.

Note that, in modifying the original thesis,

conceded

a

point to Kripke.

Durronett

and Linsky have

They have conceded that the original
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argument refutes the
orlgi„ al Synonymy
Thesis.
.towevcr. the modlfled
Synonymy Thesis preserves
much of what some
fi„a attractive
about the
original thesis: through
the meanings of
certain sentences in
which they
occur, the meanings of
proper names are accounts
for in terms of
the
meanings of their associated
definite descriptions.
This concludes the first
round of the dialogue
between Kri pke and
Durrmett.

Section F our

Kripke initiates the second
round of hi s dialogue with
Dummett in his
preface to Naming and Necessity
Therein
Kripke writes:
.

It has been asserted
that my own view itself rpHnnnc

4-

context of any sentence,
should be
read with a i a v. 8n£1
f
0Pe lncludi "g all modal operators.
This
1
latter
idea is particularly wide
of the mark* in tcrm^
3
logic, it represents a technical
*
error
[(8)] and KQVl
[stated below] are simple sentences.
Neithe^ contains modal or
other operators, so there is no
room for any scope distinctions
e 0
l
abOUt
int:rpr
interpretation
et a«iro
off°th
these sentences.
Yet the issue of rigid itv
makes sense as applied to both.
My view is that ’Aristotle*
in
P1 1 *
U
the last great philosopher
of antiquity’ in
r (n \ I
f
9
not *
No hypothesis about scope
conventions for modal
!
contexts expresses this view; it is
a doctrine about the truthconditions, with respect to counterfactual
situations, of (the
propositions expressed by) all sentences,
including simple

^

.

.

T

m

^

.

sentences.

°

-

This shows that the view that reduces
rigidity to scope in
the manner stated is simply in error.
(Kripke, 1 980a,
1112

pp.

)

The argument from Kripke's Preface
involves the truth-values of

sentences
(8)

Aristotle was fond of dogs

8
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and

The last great philosopher
of antiquity was
fond of dogs
relative to the possihle
world, w„ partially
specified as follows:
at
°tle and Plato exist Aristotle
1
did not go into
philosophy,
Plato was antiquity's last
great philosopher, Aristotle
was not fond of
dogs, and Plato was fond
of dogs. '7 Sentence
(8) is false at w„
slnoe
Aristotle is not fond of- dogs at
Sentence (9) is true at w
r If the
modified Synonymy Thesis were
true, then (8) would be
synonymous with
(9).
If (8) were synonymous with
(9), then (8) and (9) would be
(9)

*

’

logically equivalent.

If (8) and

(9)

were logically equivalent,
then

there would be no possible world
relative to which
is true.

But w,

i5

suc h a world.

(8)

is false and (9)

Therefore, the modified Synonymy

Thesis is false.
Dummett's response to the argument
from Kripke's Preface rests on
Durrmett’s views about the connection
between semantic theories

for

natural language, the data such theories
must preserve, and our pretheoretic intuitions.

1

In

this regard,

Dummett writes:

Since Frege, philosophers engaged in logical
analysis have
usually proceeded, as he did, in two stages.
The first stage is
to transform sentences of the natural
language into what Quine
calls a regimented’ form; the second is to construct
a semantic
theory whose direct application is to the
regimented language.
The semantic theory states how each sentence
of the regimented
language is determined, in accordance with its composition,
as
true or as false; it indirectly assigns truth-conditions
to
sentences of natural language in virtue of the mapping of
those
sentences on to the regimented ones. The entire analysis
is to

be judged successful or unsuccessful by whether the
truthconditions thus indirectly assigned to sentences of natural
language accord with our intuitive understanding of those
sentences.
The regimentation cannot be judged correct or
incorrect in isolation:
it has no significance on its own, but
only as supplying the syntactic forms to which we formulate the
semantic theory as applying.
(Dummett, 1981, p. 574)

52

As characterized by
Dummpt-iy Dummett,

the semanticisfs
job is a two-step

Procedure.

First, certain sentences
of English are
formally represented
3 giV6n f0mal lan§UaSe
wel 1-formed formuli
of that formal
language.
Where 0 is a sentence
of English and*
and y is a
well-formed
formula of the formal
*-•
language
a franci
8
translation
procedure is specified
It
ma y be th0Ught of as
sentences of the for m!

^

^

•

.

n^ing

Vif
In

and only

If

such as case X represents
*

.

Second, truth-conditions
are directly

assigned to the well-formed
formuli of the foraal language.
4 formal
semantics is given. Where
is as above, the
semantics will lss ue
sentences of the form:

X

1

is true

where sentence

formulaX

.

Vis

t is

if and only if

a direct specification
of the truth-conditions of
the

then taken to be an indirect
specification of the truth-

conditions of the original English
sentence^.
success just in case,

for every

<j>

invol ved,

The entire project is a

our intuitions about

accord

with sentences of the form:
*'<!>'

is true

if and only ifY' 7

.

Dummett steadfastly maintains that
the only relevant intuitions-the
only

intuitions the semantics must accommodate—
are our pre-theoretic
intuitions.

A theory which fails to preserve
such intuitions must be

rejected or revised.

Dummett points out that we must consider
two rival accounts of

sentences like
(8)

and

Aristotle was found of dogs

)
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(10)
In

Deutero-Isaiah died in infancy.

this regard, Dummett
writes:
Two strategies are
possible
the mechanism of scope.
On
'Deutero-Isaiah' is
k5

Onp

s

Q

.

,l

t0 a PP ea l once
more to

+.

the

“Passion

r

the P r °Phecy', to be
represented in the ’regimented ll»
°w
6 ™-?'’ Whose
denotation in possible worlds
„e havTa^eaSv
d
c
oonslder «i- The
regimented versions of
'Deutero-Isaiah a Kda /
ln lnfandy and of
'The author of the
croBheov
h
!
" lnf, ancy w111
then be the
same, namely
-

'

'

D(t)'

'the author of the

admit the regimentation
A1 ternativ ely,
6

™

^

This is not

prophecv”

(

t)

'

,Deuta >-o-I S alah'

eS not

*

M

and

.

we may represent 'Deutero-Isaiah'
bv a

^

°f

regimented language, which is
stipulated in 'fh
the semantic theory to be a
rigid designator,
denote in every possible world
the object identical
with the actual referent of
'Deutero-Isaiah' (or of 'f)
In
this case, 'Deutero-Isaiah might
have died in infancy' may be
regimented as ’OD(d)'; as Kripke remarks,
this sentence will
tr nth-conditions as
Ux.<)D( x) } ( d)'.
(Dummett,
^981, p! 577)
'

Thus,

according to Dummett, (10) can be formally
represented either

by
(10')

D (d)

or by

(10")
Where

'd'

is

Ux.D(x)KiyAy).

stipulated to be rigid designator and 'iyAy' is
interpreted

as an incomplete symbol a

designator.
prophecy.'

(We

_la

will let

Dummett uses

'

t'

Russell:

'Ax'

'iyAy'

represent

'x

will not be

a

rigid

is an author of the

as a metalinguistic variable which takes

expressions with the semantic properties of definite descriptions as
values

.

.

54

Dummett maintains that no
relevant datum-no
pne-thecetlc intuition
about sentence (1 0,
-supports representing (10)
as do-, (whloh he
regards as Krlp.e-s analysis
of (10,) rather than
as (10-) (which Is
his
own analysis of (10)19).
Thus Dummett writes:

Which of the two analyses
ought we to nrpfw?
intuition will not help us
here, at least in so far
aslt
relates to the truth-conditions
of sentences of natural
anguages, since both analyses
ascribe exactlv i-h
conditions to such sentences.
(S»e?t. 198lf Ts/lT
Along these same lines, Dummett
would maintain that no relevant
datum
supports representing
•

.

r

°

Aristotle was fond of dogs

(8)

as
(8

'

)

F( a)

rather than as

(8'”)
Now,

{Xy. D(y) }( ixGx)

according to the modified Synonymy Thesis,
for

a

speaker who

associates 'Aristotle' with 'the last great
philosopher of antiquity,'

English sentences of the form
r

0 (Aristotle)"

1

are synonymous with the wide-scope interpretations
of English sentences

of the form

0(the last great philosopher of antiquity/ Ar istotle)*1

.

The wide-scope interpretations of sentences of the form

#(the last great philosopher of antiquity/ Aristotle) 1
are adequately represented in our formal language by formuli of
the form
*”{Xx.0(y)

}( ix

Gx

)"*.

Dummett maintains that no relevant datum supports representing

(8)

as
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<8')

rather than as (8")

representing (,0) as

and thatthat „„
no relevant datum
supports

(10-,

rather than as <10")

'
In addition, he
makes
the more sweeping claim
that no relevant datum
supports representing
sentences of the form

^(Aristotle)'1
by a formuli of the form
f

$(

7

a)"

rather than by formuli of
the form
r

Uy.^(y)}(ixGx)’\

Formuli of the form
r Uy.^(y)

KixGx) -1

represent^ the wide-scope
interpretations of English sentences
of the form
0(the last great philosopher of
antiquity/ Aristotle)-1 .
Therefore, If Arnett’s general
claim is correct, no relevant
datum will
show that the truth-conditions
for English sentences of the
form

^(Aristotle)"1
differ from those for the wide-scop*
interpretations of English sentences
of the form

^(the last great philosopher of antiquity/
Aristotle)”1
So,

Durrmett would maintain that no
relevant datum shows either that
(8)

is

.

Aristotle was fond of dogs

not synonymous with the wide-scope reading
of
(9)

The last great philosopher of antiquity was
fond of dogs

(which is formally represented by (8")) or
that
(10)

Deutero-Isaiah died

in

infancy

is not synonymous with the wide-scope reading
of

.

.
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(11)

(Which

The author of the prophecy
died in infancy

formally represented by (10"),
.

is

If

Dummetfs general claim is

correct, no relevant datum will
S erve as the basis for
an arg-ent from a

divergence of truth-conditions to the
denial of the modified Synonymy
Thesis
Kripke would doubtless agree with
Dummett that if no relevant
datum
favored representing sentences of the
form

r

^( Aristotle)"1

by formuli of the form

rather than by formuli of the form
r

Uy.^(y)HixGx)"\
then his modal arguments do not refute the
modified Synonymy Thesis.

Nevertheless,
(8) as (8 M

)

Kripke maintains that there is datum against representing

and, by default, in favor of representing
(8) as (8').

according to Kripke,

intuition that
at w

a

(8) is

theory of names must be adequate to the apparent

false at

w-|,

(8')

is

false at

w-j,

and

(8 M

)

is true

i

Dummett is apparently willing to concede the point that
at

For

w-j

and (8") is true at

w-|.

(8')

is false

For he writes:

The choice between them [i.e., the two analyses] may seem
important, however. On the second analysis, the regimentation
'D(d)' of 'Deutero-Isaiah died in infancy* is true with respect
to any possible world v such that *D(x)' is true of i with
respect to _v.
In such a world *t* will not of course denote i,
but may denote some other object _j of which *D(x)' is not true
with respect to ^v. On the first analysis, however, the
regimentation of 'Deutero-Isaiah died in infancy' will be
'D(t)', and this will be false with respect to _v.
(Dummett,
1981, p. 578)
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The first analysis is
of course

CO").

The second analysis
is (IC),

KriPke -

*ich

Dumetfs analysis of

ThS P ° lnt ° f

(10.)

and

«»*

there is

namely

a

world relative to

Dummett would al mo st

certainly concede the same
technical point about
(8') is

10 ),

the analysis Dummett
attributes to

(10") differ in
truth-value.

acknowledge that

(

(8>)

and (8"),

and

false, whereas (8") is
true, at

However, although Dummett
will concede the "technical
point" that
(8') and (8")~.a
well as (10') and <10">-diff
er in their world-

relative truth-values, he would
deny that

it thereby follows that
(8")

is an unacceptable analysis
of (8) or that (10")

analysis of

(10).

Putting the issue in terms
of

is an unacceptable
(10)

and its rival

analyses, Dummett rejects the
notion that the divergence in
world-

relative truth-values in

(10')

and do") is evidence that
one of them is

better suited to represent (10)
than the other because Dummett
holds that
a semantic theory need not
accommodate Kripke's apparent intuitions
about
the world-relative truth-value
of (10) (or of (8)).
In this regard,
Dunmett writes:
This argument leaves it obscure at
which level it is
intended to apply:
at that of our intuitions concerning
sentences of natural language, or at that
of our regimentations
of those sentences and the semantic
theory we present as
governing them. At the latter level, it is
certainly correct.
Let v be a world in which the individual
who in fact composed
e prop ecy died in infancy, but
in which someone else composed
the very same prophecy.
Then, on the first of the two analyses
1S
S d above
'Deutero-Isaiah died in infancy’ is represented
K
by ’D(t)N? which is false with respect to v_,
whereas, on the
second analysis, it is represented by a sentence
'D(d)' which is
true with respect to v
Kripke’s argument is irrelevant if
it is concerned only to make this point,
which is indeed a
"technical" one.
It has force only if it be held that, among
the linguistic intuitions to which a logical analysis
is to be
held responsible, there are ones which bear, not upon the

^

’

.

.

.
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absolute truth or falsitv nf
falsity with respect to
17’ bUt UP ° n Us truth or
hypothetical
P thetical circumstances.
1981, p. 581)
(Dummett,
The preceding passage
identifies the basic

Dumnett and Krip k e.
(K)

(8)

disagreed

between

KripKe claims to have
as an intuition

is false at w
1

.

Dummett denies that he has
any such intuition and
refuses to count (K) as
part of the data a theory
of names must preserve.
Against admitting «)
as datum, Dummett writes:

Isaiah might have died in infancyas true.
Truth or ?aTsit3
with respect to possible worlds
is a very different
trUt h ° r alS ty ° f
““"^factual conditionals. For
thing,
tMng a sounda judgement
i
that, if Jones had attended
the
meetmg, he would have proposed a
vote of censure on the
chairman does not amount to a
judgement that it would have been
i2££^ible for Jones to attend the meeting
without proving
th6ref0re d06S " 0t dema " d
Jones
proposed a vote of censure' is true
with respect to every
possible world with respect to which 'Jones
attended the
meeting is true.
For another thing, we may judge
a
counter factual statement to be correct
without committing
ourselves to accepting the antecedent as
stating a genuine
possibility. The notion of truth-value
with respect to possible
worlds is a technical one, which may
or may not admit a coherent
explanation, but it belongs to the semantic
theory rather than
that understanding of our own language
which is datum for
such theory.
(Dummett, 1981,
581

Z?

Led

vTlf

pp.

-581

)

Durrmett appears to have two reasons
for refusing to admit

datum.

(K)

as

First, Dummett holds that claims about the
world-relative truth-

values of sentences make reference to the theoretical
entities— possible

worlds— of

the theory under consideration; and, therefore,
are not part

of the data the theory must preserve.

Second, Dummett holds that our

beliefs about the world-relative truth-values of sentences
are not

generally clear and consistent; and, therefore, are generally unreliable.
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Let us consider the
force of Dummetfs
ummett s second
spnonn reason
against admitti ng
(K) as datum.

Each of the following
states of affairs Is
compatible with Lett's
cla lm that our beliefs about
the world-relative
truth-values of sentences
are not generally clear
and consistent:
(i) a recognizable
subset of
such beliefs both contains
only beliefs which are
clear and mutually
consistent and Includes (K);
and (ii) an identifiable
subset of native
speakers of English boUi contains
only members who espouse
nothing but
Clear and mutually consistent
beliefs about such matters and
includes
Kripke and others *o claim (K)
as an intuition.
So long as either of
(i) and (ii) are live
options-and nothing Dummett has said
suggests that
they are not-we would be rash
to dismiss (K) on the basis
of Dunmett's

claim that such beliefs are not
generally clear and consistent.

We

should not conclude from what Dunrnett
actually asserts in this regard
that <K> should not be counted as
datum.

admitting
(K)

(K)

Let us see what can be said for

as datum despite its apparent
reference to possible worlds.

involves apparent reference to possible
worlds; that

theoretical entities of possible worlds semantics.
this has against counting (K) as datum,
First,

Is, to the

To see what force

two things must be considered.

we must see whether or not it is "bad philosophy"
to test

against our beliefs about its theoretical entities.
inquire whether or not

(K)

admits of

a

a

theory

Second, we must

reformulation which avoids

apparent reference to possible worlds but which still

''argues''

against

the modified Synonymy Thesis.
It

is far from obvious that it is

''bad

philosophy" to test

against our beliefs about its theoretical entities.

a

theory

If we are realists

.
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about our theories and
their ontological

comments,

then, if „ e find

ourselves quantifying over
possible worlds, we must
acknowledge that we
think such things exist.

worlds, even if ue

We must ack

Mediately

already committed to.

m „ledge

that there are possible

try to "reduce- the™ to
entities we were

(For example, by saying
that possible worlds are

really just maximal, consistent
sets of propositions.)
When we discover that we are
coranitted to possible worlds,
it does
not seem unreasonable to
consider their relations to
things we were

already committed

to.

It does not seem unreasonable
to

form beliefs

about how possible worlds relate
to such things as sentences,
or
propositions, and truth-values. So,
our philosophical curiosity
ccxnpels
US to pose questions like, -Is
(B) true at w, ?
when we think we have an
answer say, that (8) is false at w-| we
would be irresponsible if we
-

—

refused to apply our answer in order
gain further information about the

things the answer involves.

Therefore, applying our answer in the
hope

of deciding between rival analyses of
philosophy."

In fact,

(8)

does not sound like "bad

quite the reverse is true:

to arrive at an answer

and then refuse to apply it sounds
like a much better recipe for "bad

philosophy."

In the face of these considerations,

conclude, simply from the fact that

possible worlds, that

(K)

involves apparent reference to

should not be considered when we try to decide

between competing analyses of
(K),

(K)

we would be hasty to

(8).

Dummett, who would have us reject

owes us a better explanation of why we should than the one he has

provided

There is a reformulation of the apparent intuition Kripke appeals to
in his

Preface which avoids reference to possible worlds and which
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FGfcsins the force nf (v\
f
,
formulation

he ” 0dlfied S

.

»«»W

Thesis.

One such

is:

(K')

Had Aristotle exisi^ri
k
a Philosopher,
d "° b bee "
and had PlatoTxisted
°bbeen fond of dogs,
and been the last
great nhl l
P
° f antiCIUit
«e use (8), (8) would
‘hen. 'as
be

“

f

^

false

(K')

is

perfectly legitime
contrary-to-fact conditional.
It makes no
reference to possible worlds.
Kripke would doubtless
agree that he
a

«•> as an intuition
and would regard it
as a reasonable
the apparent intuition
he appeals to in his
Preface.

Semantic theories,

has

reformation of

like other theories in
philosophy or in the

sciences, should not restrict
themselves to what is the
case.
They must
also be responsive to
questions about what could
have been the case or
could still be the case.
They must answer questions
of the fo™. -How
are S and T related?. In
addition, they must answer
questions of the
form, 'How would S and T
be related if such-and-such
obtains?.
Letting
'S'

<K->

and -T- take sentences and
truth-values as their respective
values,

is an answer to one such
question; and, therefore,

be perfectly legitimate
datum.

analysis preserves.
whereas

Knpke.

(K-)

It is not,

<K')

appears to

however, datum that Dummett's

For, according to Dummett's
analysis,

(K-)

is

false;

is true according to the
analysis Dummett attributes to

Apparently,

in «') we have admissible datum
which supports

Kripke’s case against the modified
Synonymy Thesis.

Assuming that Dummett would still defend
the modified Synonymy
Thesis,

he has just two options:

(i)

deny that

and (ii) offer a substitute formulation
of

(K‘)

(K»)

is admissible datum;

which both captures the

apparent intuition Kripke appeals to and comes
out true according to
Dunmett's analysis.

Let us consider the second option.

7
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Dumnett might propose to
capture the apparent
intuition Kripke
appeals to with the following:

a philosopher,

anfhad

^

*

Plat^txisted ’ “bet^r’
been fond off" dogs,
and been the last great
ohiln^nho
would not be the case that
AristotlVwas^nd^o^'do^’
(D)

is true under

both analyses.

7

If (D) better captures
the apparent

intuition that Kripke appeals
to than «•),
that

(K-)

then „e can no longer be
sure

admissible datum against the
modified Synonymy Thesis.
In discussing his apparent
intuition,
is

W

Kripke reports:

^

iS 3 doctrine abou t the
truth-conditions, with
fa
Ual Situations of

Un

ex%esLrbv)
(Kripke!

,

a

ir

980^

s

12

^

propositions

*

**'

)

Kripke would almost certainly deny
that (D) does

a

better job than

(K-)

of capturing the apparent intuition
he appeals to in his Preface.

intuition is about sentence

(8)

above on page
(D)

is

31.)

(K

1

)

That

and the truth-value it would
have had a

certain state of affairs obtained.

not.

“

(This is stated in the passage
quoted

has the appropriate subject matter;

not about sentence (8),

(D)

does

nor is it about a truth-value.

(D)

is not a faithful rendering of the
apparent intuition Kripke appeals to.
To defend the modified Synonymy Thesis,

not

admissible datum.

Duimiett must say that

Dummett must deny that

(K»)

(K 1 )

is

is among his

intuitions and maintain that Kripke is confused
or mistaken when he

claims that

(K

T

)

is among his intuitions.

we have reached an impasse,

Dummett could then hold that

that Kripke’s modal arguments are,

at best,

inconclusive, and that now is the time to consider the other ways
in
which description theories of meaning are superior to the sort of theory
Kripke seems to favor.

Dummett could remind us that descriptions

,
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theories, in contrast with
their Millian rivals,
deliver clean solutions
to the problems of
negative existential sentences,
non-referring names,
and significant, true,
identity sentences.

reply Kripke could hold fast
to «•>. and maintain
that it does
represent a genuine intuition, one
which would be accepted by
native
In

speakers of English who are not
committed to certain theories
about
proper names.
In addition, Kripke could
remind Dumnett of the problems
generated for description theories
by the No Description Objection
and
the Wrong Referent Objection.

He could also recall

theories have with belief ascription
sentences:

problems descriptions

namely, deciding which

descriptions— the speaker's or the alleged
believer's— should

be

substituted for proper names which occur
in the that-clauses of such
sentences.

Finally, Kripke could point out special
new problems raised

for Dummett's Synonymy Thesis by negative
existential sentences,

referring names, and belief ascription sentences.

non-

These new problems are

discussed below.
We may assume that the following sentence is
true!
(12)
So,

it

Sherlock Holmes does not exist.

is reasonable to expect that the following sentence
also be true:

Possibly, Sherlock Holmes does not exist.

(13)

Nevertheless, according to the modified Synonymy Thesis, (13) should
be

formally represented by
(13')

where

'Hx'

Ux.M(-Ey y=x)

formally represents

existence of

a

Holmesizer,

}(

izHz)

'x

(13')

is a

Holmesizer.'

is false.

Since entails the

Apparently, then,

a

description theory which incorporates the modified Synonymy Thesis does

::

,

,

64

not handle negative
existential sentences
as cleanlv a, °
ne might have

hoped.

The description theory
is praised for its
apparent success in
Handling the Problems
raised hy sentences
that contain
non-referring
names.
Many description theorists
would regard the
following sentence as
true

m>
Thus,

it is

Elther

^

°r

»«-look Holmes

is a detective

reasonable to expect them
to also hold that
the following is

true
(15)

Possibly, either 2+2 =« or
Srerloch Holmes is

After all, (15) merely
asserts the ^sslbility of

a

(15)

detective.

disjunctive state of

affairs one of whose disjuncts
necessarily obtains.

according to the modified Synonymy
Thesis,

a

Nevertheless,

must be formally

represented by

0 5')
where

’Dx'

{Xx.M(2+2=4 v Dx)

formally represents

entails the existence of
is false.

}(

’x

iyHy)

is a detective.’

Like (13’), (15.)

Holmesizer; and, therefore,

a

like

(1 3’),

(

15 «)

So it appears that a
description theory based on the
modified

Synonymy Thesis will have its own
problems with non-referring names/20
Description theories have been praised
for their success in

accommodating alleged truths like
Smith believes that Sherlock Holmes
is

(16)
(16)

seems open to two non-equivalent
representations:
(16')

{><x.Bs,

DxKiyHy)

and
(16'

')

Bs,

{Xx.Dx}

(

iyHy)

a

detective.

, .
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where

'Bn,

y formally

unacceptable.

represents

'x

believes that

y.'

(16’)

is

It entails the existence
of a Holmeslzer.

Description
theories are also often credited
for their treatment
of apparently true
sentences like
(17)
But,

like

Smith does not believe that
Hesperus is Phosphorus.

(16),

(17)

seems to admit two non-equivalent
formalizations,

namely:
(17')

Ux.Uy-Bs,

x = y}(izP

1z )}( iXl H lXl

)

and

(17")
where

H-jX

-Bs,

Ux.Uy. x=y}(izP )}(i Xl H
1z
lXl)>

represents

Phosphorizer.'

'x

However,

represent it by (17),

is

if

Hesperizer' and

a

(1

since

7)

'P-|X'

represents

really is true, it would be

(17')

is false.

a

'x

is

a

mistake to

This suggests that the

modified Synonymy Thesis must be amended
to require that the second place
of formuli representing belief ascription
sentences-and attitude

ascription sentences in general— is occupied
by closed sentences of the

representing formal language.
rendering of (16),

and

(16")

then becomes the only acceptable

(17") becomes the only acceptable rendering
of

(17).

This treatment of (16) and (17) suggests that sentence
(18)

Possibly, Smith believes that Sherlock Holmes is
detective

should not be represented by
(18')

{/Oc.M(Bs, Dx)

}(

iyHy)

but rather by

(18")

M(Bs,

{Xx.Dx}

(

iyHy)

)

a
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This Is well and fine,
especiallyy In llght
lieht „r
of the ,^ct that
(18') entails
6 existence of a
Holmesizer*’ stil
!+•
j
still
does
present a problem.
Strictly
speaking, the modified
Synonymy Thesis requires
4 ires that (1
(18)
h
«> be
represented
by
For (18, represents
the reading 0 f (18)

„

i

u

(the

Holmesizer/Sherlock Holmes) where
the scope of -the
Holmesize, includes
all modal operators. Of
course discretion is the
better part of valor
and, so, the modified
Synonymy Thesis must be
"remodified" to allow
(18 M ) to

represent (18).

The remodified Synonymy
Thesis is that a speaker
who uses '*<„) and
Wh ° aSS0 ° lateS the n
e
wlth th. definite
description 'd* expresses
the proposition he would
express were he to use
'(S(d/N),' where 'jj(d/N>'
la interpreted so that:
(i) every occurrence
of 'd' in '*< d/N ,, that is
not in a that-clause of
some attitude ascription
sentence in '(J(d/N)' is

“

read with a scope that includes
all modal operators In

every other occurrence of

-d-

in

'(kd/N )'

remodified Synonymy Thesis,

in
(18)

and (ii)

is read with a scope that
does

not exceed, but which includes
all modal operators in

component of the that-clause

'jS(d/N)' :

,*ich is occurs.

,

the sentential

According to the

is to be represented by

(18"),

but by

08').
This move is independently motivated.

We are operating under the

assumptions that propositions are the
objects of beliefs and that the

that-clauses of belief ascription sentences
name the propositions

allegedly believed

(i.e.,

the propositions expressed by the sentential

components of such that-clauses).
'Dx'

Traditionally, formal expressions like

(and "English expressions" like 'that

x

is a detective')

taken to designate propositional functions,
not propositions.

have been

9
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Phers
0

f<>rmal

“e"

f°

--

trade in

~

langUageS tradlU ° nally

mal

langU3ge (reP

propositions.

Thesis bring

>»“

Ply their trade in terras

only the olosed
sentenoes of

---ion.

of Engll s h which)
deslgnate

So the representations
required by
th„ remodified
bv the
Synonymy
Durrcnett’s

project more in line with
our assumptions
and
long standing tradition.

a

Despite its apparent advantages,
even the recodified
Synonymy Thesis
has Problems with belief
ascription sentences. Consider
this sentence:

09)

(19)

Possibly, Aristotle was not

^

is about a counterfactual

false belief about himself.

a

—

philosopher, Plato was the
y * and Aristotie b

situation in which Aristotle
has

a

certain

According to the recodified
Synonycy Thesis,

09) is to be formally represented
by:
<19,>

where

'Px'

4

represents

'x is a

authored The ReEublic.'ZI
(19).

For (19')

Aristotle has

a

is not

<1

y=1ZGZ

4

Ux '- Px l' “»1<*1)»

BX>

philosopher' and

9 ')

about

a

is

'x

counterfactual situation in which

false belief about himself

Therefore,

represents

not an acceptable representation
of

.

( 1

counterfactual situation in which Aristotle
has
Plato.

'Rx'

(1«, R.,))

is

»)

a

about a

true belief about

like the modified Synonymy Thesis it is
meant to

replace, the remodified Synonymy Thesis has
special problems when it
canes to belief ascription sentences.

Where

*0 (N

f

)

is a

sentence which contains the proper name

contains no modal operators,

'N'

we generally think that 'Possibly,

0(N)'

expresses the proposition which asserts the possibility of
the
proposition expressed by

'0 (N

) .*

We think that

*0 (N

)'

expresses

and

a

'
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proposition which attributes
the Property
property of h
being an x such that
0(N) to
the referent of 'NN, or fo
r r
the-F
(where 'the-F' is the
definite
description associated with
the name »).
Dumett seems to thin,
the
•

»

Same 3bOUt ,0<N)

’

!

h

—

,

~t

’

thin, that .Possih ly

,

expresses the proposition
which asserts the
possibility of the
proposition expressed by
*«).• Instead, Dummett
thinks that 'Possibly
6XPreSSeS 3 PrOPOSltl °" " Wch
tributes the property of
inch that £OSsibly &x/N) to the
referent of -N,' or to the-F.

^

^

Domett’s understanding of
’Possibly,
his project.

|«(N)'

is an essential

For this understanding
of 'Possibly,

guarantees that the description
substituted for
a

’N’

J|(N)'

is „ hat

gets interpreted with

scope which includes all
modal operators in ’Possibly,

this understanding of ’Possibly,

problems presented above.

However,

Other description theories can
avoid these
0(N)'

(or

0(the-F/N )') admits an interpretation
which does not entail

the existence of the referent of

'Possibly,

0(N).’

««). is also what gives rise
to the

problems by taking advantage of
the fact that 'Possibly,
'Possibly,

part of

j>(N

)’

or of the-F.

'N,'

On such a reading,

expresses the proposition which
asserts the possibility

of the proposition expressed by

(N).'

Such a reading is not available

to a description theory of meaning
based on the modified Synonymy Thesis.

Indeed,

the modified Synonymy Thesis entails
that if

existence of the referent of
0 (N

)

'N,'

or

of the-F,

'jj(N)'

entails the

then so does 'Possibly,

.

We now know that a description theory which
includes the modified

Synonymy Thesis will have special new problems dealing
with negative

existential sentences, non-referring proper names, and belief
ascription
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sentences.

We also know that in

«)

Kripke has an apparent
intuition

which is inconsistent with the
modified Synonymy Thesis,
an intuition
which I share.
Of course Dummett could
reject <K')i however, „ e
know

that his stated reasons against
admitting

(K-)

(or

either inconclusive or open to serious
objection.

«)) as datum are
We have also examined

an alternative formulation of
Kripke's apparent intuition-one
that is

consistent with the modified Synonymy
Thesis-and found that it does not
have the appropriate subject matter.
On the basis of these considerations,
while acknowledging that they

might not be decisive enough to dissuade
the die-hard description
theorist,

I

conclude that the Modal Objection gives us
additional good

reasons to withhold acceptance from the description
theory of meaning and
take another

look at the Millian theory of meaning.
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Notes

'The basic objections to
the description theory
are reviewed in

Chapter

—

I.

^Dummett's initial response
to the Modal Objection
appeared in Frege;
l03 ° Phy
(1 973).
It was modified in i
lght 0 f Kripke's

^

replies; the modified version
appears in The Interpretation
of Frege's
Philosophy (1981).
3

We will say that, as used by
such a speaker, the original
name
sentence and its corresponding
description sentence are synonymous;
and,
for brevity, that the two
sentences are synonymous.
‘'According to the description theory,

proper names with definite descriptions.

speakers back their uses of
On a given occasion of its
use,

a name's associated definite
description

is its backing description.

crude test for determining what description

a

his use of a name is given by the following:
(at

time

t)

speaker is using to back
'D'

backs S's use of H>

if (at t) S is disposed to respond,
'N is (was) D,' to the

question, 'Who (what) is (was)
Roughly,

a

N ?'

definite description is

description if and only if it is about

a
a

referential ly identifying
singular term or an act of

ref erence.
But for a few stylistic changes, this discussion
of Harrison is

taken directly from Ryckman (in press).
7

Ackerman,

1979.

^Austin,

1983.

^Kripke,

1980b.

A

6
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10

See

Chisholm,

^See

Lewis,

1981,

1981,

pp .

pp .

54,55.

286-287.

12

Sev eral PhUosophers.
Loar. Hoonan, and
Schiffar come readUy
” lnd ’ rely °" DU
ett S basl ° Strate
their sketchy hefen.es
of the
description theory against
the Modal Objection.

”

^

^Linsgys response
(1

^

’

is virtual!,
Identical with that
given in DuMlett

973).

’We’s
0 980a,

views about the contingent

54-57 and 79).

pp.

the reference of

a

name

a

priori are stated in frip
ke

Kripke holds that

-N- by a

a

person who rigidly f lxes

definite description -the-F'
is ln

position to know a £riori
that if N exists,

a

then N is the-F.

Suppose
that Djmmett insists that,
as we use it. the reference
of the name -Saint
Anne' is rigidly fixed by
the definite description
-the mother of Mary.Kripke could then allow
that we are in a position
to .now a priori that
if Saint Anne existed,
then Saint Anne was the
mother of Mary. He could
then allow that we are also
in a position to know a
£riori that if Saint
Anne existed, then Saint Anne
was a mother.
Kripke could then maintain
that if (5) has a true
interpretation, it is the interpretation
given by

(5'”).
One finds Kri P ke endorsing this
very maxim
and

Semantic
1

Reference,”

(1

977,

P.

in ”SP eaker's

Reference

267-268).

We need to insure that ’Necessarily,
Aristotle was the last great

phi loso P her of antiquity' does not
come out true according to the

modified Synonymy Thesis.
EXP
be

Let
j

the last great P hiloso P her of antiquity ( ®^ Aristotle ))
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'

0

(

Aristotle)

'

,

™

when '^(Aristotle)' C ont-3in<!
contains no occurrences
of 'the last great
philosopher of antiquity,’
and

EXP

let

the

last great philosopher
of antlquity^Wristotle))
be the interpretation
of '#( Aristotle)- that
results when every
occurrence of -the last great
philosopher of antiquity’
in '^(Aristotle)'
is read with a scope
that does not exceed any
modal operator In
^(Aristotle),’ when -fl(Aristotle)contains one or more
occurrence of
'the last great philosopher
of antiquity.’ The modified
Synonymy Thesis
should be understood so that
’tf(Ar
isfni- 1
„
nwistotle)'
is
synonymous with the

interpretation of

'EXP*.u a

the ,last great philosopher
of

antiquity^ (Ari stotle))(the last great philosopher
of
antiquity/Aristotle)- that results when
’the last great philosopher
of
antiquity’ is read with a scope
that includes every modal
operator in
'EXP the
u

last great philosopher of
antiquity <0(Aristotle))(the last great

philosopher

of antiquity/ Aristotle).'

In this way, 'Necessarily,
Aristotle was the last great philosopher

of antiquity' is not supposed to
be synonymous with the wide-scope

reading of 'Necessarily, the last
great philosopher of antiquity was the
last great philosopher of antiquity,'
which is true.

Rather,

according

to the modified Synonymy Thesis,
'Necessarily, Aristotle was the last

great philosopher of antiquity' is synonymous
with the wide-scope reading

of 'Necessarily, there was exactly one last
great philosopher of
antiquity and the last great philosopher of antiquity
was

it.'

That is,

according to the modified Synonymy Thesis, 'Necessarily,
Aristotle was
the last great philosopher of antiquity' is synonymous
with the

73
n arrow-scope

reading of -There was
exactly one last great
creat philosopher of
antiquity and necessarily,
it WaS
was fhp
Y
the last S^eat
philosopher of
antiquity.’
This sentence is false.

was partially specified
early i„ this Chapter.
18 From
this point on. the response
we are considering
is Du-ett-s.
Linsky may or may not favor
Dummett's position.

19 Where

(10")

Ol)

formally represents:

The author of the prophecy
died in infancy.

20

Description theories and Millian
theories alike have troubles
with
"names of fictional entities."
The point here is that
Dummett’s defense
against the Modal Objection raises
special new problems for such
names.
21

The rationale behind this
reading is given in Note

16

above.

chapter
kripke-s PUZZLE ABOUT
BELIEF:

In a recent article,

presents

"A Puzzle About

I

I

I

consistency solutions

Belief

puzzle
ooxc about
doout hoi
belief andj proper
namp<?
v u P er names.

3

(,

979) .

Saul Kripke

-

i-

successor are about Kripke's
puzzle.
presented and explained.

twi
This„

.

chapter and its

In this chapter the
puzzle is

-

In addition,

we will examine a
recently

developed theory of proper
names and show both that
the solution
offers to the standard
versions of the problem of
the apparent

it

failure of
the substitutivity of
codesignating names does not
extend to Kripke's
puzzle and that this leads to
additional problems for the
theory. 1

Finally, four proposed solutions
to the puzzle are stated
and critically
^
evaluated
.

Section One

ripke states the puzzle in terms
of the following example.

This

example is about Pierre and Pierre's
dispositions toward certain
sentences of French and English.

While living in France, Pierre is

competent, monolingual speaker of French.
of his monolingual French speaking
peers,

a

As a result of the testimony

Pierre is disposed to assent to

the sentence
( 1

)

Londres est jolie.

Later, Pierre moves to an ugly section
of London.

There he learns

English "on the street," by observing the behavior of
others, and without
the benefit of a translation manual.

He is not told that 'Londres' and

3

~—

“*
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» »>

...

«„

soon a competent
speaker of English
and he remains
competent speaker of
French
ench. As
4 s they ,
frequent onlv its
i
Q
gll6r
ParU ’ hls
friends have
little regard for London.
On the basis of
f the ,te stimony
of his new
a q that
3S W
0 ll as
wen
of his senses,
Pierre iss dls Posed
to assent to
the sentence
,, CT

(2)

London is not pretty.

For similar reasons,
he is not disposed
to assent to the
sentence
(3)
London is pretty.
In

fact.

Pierre is disposed to
dissentC irom
from

assent to

m

(3).

»
He

remains disposed to

(1).

Kripke concentrates on
the connections between
Pierre's dispositions
toward sentences 0).
(2). and (3, and certain
natural principles about
belief, language use.
translation, and truth.
Certain of our interests
are better
(7) served by continuing the story
of Pierre to consider
his
dispositions toward sentences
(4)

Londres is London,

(5)

Londres is not London,

(6)

London is London,

and

London is not London,
both before and after he discovers
that 'Londres’ and 'London'

codesignate.
It is natural to expect that
a reasonable person in Pierre's

situation, with Pierre's dispositions,
will not be disposed to assent to

76

We will assume that
this is so: ln
in fact

(4).

*

dissent from
assent to

(5)

assent to

(7).

(4).

in

and to

(6).

WU1

assent to

"° l0 " Ser
(6),

We

’

Pi
p ierre

is disposed to

we
n i aSSUme tha t Pierre
WS u
Wl11
is disposed to

wm

assume that Piece is
not disposed to
We will also assume
that when Pierre learns
that

'Londres' and -London'
(4> ’

addition

’

oodesignate,

^

dlSP ° Sed t0

he will beoonle disposed
t „ assent

-““t

t<>

to (5), will remaln
disposed tQ

and will remain ill-disposed
to assent to

(

7 ).

It is important to note
that there is nothing
puzzling about this

example.

The story of Pierre is
perfectly coherent; the events
described
above might will have occurred.
Kripke gets a puzzle only
when he

applies certain principles about
belief, language use, translation,
and
truth to elements of this example.
The first of the principles that
Kripke employs is

principle.

a

disquotation

Kripke presents his disquotation
principle as follows:

Let us make explicit the disquotat
ional principle
presupposed here, connecting sincere assent
and belief.
It can
be stated as follows, where
is to be replaced, inside and
6 a11 quotatlon marks, by an
appropriate standard English
sentence:
If a normal English speaker on refl
ection.
6
aSSen ^ S
*£*' ^hen he believes that
~~ n
p."
(1979,
248 249

V

—

,

To help illustrate what he means by
"appropriate standard English

sentence," Kripke adds:
The sentence replacing *p» is to lack indexical
or
pronominal devices or ambiguities.
(1979, p. 249)
In

addition to

a

disquotation principle in English, for sentences of

English,

Kripke needs an analogous principle in French,

French.

In

for sentences of

this regard he writes:

We have stated a disquotation principle in English, for
English sentences; an analogous principle, stated in French

-

t
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sentences.

Umeci

(1979* pT 2 5o)

t0 h ° ld

f°r

Frenoh (German,

etc.)

A third principle
Kripke uses to generate
his puzzle is
-s a
_

"strengthened disquotation
principle'.; he presents
as follows:
A normal speaker who
is not reticent win ho asincere
disposed to
ne assent to 'o' if
^7
il£ believes U^tX^(T97Q,
P. 249
9))

——

In

^
—

~

—

—

addition to the principles
above, Kripke uses
truth:'
"t

£D

t

'

dl = quotatl0 " Principle
for\ST (French oT^TEnglish) replacement for 'p'

i s true*,
is
true" rfrom

,

'p,'

and conversely.

(1979, p

.

for

infer

277 f

Finally, Kripke uses the
following principle of translation:

expresses
=S a trutn
Now,

that other language).

if the story of Pierre were
a true story,
( 1 )

in

Un

(1979,

250)

p.

Pierre's assent to

Londres est jolie,

conjunction with the French version
of Kripke's disquotation

principle, the French version of the
Tarskian disquotation principle,
the
principle of translation, and the
English version of the Tarskian

disquotation principle, would entail that
Pierre believes that London
pretty.

We have already said that Kripke's
story of Pierre is

perfectly coherent story.

is

a

With this in mind, so that we can avoid
the

sort of cumbersome subjunctive locution
employed above, we will assume
that Kripke's story of Pierre is a true story.
in conjunction with Kripke's principles,

that

London is pretty.
(

2

)

Pierre's assent to

(1),

entails that Pierre believes

Pierre's assent to

London is not pretty,

in conjunction with Kripke's disquotation principle,

entails that Pierre
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believes that London
is not pretty.

Pierre's

h lng
.

assent to
(3)

London is pretty,

ITT

““

«-»••

that Pierre does not
believe
ueneve t-haf
that London is nrettv
Pretty.
disposed to assent to
(4)

dlSP° Sed to

Pierre’s not beine

Londres is London,

in conjunction with
Kripke's strengthened
disquotation principle,

that Pierre does not
believe that Londres is
London.
disposed to assent to
(5)

«...

r

entail.

Pierre's bein g

Londres is not London,

in conjunction with
Kripke's

dictation

believes that Londres is not
London.

principle, entails that
Pierre

Pierre's being disposed
to assent

to
(6)

London is London,

in conjunction with
fripke's disquotation
principle,

believes that London

is

London.

entails that Pierre

Finally, Pierre's not being
disposed to

assent to
(7)

London is not London,

in conjunction with Kripke's
strengthened disquotation principle,

entails

that Pierre does not believe
that London is not London.

Recall that when Pierre learns
that 'Londres' and 'London'
codesignate,

he becomes disposed to assent
to (1),

to assent to (5),

remains disposed to assent to

disposed to assent to
principles,

(7).

This,

(6),

is no longer disposed

and is still not

in conjunction with

Kripke's

entails that, once he learns that 'Londres'
and 'London'
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believes that Undres ls
not Undon

to

.

London,

^^^

^

and continues not to
believes
oeiieves that
that London is not
London.
We hold that belief
is a two-place
Place relation
relation, one that
relates persons
to propositions. We
hold that when we say
’ that b
S believes
he! i
„
that a
f we are
t

asserting that S stands in
that relation to the
proposition expressed by
our use of
A belief is the state
of affairs of a person
standing in
the belief-relation to
a given proposition.
The object of a given
belief
is the proposition that
person believes. Finally,
„e hold that two
beliefs are inconsistent if
and only if there is
no possible world
wherein both of the beliefs
objects are true (at one and
the same
time).

We are committed to the
claim that Pierre believes
both a

proposition
its

the proposition expressed
by 'London is pretty'-and
also
the proposition expressed by
'London is not pretty.'

we are committed to the view
that Pierre has inconsistent
beliefs.

Hence,
But!

according to Kripke, this presents
us with "insuperable
difficulties"

0979,

p.

257).

He writes that:

We may suppose that Pierre, in
spite of the unfortunate
situation in which he now finds himself,
is a leading
philosopher and logician. He would never
let contradictory
beliefs pass. And surely anyone, leading
logician or no, is in
principle
a position to notice and correct
contradictory
beliefs if he has them. Precisely for
this reason, we regard
individuals who contradict themselves as
subject to greater
censure than those who merely have false
beliefs.
But it is
clear that Pierre, as long as he is unaware
that the cities he
calls London’ and ’Londres’ are one and the same,
is in no
position to see, by logic alone, that at least
one of his
beliefs must be false. He lacks information,
not logical
acumen.
He cannot be convicted of an inconsistency:
to do so
would be incorrect.
(1979, p. 257)

m

We may safely assume that, apart from those
beliefs involved in

Pierre's dispositions toward sentences

(1)

through

(7),

Pierre does not
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have inconsistent beliefs.

According to Kri pke
p

from what he has said
about Pierree.

^

we consider Pierre's
behavior.

’

lt ,,
ls wrong to conclude,

that
that pPierre has inconsistent
beliefs

Kripke's claim see
ras qui te

Plausible. Pierre seems
perfectly rational.

Pierre seems to draw
the
sorts of conclusions any
y other ratinnai
rational person would
draw, were he to
find himself in Pierre’s
i-natsituation.
A rational person
who assents
-i

to

(1

)

Londres est jolie,

and
(2)

London is not pretty,

would dissent from
(4)

It

Londres is London.

is also clear that,

to the extent
^
extent thaithat p-:
Pierre
can compare his beliefs,

no amount of introspective
comparison will help him detect
an
inconsistency among them. Furthermore.
Pierre does not draw the
sorts of
wild conclusions apparently
available to a person v^o takes
both
and -p
P

as premises; a person with
inconsistent beliefs apparently
has such

premises at his disposal.

Yet, we do not find,

nor would we expect to

find,

Pierre running through the streets
of London declaring, say, that
the moon is made from Carl Sagan's
old
sneakers.

Still, Pierre’s behavior and Kripke’s
principles commit us to the

conclusion that Pierre believes both that
London is pretty and that
London is not pretty; that is, to the
conclusion that Pierre has

inconsistent beliefs.

Together with the fact that is seems wrong
to say

that Pierre has inconsistent beliefs, this
constitutes the first element
of Kripke’s puzzle.

A solution must tell us what beliefs

Pierre exhibits

by his assents to

—

and

( 1 )

.

Inconsistent.

J"

r.

-

-

conclusion that Plerre
belleyes
we are committed t0
the

oMciusion

°" 13

contradiction.

PreUy
This

ThUS ’

-

i <=

"

—*

pisrre

^^

u
beiieve

>» committed to
an outright

the second element
of Krip ke

«

s

puzzle.

A

solution to this part of
the puzzle will a ,
explain why we are not
really
committed to this
.

contradiction.

We are also committed
to the conclusion
that before he
discovered
that ’Londres' and
'London' codesignate,
Pierre did not believe
that
Londres is London, did
believe that Undoes is
not London, did
believe
that London is London,
and did not believe
London is not London.
In

addition, we are committed
to the conclusion
that once he discovered
that
the two names codesignate,
Pierre began to believe
that Londres is
London, ceased to believe
that Undoes is not
London, continued to
believe that London is London,
and continued not to
believe that London
is not London.
This seems well and fine.
After all, if „ e were to
report on the change in
Pierre's doxastic state,
citing his behavior
toward sentence (4), we would
say that when Pierre
discovered that the
two names codesignate, he
acquired a new belief.

However plausible this seems,
it is unacceptable.

Recall that we are

presently co.itted to the Millian
theory of the meaning of proper
names.
According to the Millian theory,
since 'Londres' and 'London'

oodesignate,

sentences

(4)

and

(6)

express the same proposition.

So,

when we report that upon discovering
that the two names codesignate,
Pierre acquired

a new

belief

— the

belief that Londres is London

—we

must

.
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be mistaken.

For Pierre already
believed that Lend
London is London, and
the
proposition that London
is London is t-h
P
the
P ro P° s ition that Londres
is
•

,

—

London

This is the third element
of K-ipke's pu zz i e

^

A

solution
say
beliefs Pierre acquired
(or old beliefs
he discarded)
when he discovered that
'Londres' and 'London'
codesignate; that is,
say what, if a „
new bellefs are
y
exhlblted fey pierre s
behavior with regard to
sentences (4) and (5).
what,

if any

.

„ ew

,

,

,

At this point,

^

„m

^

one might be tempted
to say that there is
nothing

puzzling about all of this;
that the situation described
leaves us with
nany options, each of which
eliminates any pu zz li„g reS
ults.

To see that

things are not quite this
simple, we shall consider
four basic options.
nfme ° Ur attentlon to the beliefs,
or disbeliefs, attributed
to
Pierre as a result of his
dispositions toward sentences
(1

Londres est jolie,

)

(2)

London is not pretty,

(3)

London is pretty.

and

According to Kripke, we have four
basic ways of sorting out Pierre's
doxastic state.
We can maintain:
.
•
that at the time we no longer respect
this French
n0e
° ndre 6St j° lie '>> th ut is we no
longer
ascribe to
hfm th
f
him
the corresponding
belief; that we do not respect his
English
utterance (or lack of utterance); that we
respect neither; that
we respect both.
(Kripke, 1979, p. 258)
.

e

The first of Kripke's four options is
to refuse to conclude,

basis of Pierre's assent to
(1)

Londres est jolie,

on the

:
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that Pierre believes
that London is
pretty

writes
is undeniable that-

Against this option,
Kripke

Pi

6 believed that
pretty— at least before
London
he learntdT
he differed
8
F° r

is
.
at that time,
not at all from
oounue^
hls c ° un trymen,
would have exactly the
and we
same grounds
d
to
, y ° f him
1
them that he believes
as
of
any
of
that iSLh
1
pretty :
who is both ignorant
lf any Frenchman
of English and ^
believed that London is
L° nd °"
pretty,
.

lives in London and
speaks English,'“o
lonLr'brilevT thV
Pretty? Wel1 ’
unquestionably, Pierre once
believed thatTL° n n otl
we would be forced
15
prett 7- So
to sIFThat
h3S
ng
given up his previous bel iaf
*211 mi nd
has
r„«. u„
has he real ly done
Pierre is
i^T
„
* reiterates
with vigor,
every assertion he has
eve^made
French
He says he ha s not
changed his mind about
anything he" h
; giV6n
Can we say that he
Uf> a " y belief
is wr"™
thi,”
story of his living in
the
London and his Engl
hngllsh
isTut^
utterances, on the
basis of his normal command
of f*. om u
be X2ESSJ to
conclude that he
that Undon ls pretty.
(Kripke,
1979, p. 256 )

^

—

ill

-

^

,

>

^

^^

.tiK ^,""’“

The second of Kripke-s
four options is to refuse
to conclude,
basis of Pierre's assent to
(2)

on the

London is not pretty,

that Pierre believes that
London is not pretty; and to
refuse to
conclude, on the basis of Pierre's
dissent from
(3)

London is pretty,

that Pierre does not believe
that London is pretty.

Against this option

Kripke writes:
His French past aside, he [i.e.,
Pierre] is just like his
riends in London. Anyone else, growing
up in London with the
same knowledge and beliefs that he
expressed in England, we
would undoubtedly judge to believe that
London is not pretty.
Can Pierre's French past nullify such
a judgment?
Can we say
that Pierre, because of his French past,
does not believe that
[London is not pretty]? Suppose an electric
shock wiped out all
is past memories of the French language,
what he learned in
France, and his French past. He would then
be exactly like his
neighbors in London. He would have the same
knowledge, beliefs,

-
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and linguistic capaciti
Uo il
esumably would be forced
to say that Pierre
believes that^nd
“ 8ly if ue say
his neighbors.
16 of
But surely no shock th"t
Pierre's Tories and
P3rt ° f
knowledge can give
Pierre believes that
If
(London is not prett v ,
ty
believed it before, despite
the shock, he
his French
enoh lan 8 ua 8e and
0979,
background.
i

p.

257)

The third of Kripke's
four options is to
refuse to conclude,
basis of Pierre's assent to
(1

on the

Londres est jolie,

)

that Pierre believes that
London is pretty; to refuse
to conclude, on the
basis of Pierre's assent to
London is not pretty,

(2)

that Pierre believes that
London is not pretty; and
to refuse to

conclude,

on the basis of Pierre's
dissent from

London is pretty,

(3)

that Pierre does not believe
that London is pretty.

Against this option,

Kripke writes:
If
”° Uld dSny Plerre
ln his bilingual stage, his
belief
that ,London is pretty and his
belief that London is not prettv
the d ifficalti
»« both previous options.

7

’

-

^

would
SU°1°1 be^f
, t ° JUd
that Pierre ° nce believed that
London
IS
is pretty
prettv but
hut does
^
no longer, in spite of Pierre's
own sincere
denial

f

that he has lost any belief.
We also must worry whether
Pierre would gain the belief that
London is not pretty if he
totally forgot his French past.
(1 979,
p. 257)

Kripke's final option is to conclude,

on the basis of Pierre's assent

to
(1)

Londres est jolie,

that Pierre believes that London is pretty;
and to conclude, on the basis
of

Pierre's assent to
(2)

London is not pretty,
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that Pierre believes
that London Is not
pretty.
prettv

<p
(Presumably,
we are to

.

refrain from ooncluding,
on the basis of
rierre
Pierre's
s Hi
dissent„ from
(3)
London is pretty,
that Pierre does not
believe that
that London is pretty.)
which Knpke says raises
"insuperable difficulties"

This is the option
Thl3
This option
t
commits
.

•

us to the view that
Pierre has
hp* inconsistent
beliefs.
seen, Kripke thinks that
this is unacceptable.

As we

have already

unless Kripke is mistaken
in his assessment
of these optlons
_
is no "easy way" to
avoid this
puzzle.

That ,

ln faot>

is Qne major

thesis of the article wherein
the puzzle was presented.
wrote:
". . . my raaln
the3ls ls a slmple one;

^^

puzzle" (1979,

p. 239).

^

^

Therein, Kripke

^

#

Once he presents the puzzle,
and discusses the

four options considered
above,

Kripke continues,

saying:

SSlblllty SeemS t0 lead us t0
sa 7 something either
Dlain?v°f
ly
f a lse or even downright
®
contradictory.
Yet the
K
J
possibilities
appear to be logically
(‘
exhaustive
979 p. 258-

^

^

.

,

Since there is no easy way to
avoid Kripke's puzzle, we will
consider
what other philosophers have
said about it and some of the
issues it

raises.

We shall first examine the impact
of the puzzle on Michael

Devitt's recently developed theory
of proper names.

puzzle refutes Devitt’s theory.
"solutions” to the puzzle.

We argue that the

We shall then consider various

The ’’solutions” we consider in this
chapter

are united by the fact that each is
designed to preserve the claim that

Pierre does not have inconsistent beliefs.
is unacceptable.

We argue that each solution
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Section Twn

Re=ently

’

ln hlS b °° k
’

th eory of the reference
and

(198,).

Dev itt presented
a causal

waning of proper

names.
Devitt includes a
proposal for the
truth-conditions tor
for belief
ascription sentences.
We will consider
Devitt's theory to the
extent „„
necessary to explain
its solution to a
standard version of the
prohlem of the apparent
failure
or the suhstitutivity
of codesignating name.
We will then see
that this
solution does not work for
Kripke's puzzle. F i„ a
ii y> ue ulll exami „
e a
problem raised for Devitt’s
theoryy bv
Dy lts
its f
a
-n
fa ilure to solve
Kripke's
puzzle.
In

fairness to Devitt. it
should be noted that he
never explicitly
discusses Kripke's puzzle.
Still, as we will see.
he has clear
commitments with regard to
the issues
it raises.

We will approach Devitt's
theory through its application
to the

truth-conditions for sentences.

We first consider his
truth-conditions

for simple sentences that
contain no "intensional" verbs.

We then

consider Devitt's truth-conditions
for belief ascription
sentences.
According to Devitt,

^

3

iS trUe if

7?"!
'Nanaf
Nana Dea^i
Des x & nl
[that
token of] ’cat' App
Designation (abbreviated

’Des’)

is a

x).

(1

([that token of J
98
p. 241)
1 ,

relation that holds between

a nametoken and an object when, and only
when, that token's underlying d-chain

is

Hounded

in

that object.

A token’s

underlying d-chain is the d-chain

that figures causally into the
production of that token.

A

d-chain is

special kind of causal chain running back
from the production of

a

a

token,

possibly through the production of prior
tokens of the same name-type, to
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the object in
which the d-chain
nam iis grounded, a a rrt .,nH,n§ 1S 3 naming
ceremony,
y ’ initlal
initial banf
baptism, or dubbing.
As f ar 33
^Plication
/
hh
(abbreviated

—

<=

•

^

•

«

»Ann»'i>

lf

~

c

.

13 3 Cat

.

•

a

token or

.

oa , applles
t0

thlS 13 an overs
impl ification,

’

but it has

earl " 8 °"

issues we will
encounter.

Illustration,

al

"

"

°f

'

Nana

'

suppose that

d6Sl8nateS

I

3

say 'Nana is

a

« -rly

;;
hmg s g et considerably more
complex, however,
when it
truth-conditions for belief
ascription sentences.

,

cat

•

painless.

conies to

Oevitfs

For Devitt, the
canonical of a de dicto
belief ascription
Si
sentence is
S believes/N is F.
He states the
truth-conditions for such
sentences in terms of
this

example sentence
(30)

Tom believes/Cicero
is an orator.

According to Devitt,

a

token of

W

(30) is true if and only
if Ex Ev E 7 cr fhaf
° °
[that token of] 'Cicero’
cero j£ecy
Soi v & [that. token of]fJ
’orator’ Spec x 4
* Cthat
rth.f t0ken 0f]
'beHevesi App x and (y, ,).
(1981, p. affr

Des

Ai

x &

<.

i

«.

Designation is as before.

The fully understand
Devitt-s truth-conditions

for tokens of (30) we
must see what he means by
specification

(abbreviated -Spec') and how
he understands the locution
-believes" App
to x and (jr, z).' We consider
specification first.
Devitt's book contains

a

glossary of special terms.

Under

'specification' one finds:
The relation that holds between
an expression in a
proposition attitude context and the
mechanism of reference, or
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sets of mechanisms,
it Ci p
( 1981
.
p 278-279)

context].

ex P res sion]

,

In the book's text,

refers to [in that

Devitt says

We can sum up our
discus**-?

10
A name in an opaque
-° n 3S follows:
context specif 1ies^he^
d_Chains in the same
causal network as those

^

under 1 vine
o,a,„3 )involvlng the
name

Specification is

mechanism
reference.

(or,

a

relation that holds between

when the term is general
g nerai,

a

^

-

term-token and its

^

sets of mechanisms) of

A name-token's
mechanism of reference is
the causal

network

of d-chains that contains
that token's underlying
d-chain.
Hence, a
name-token specifies the causal
„u
network noff hd-chams
which contains its
underlying d-chain.
•

Devitt employs his
designation/specification distinction
to much the
same purpose that Frege
employed his reference/sense
distinction.
For
Devitt. the semantically
significant contribution of

a name,

in a non-

intensional context, is its
designation, the thing it designates;
whereas
the semantically significant
contribution of a name, in an
"intensional"
context, is its specification,
the thing it specifies.
a

name-token specifies its "Dev itt-sense."

We will call what

Names specify their Devitt-

senses and (for name-tokens) Dev
itt-senses are causal networks.
Names are not the only terms that
specify.
a

token of

(3)

Indeed, Devitt holds that

is true only if its token of 'orator'
specifies

something.

Without going into what expressions other
than names specify, for this
has no bearing on issues we will be
considering,

Devitt-sense of

a

let us say that

x

given token if and only if that token specifies

Names specify causal networks.

We will take the notion of

network as primitive, subject to two requirements.

a

is the
x.

causal

First, we want to

.
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anew
telev

that causal
isioti

network

networks, it might be
the case that

inN 2 att

—

1

a

at

_

t

(1)

obj ect;

**

"

C3USdl

.

“ here kl

«-

earller

"

^

the same type: and

D,

fi-i-n’

6Very

me," ber

x

and

(y,

proper name

a

the expression

'(£,

z>-

HI-

d-chains in

0,

and 0, underlies a
token of

union of

D,

and D

uas

The reasons for
insisting on these
•

•

requirements are best considered
later
later.

„

and D is grounded
2
in the same

of

grounded in the same naming
ceremony.
y

'"believes" App

Second. ue hold
that

*

^

every member of the
union of

(ii,

t 2.

is identical with
causal network »
2 lf and only
° f a '° halnS
iS
of

,,

thS S

U

every member of the
union of

Where

^

is N

N-,

.

2.

^ 26

.

network

“ here Dl

^

networks and grapevines.
expand;

d-chains in

^

(and the d-chains
they c0 „ taln)>

«.

w* ,turn now
We
to the locution

2 ).'

specifies y and

a

predicate

'F'

specifies

designates the "Dev
itt-propositio,. expressed

the subject-predicate
sentence

*

is

believes that Cicero is an
orator.'

F.'

z

b^y

Suppose that Smith says
'Tom

Provided his token of

'Tom’

designates Tan, what Smith
said is true if and only
if hls token of
'believes' applies to Ton, and
the Dev itt-proposition
expressed by his
token of 'Cicero is an orator.'

to

x

and (i.

z)

Generally,

a

token of 'believes' applies

if and only if the Dev
itt-proposition (*,

z)

is among x's

belief s.
To summarize
say:

a token

of

Devitt's truth-conditions for
a token of (30), „e may
(30)

is true if and only if the
Dev itt-proposition

expressed by that token of 'Cicero
is an orator' is among the
beliefs of

^
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the person designated
by that token of
iom.
-Tom

'

account of belief.

Devitt would "like.,
to maintain that
f

.

,
he beliefs
.

,

.

of

a

person

x

if and only
"iy if

We turn
t
next to Devitt's

Devin^-proposition

a
3

p is among

has assented to

x

a token of
his simple account
of belief raises
some problems.
Devitt
introduces one of these
problems, along with
his proposed
solution, in
the following passage:
,

,

P-

'

The view that thoughts
are attitnH^* <bel
laVi " g deslrln
S.
gualiOcaM
r
bafloatlon
has pointed out that
[Daniel] Dennett
most of the
We believe ab °ht,
New York or salt,
say,
we
y entertain because they
too obvious and boring
are
g
Indeed
0
beUefs tha "
could ever e„tertain,
for we haVe anTr”
infinite number. The
solution is to claim that- if
S that are attitudes
to sentences.
Only they are reorfP"^?
" lnd in general is
Thoa « hb
explained dis^aiUonal lt
bus 3 P erson believes
all the obvious conseauencp^
uand so on) to sentences
needs

’

-

^

ler LI,

.

?

•

S nf

^

^

^

S

this q ualifioatiorrZr
fo°llot

.

Later, in the course of
stating the truth-conditions
of or belief

ascription sentences, Devitt
reminds us that they must
accommodate this
never truly ’’ignored"
qualification:

a gU g
0f
en te r ta in.
i

“

t

.

datte

£FT

i0a

1

core-beliefsf
1

/ ^

0)

have we

om s belief is not a
"core-belief." there

,

n

°

must modlf
d
y the statement of truth
"‘ ,t 1 haVe Sald [so farJ

to

is true but Tom does not

have the required corehe Wl11 be in the appropriate
relationship to other
sen tence fok
S
S
includin S [tokens of] ’Cicero’ and
sori^T
inc^udin, r^u
°r?] orator ’’ which
w°ul d dispose him to be in
°/
that
tionship to a token of 'Cicero is an
orator' were he to
en tertain one; Cicero's being
an orator is an obvious
.

,

.

-

’

1 L

,

consequence of his core-beliefs.

(1981,

p.

237-238)
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(Note that the
statement of the truth
«
r uth— cond
i tions for
(30) glven above
is
Dev ii-t'o
itt s modified
statement of lts
its tru
truth
th-conditions.)
A *vitt-proposition
p ls amMg person x
s oore _ beiiefs
,

such that

-

q

-

assented to

a

expresses the same
Devitt-proposition as
token of 'q.'
a Devith
q
Devitt-proposition
is

y

n is
p

fit
(i)

•

there are Dev itt-propositions
qi1»
core beliefs and

...

%

and

(obvious) consequence of
q,

i

1

•

•

•

among
qn

»

x's

has

x

among person x's

p

,

beliefs if and only if
either

and

core-beliefs or (ii)

such that

q-|

is among x s core .
beliefs

among x's

is

,

an(J

p

.

g

^

,

*

*

*

&

q n*

A Person

believes all the

obvious consequences of his
core-beliefs. 4
The problem of the
apparent failure of the
substitutivity of
codesignating proper names is
usually stated in terms
of such name-pairs
as 'Hesperus, and
-Phosphorus,' and 'Cicero'
and -Tully.' Devltt ,,
theory affords him a solution
to such versions of the
problem; however,
it does not yield a
solution to Kripke's puzzle.
Let us first see how

Devitt would handle the
puzzle of 'Hesperus' and
'Phosphorus.'
Let us suppose that
Pierre uses both 'Hesperus'
and 'Phosphorus' to
designate the planet Venus, but
that he does not realize that
he uses
them to codesignate. One
evening we ask Pierre to
consider the sentences

Hesperus is visible,

Phosphorus is not visible,
and

Phosphorus is visible.

Pierre assents to the first and
second sentences.
third sentence.

He dissents from the

We conclude that Pierre believes that
Hesperus is

visible, that Pie-re
beiieves bbat Phosphorus
ls not
Pierre does not believe
that Phosphorus is
visible.

^
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^^

By concluding that
Pierre believes that
Hesperus is visible
and that
Pierre believes that
Phosphorus is not visible,
we have apparently

committed ourselves to the
view that Pierre both
believes a proposition
and also believes its
denial-that Pierre has
inconsistent beliefs. By
concluding that Pierre believes
that Hesperus is visible
and that Pierre
bees not believe that
Phosphorus is visible, we have
apparently committed
ourselves to a contradiction.
According to Devitt, when we
say that Pierre believes
that Hesperus
is visible, what we say
is true if and only if P
ie rre believes the

Devitt-proposition expressed by our
token of 'Hesperus is visible.'
Also, according to Devitt,
when we say that Pierre does
not believe that
Phosphorus is visible, what we say
is true if and only if it
is not the
case that Pierre believes the
Devitt-proposition expressed by our
token
of 'Phosphorus is visible.'
We have seen that,

according to Devitt, the Devitt-proposition

expressed by our token of 'Hesperus is
visible' is identical with the

Devitt-proposition expressed by our token of
'Phosphorus is visible' only
if the Devitt-sense expressed by
our token of 'Hesperus' is identical

with the Devitt-sense expressed by our
token of 'Phosphorus.'
to Devitt,

According

the Devitt-sense expressed by our token
of 'Hesperus' is

identical with the Devitt-sense expressed by
our token of 'Phosphorus'

only if our tokens of 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus'
are codesignating,
cogrounded tokens of the same name-type.
is

They are codesignating, but it

unlikely that they are cogrounded, and it is certain
that they are not
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of the same type.

of

th6f11
fo 1 1 owi

I„ this way,

Devitt's thee.
h60ry P6mlts hi
"

that own tokens of
'Hesperus' and

Dev itt-sense

;

^

deny each

-Phosphor have

that our tokens of
'Hesperus is visible'
and

'Phosphorus is visibie'
.press the same Dev
itt-propositio„ and that
in
saying that Pierre believe
believes that uHesperus
is visible and that
Pierre does
not believe that
Phosphorus is visible,
we are committed
to a
contradiction. By a similar
line of reasoning, Devitt
can reject the
claim that in saying that
Pierre believes that
Hesperus is visible and
the Pierre believes
that Phosphorus is not
visible, we are co itted
to
the view that Pierre
has inconsistent, or
contradictory beliefs.
Devitt has a solution to
the puzzle of 'Hesperus'
and
;

m

-Phosphorus.’

Whether or not his solution
is acceptable depends
in part on the merits
of his theory.
We will not consider the
merits of the theory. Rather,
we
w that Devitt cannot give
a similar solution
to Kripke's puzzle.
At bottom, Devitt's
solution to the puzzle of
'Hesperus'
and

'Phosphorus'

rests on his claim that
because our tokens of 'Hesperus'
and

Phosphorus' are not codesignating,
our

cogrounded tokens of the same
type,

tokens of 'Hesperus' and
'Phosphorus' do not have the same
Devitt-

sense.

An analogous treatment of
Kripke's puzzle must rest on
the

analogous claim about tokens of
'Londres' and -London.'
a

That is,

to give

solution to Kripke's puzzle, Devitt
must maintain that because tokens

of 'Londres' and 'London' are
not codesignating,
same type,

cogrounded tokens of the

tokens of 'Londres' and 'London' do
not have the same Devitt-

sense.

Devitt actually has a view about he
Dev itt-sense of 'Londres' and
'London.'

Along with other important parts of
his theory, it is
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presented in the following
passage:
I talk of
d-chains as being Dart- nr m-u
6 ° aUSal
network."
Is anything more
required for tn
f"" that
concern the same name and
they
same object" ^e d!,
there is: they must be
discussion suggests
linked int-n nif W ° rkS
arising from the
same grounding (including
same namine ° eremm
* or suitable
substitute).
And this seems intuTt,®
oorreot here
there are two distinct
Suppose
communities which
each other, but both
10
6 Wlth
communities by chaLeTiTindTh"
g iving the same name
to an object.
Could an opaque belief
taternent including
name token arising form
a
one
nami
i
naming
be confirmed by an
°
exoression nr
*
8 3
t0k6n arising from
another?
The
,

-

^

»

’

•

situation ^s^so”

pretheoreticai

"°

cT

'It*

that the
.^he case of the two
communities raises the matter of
ellefs to those who speak
another language
Names thatTtr^ ^

a ..

streLrto

he S

e n

ai

t

r

rivH

:;:

r

e‘

Nevertheless

*

this liberality cannot

r^

For if we allow that they
could, how could we deny that (W)
true if Tom assents to -Tully
is an orator' but di^ents
from
Cicero is an orator'?
(Devitt, 1981, p. 239-240)
In the above passage, Devitt

the same causal network

(i.e.,

-i

*

tells us that two name-tokens specify

have the same Dev itt-sense) exactly
when

they are codesignating tokens
of the same type whose underlying
d-chains
are grounded in the same naming
ceremony.

This is the source of our

earlier account of the identity conditions
for causal networks.
the point of Devitt's 'Everest' example.

Two communities,

X and

tokens of 'Everest' to designate one and
the same mountain.
time

t

Y,

use

Prior to

there was no (significant) causal connection
between the two

communities.
y,

This is

At time t a member,

x,

of community X overhears

of community Y say 'Everest is tall.'

y

a

member,

has used 'Everest' to refer
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to the very mountain

and other members of
community X use 'Everest'
to
refer to. Nevertheless,
according to Devitt,
x would be
saying something
~ ,
he were to return
to his community
and issue the
following
’y

x

believes that Everest is
tall.

to Devitt. the
Devitt-sense

x

This is because,

according
would thereby express
by his use of

•Everest' would not be
identical with the
*vitt-sense y expresses by
his
uses of 'Everest, Since,
the two
have

_ities

never causally

interacted, the causal
network specified by y's
tokens of 'Everest'
cannot be the causal network
specified by x's token of
-Everest,
also makes it clear that
one speaker's token of
a name
sentence can express the same
Devitt-proposition as another
speaker's
token of the same name
sentence type. So we can
speak of the proposition
typically expressed by tokens
of a sentence type. This
is why I insisted
that causal networks
(and the d-chains they
contain) be allowed to grow

over time.
Finally, the preceding passage
contains Devitt’s view about
the
Devitt-sense of 'Londres' and 'London,
Devitt holds that typical
tokens
of 'Londres' and 'London' are
codesignating, cogrounded tokens
of the
name type.
They specify the same causal
network; and, therefore,
they have the same Devitt-sense.

This means that Devitt cannot
give

a

solution to Kripke's puzzle analogous
to his solution to the puzzle of
'Hesperus'

that

and

'Phosphorus,

Such

because tokens of 'Londres'

and

cogrounded tokens of the same type,
not express the same Devitt-sense.

solution would depend on the claim

a

'London'

are not codesignating,

tokens of 'Londres' and 'London' do

Devitt explicitly rejects this claim.
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Let us consider a
consequence of Ue
Devitt's
v itt s vi
PU about
K
view
the Devitt-sense
of Londres' and 'London.'
Pierre expressed the
same Dev itt-proposition
by his use of
(1)

Londres est jolie

that we would express by
our use of
(3)

London is pretty,

were we to say,

'

Ple rre believes that
London is pretty.’

By Devitt’s own
admission, the Dev itt-proposition
typically expressed by tokens
of (1) is
identical with the Dev
itt-proposition typically expressed
by tokens of
(3).
Among Pierre's core-beliefs
are the Dev itt-proposition
typically

expressed by tokens of (,)

expressed by tokens of

(3))
J"

(i.e.,

the Dev itt-proposition
typically

an d tne
dnu
the Devit-f
itt-proposition
•

typically

expressed by tokens of
(2)

London is not pretty;

Pierre has assented to

(1)

and

(2).

These are contradictory Devitt-

propositions; and, therefore, unless
there is
such that p is not an obvious
consequence

,

a

Dev itt-proposition,
p,

for Pierre, of the Devitt-

propositions expressed by typical
tokens of

(2) and

(3),

according to

Devitt's own theory, it follows that
Pierre believes every Devitt-

proposition.
Of course,

Pierre does not believe everything.

disposed to assent to every sentence he
understands.

He is certainly not

Devitt's theory

fails to solve Kripke's puzzle, and its
failure to do so raises
for Devitt's views about

a

problem

belief.

We will consider an objection to the
preceding discussion.

One

sympathetic with Devitt might object that Devitt was
simply mistaken— too
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and avoid the
conclusion that Pierre belie

either

,
'L
„
Londres.

'London'

and

are of the

.London,

-erything by denying
that

are cogrounded or
that .Londre, and

same name-type.

We should not be
swayed by this objection.

and

London"

are

not

in

In the first place,
even

fact codesignating,

cogrounded
tokens of the same type,
they could have been.
We could concoct an
example like the one about
Pierre and his dispositions,
but which
involves codesignating,
cogrounded tokens of the
same type. In which
case, Kripke-s puzzle
would still arise. (As
a matter of fact,
Kripke
states a version of his
puzzle which does involve
codesignating,
cogrounded tokens of the same
type.5) In the seoond
place>
f
speculate about Levitt's
motivation for allowing that
'Londres' and
,

'London' express the same
Dev itt-sense,

the most reasonable answer
is

that he did so because he
wanted to allow that
s

to

(1)

common belief.

and a typical

^

a

typical Frenchman who

Englishman who assents to

(3)

exhibit a

Fregean theories make it unlikely
that this is so, and,

in this regard, if Devitt
were to succeed, his theory
would better accord

with our ordinary intuitions.
'Londres'

and

-London' do not

have to deny that

a

express the same Devitt-sense,

typical Frenchman who assents to

Englishman who assents to
To close,

However, if Devitt were to maintain
that

(3)

exhibit

a

he would

(1) and a

typical

common belief.

let us summarize the basic moves
Devitt must make to avoid

the problems raised by Kripke's
puzzle.

One is to modify ''his" account

of what it is for two tokens to have
the same Devitt-sense.

Another is
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to modify his solution
to the objection Dennett
raised against his
original account of belief.
A third mov e is to
give a plausible account
o
obvious consequence'" one
that pemits a solution
to Dennett's
Problem but which also explains
why we neither find,
„or expect to find
Pierre racing through the
streets of London proclaiming
that the moon is
made of Carl Sagan's old
sneakers.

Section Three

In a recent

presented

a

article. "Names and Belief"
(1981),

version of the description theory
of proper names and

proposed a solution to Kripke's
puzzle.

mistake to conclude,
(1)

Noonan maintains that it is

a

on the basis of Pierre's
assent to

Londres est jolie,

that Pierre believes that London
is pretty.

conclude,

Harold Noonan

He says we are right to

on the basis of Pierre's assent to
(2)

London is not pretty,

that Pierre believes that Uindon is
not pretty.

If Noonan is right about

this, then we are not committed to
the view that Pierre has inconsistent

beliefs, nor are we committed to the
contradictory conclusion that Pierre
both does and does not believe that London
is pretty.

According to Noonan,
assent to

(1)

the critical step in Kripke's move from
Pierre's

to the conclusion that Pierre believes that
London is

pretty is the step from
(C)

to

'Pierre crois que Londres est jolie' is

a

truth of French,

99
(D)

r

^U

belleves that LOnd
:h .

™

Noonan correctly notes fhaf fu D
„
that the ,o,e from

Pretty, is a truth of

(c)

to (D) rests on
KripKe's

translation principle together
with the assumption
that
(E)
Pierre believes that
London is pretty
translates
Pierre crois que Londres
est jolie.

(B)

AS far as Noonan is
concerned the guilty part
is the assumption that

translates

(B);

he never questions the
translation principle.

(E)

So we find

him claiming:

...

the assumption that (E)
translates rm in *u

vnuTvr
To summarize:

sr

pierre

According to Noonan, we cannot
generate

because the move from

(C)

to

(D)

is illicit;

the move from

illicit because it depends on the
false assumption the
(B).

.

(E)

a

puzzle

(C)

to

(D)

is

translates

We need to see why Noonan thinks
that (E) does not translate (B).
Noonan avers that (E) does not
translate (B) because,
.

.

contains

098^

p.

.

a

and (E) differ in subject matter,
the former
reference to the French work -Londres’
where the
3 ref6renCe to the E "glish
word -London.-

(B)

fosj)

Noonan holds that for an English
sentence S to (strictly) translate

French sentence

S-,

S and

S-

must have the same subject matter; they
must

be about all the same things.

holds that

(E)

This seems reasonable.

and (B) differ in subject matter.

solve Kripke-s puzzle rests on his claim that
subject matter.

a

So,

(E) and

In addition he

Noonan's attempt to
(B)

have different
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This seems wrong.

(E)

and (B)

tmngs.
things-

Pierre, the belief-relati

pretty
Pretty.

C
t
Contrary
to what

»•

311

™ “

an<J

onl * <*• some

thS Propositio
" that

’

Undon

is

Noonan says in the
above

So much for a strict
and literal reading
of Noonan's case
against
ranslating (B) as <E,
Perhaps Noonan's
^sition can be reformulated
so
as to appear less

implausible.

Noonan never reallv savs
y says so, but uhis case against
asain^i- the
assumption that
<E) tranSlaUS <B)
mlght tu
O" tM, truth-conditions
for belief
ascription sentences.
Noonan holds that, where
S is a speaker, S's
use
Of

™

if eitherf

beUeV6S that

(1)

^

e X Pr

y

a°nd

*»«»»«-

Rarph%; i ;«e3 ;h a t

[

Catiline' may be true

:

a ’ren^un^d'camin^

101601

or
(11>

a^d

oTA

(Noonan^
Where 'a

1

.'

Tull y' expresses

;

hat

98 1 ^ pX® 99 ^

C

®

<r
in S's idiolect
denou " oed Catiline],

designates a sense expressed by
sane definite description,
'the-F', and '[ex denounced
Cat! line] designates the
proposition that
the-F denounced Catiline.
This suggests the following
treatment of
Kripke's claim that Pierre
believes that London is pretty:
'

•

6 °f

true

'

Neither?
(i)

Pierre believes that London
1= Pretty' is

For some cc
'London' expresses a in Pierre's
idiolect and Pierre believes that
[a is pretty]
,

or
(ii)

For some a
'London' expresses of in Kripke's
idiolect and Pierre believes that [ccis pretty].
,

.
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Let us tentatively
assume that Noonan s
truth _ oondit ons
set of truth-conditions
could be given for
Kripke's use of
'Pierre crols ,ue Londres
est Jolie’; however,
unlike the account of
Kripke’s use of (E), the
account of Kripke’s use
of (B) would make
,

reference to the word 'Londres
Londres.

truth-conditions of

(B)
IB)

(E)

beginning to sound familiar.
(E)

a

Noonan’s account of the

is about the word

whereas his account

’London.’

This is

All Noonan needs now is the
not(strictly) translates (B) only
if

have the same truth-conditions
Interpreted in this way,

Tn
In i-v-ii®
this way,

is ahonf
„
about the word 'Londres';

of the truth-conditions
for

unreasonable claim that

*

.

(or

<

E)

and (B)

intertranslatable truth-conditions).

Noonan's case seems more plausible.

This discussion indicates that
Noonan’s solution to Kripke’s
puzzle
depends on Noonan’s truth-conditions
for belief ascription
sentences.
This is unfortunate for Noonan
because his truth-conditions are
provably
f al se

Suppose that Brown associates
•London' with 'the most famous
dog';
for Brown the sense of 'London' is
the sense of 'the most famous dog.'

Applying Noonan's truth conditions for
belief ascription sentences, we
discover that if Pierre believes that the
most famous dog is pretty, then
Brown's use of (E) is true,
have.

regardless of what other beliefs Pierre might

This seems incorrect.

Suppose that Pierre associates 'London' with
'the most famous dog';
for Pierre the sense of 'London' is the sense
of 'the most famous dog.'

Applying Noonan's truth-conditions for belief
ascription sentences, we

discover that if Pierre believes that the most famous dog
is pretty, then

,
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Brown's use of

(El

i

<?

Pe8a
'

have

.

This,
This

too,
t

^

"

bellefs Pi

seems incorrect.

—

-l«ht

On the basis of this
discussion, „ e conclude
ae that ho
Noonan has failed
to explain why (E)
does not translate
«•
ansiate (B1
(B).
Since
his proposal for
solving Kripke's puzzle
r
depends on fho
ucpenus
i
the claim
m thaitnat (E) does not
translate
<B>. we have no
reason for accepting his
proposal.
Noonan has not solved
•

Kripke's puzzle.

Section Four

D.

Puzzle"

Over proposes

E.

a

solution to Kripke's puzzle
in "On Kripke's

over tries to show that
Pierre's linguistic
behavior and
Kripke's principles do not
conn.it us to the
conclusion that Pierre has
(,

983 ).

inconsistent beliefs.

Toward this end, Over maintains
that although

Pierre's assent to
(

2

London is not pretty

)

(in

conjunction with Kripke's principles)
commits us to the conclusion
that Pierre believes that
London is
not pretty,

(1)

Pierre's assent to

Londres est jolie

(even in conjunction with Kripke's
principles) does not commit us to
the

conclusion that Pierre believes that
London is pretty.
According to Over,

Kripke's inference from Pierre's
assent to

( 1 )

the conclusion that Pierre
believes that London is pretty is defective

because
.

1983,

.

p.

Kripke misuses the translation principle
*
253)
.

(Ov er

to
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In the passage
that follows.

Over explains
exolain* khow he
would handle Pierre's
,.

uses of ’Londres':

Suppose
that Pierre
n
3 Sh ° rt time
He returns to
in
London on aVrJ
the new ch ^"el
tunnel. ... He boards
the trai i„" P ris
’
•
sophisticated train (very
.
The
fasti ,
.

.

.

,.

Paris.

.

•

•

5.“.'

ivrrs,

rr-around—

London as soon as possible.
8

principles
principles^"
.

.

“? we^^tion
.

[

]

I

must go to

and translation

infer:

Pierre believes that
this is London.
3

Werre
occasion,
thls
6
that this is not
L.ndo^Ud^eleMe^lrtLVthisTs
cnat thls ls Londres.
These are the beliefs
.•
whinh OV nio'
tempted to say that he has
iT^SIStent beliefs"
ueiiets. ’ But we would
not be able to pyniain u,- c K u
0
376 t0 h ° ld
that he had inconsistent
beliefs^ f w^foll”
f llowed K rlpl<e and
translated Pierre's use of Me a’
ondres as ?London.'
(Over, 1983,
p. 253-254)

^fl*

•

"^^

,

In

Over's example,

Pierre assents to 'This is
Londres.'

that Pierre also assents
to 'This is not London.'
we conclude,

on

Over

Let us assume

records

that

the basis of Pierre's
assent to 'This is Londres,
that

Pierre believes that this is
Londres, but not that Pierre
believes that
this is London.
(This is easier to understand
if „ e assume ourselves to
be present when Pierre
arrives in London.) Over would
have us conclude,
on the basis of Pierre's
assent to 'This is not London,
that Pierre

believes that this is not London, but
presumably not that Pierre believes
that this is not Londres.

Over’s treatment of his own example
suggests his treatment of
Kr lpke's puzzle.

Over recommends that on the basis of
Pierre’s assent to

_
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(D, we conclude that
Pierre believes
3 that Londres
To a
that Pierre believes
that London is pretty
p etty.
0vPr
Over

basis of Pierre's assentassent to

(2),

^

pretty, but not

recommends that on the

we conclude that
Pierre believes that

London Is not pretty,
but not that Pierre
believes
-neves that Londres
a
is not
pretty.
,

Let us summarize Over's
response to Kripke's puzzle.
Over wants to
avoid the conclusion that
Pierre has inconsistent
beliefs.
So he tries
to block the inference
to the conclusion that
Pierre believes that
London
is pretty; he has nothing
to say against the
conclusion that Pierre
believes that London is not
pretty. He claims that the
inference to the
conclusion that Pierre bpi
i ovoc
believes
that London is pretty depends
on the
false assumption that Pierre's
uses of 'Londres' must be
translated as
a_ i_

'London.'

Finally,

r

,

in place of the belief
that London is pretty.

Over

recommends the belief that Undres
is pretty as the belief
exhibited by
Pierre's assent to (1 ).
There are at least two major
problems with Over's treatment of
Kripke s puzzle.
First, the move from Pierre’s
assent to (1) to the

conclusion that Pierre believes that
U>ndon is pretty has nothing to do
with translating Pierre's uses of
'Londres'

attempt to block the move fails.

as

'London.'

So,

Over's

Second, if we follow Over's

recommendation and conclude that Pierre believes
that Londres is pretty
and that Pierre believes that London
is not pretty, we are still
corrmitted to the conclusion that Pierre has
inconsistent beliefs;

in

fact, we are saying that Pierre believes
what Kripke's original

inferences led us to say he believes.

translation.

Let us attend to the point about
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The only step in the
move from Pierre's assent
to (,) to the
conclusion that Pierre
believes
neves that Ix>ndon is pretty
that involves a
translation of ’Londres' as
’London’ is the step,
steo via the principle
of
translation, from
•

•Pierre orois que Undres
eat jolle'

is a truth of French

to

'Pierre believes that
London is pretty'

is a truth of English.

At this point in the
derivation one is translating
one

sentence_as used

by Kripke, or us, or the
person per^ormiag the derivation..
to another
sentence.
Pierre's use of 'Londrea' is
not involved; we are not

translating Pierre's use of 'Londres.'

Nothing about

Lake's derivation

requires that Pierre ever used
or assented to either of
the sentences

involved

in the translation.

Over has simply misunderstood
Kripke's

inference to the conclusion that
Pierre believes that London is
pretty.
We now turn to the point about
inconsistent beliefs.
Nowhere in the article where Over
proposes his solution to Kripke's

puzzle does Over even

so

much as hint that he intends to employ

a

special

interpretation either of proper names or
of belief ascription sentences.
As a matter of fact, he gives
every indication of intending that this

solution is compatible with

a

Millian theory of the meaning of names;

for

he writes that his examples and his
proposed solution,

... do not establish that ’Londres' and ’London' have
regean senses and are not rigid designators.
(1 983,
p. 255)
This is all quite puzzling, because, according
to the Millian theory and
our standard interpretation of belief
ascription sentences, when we say

that Pierre believes that Londres is pretty we are
saying exactly what we

are saying when we say that Pierre believes that
London is pretty.

If

^
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the belief that London
is prettv
Pretty,

4-u
together
with Pierre's other
beliefs

t-ncr

shows that Pierre has
inconsistent beliefs
UefS th
then s ° *>es the
belief that
Londres is pretty.
Pierre's beliefs are
everyy blt
bit as inconsistent,
when
characterized byy uver,
Over
as uh.n
when "derived" by
Kripke.
'

.

•

We conclude that Over
has fa-M^a
failed on two scores.
fchs

inf'0F0npp

First,

he has failed

+-

the conclusion that
Pierre believes that
London
is pretty.
Second, he ‘has fail
pH to
failed
recommend, as the belief
exhibited
by Pierre's assent
to (1)
a belipf any
on
n
less troublesome than
the one we
already have.

Section Five

In The First Person

0 981) Roderick Chisholm claims

that he can

accommodate the conclusions
that Pierre believes that
London is pretty
and that Pierre believes
that London is not pretty,
and avoid the
conclusion that Pierre thus
stands convicted of harboring
inconsistent or
contradictory beliefs. In his
attempt to solve Kripke's
puzzle, Chisholm
invokes his own views about
proper names, his analysis
of belief, and his
account of belief ascription
sentences.

We have assumed that
propositions are the objects of
beliefs and that
when say that S believes that
p we are, thereby, asserting that the

belief-relation
propositions

a

two-place relation that relates
people and

relates S to the proposition that
p; that

the proposition expressed by

'p.'

is,

relates S to

Chisholm rejects this account as it

applies to our beliefs about particulars,
or as it applies to the beliefs
we express by means of referring
singular terms. To understand

.
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Chisholm's solution to
Kripke's puzzle,

e must first
we
„
understand
certain

features of the view
Chisholm adopts
xii
K
in piace
place of
ot the view we
have
assumed
•

Chisholm holds that

a

person

belief directly about, no
one but
refers to somethin, other
than

only

m

x can

He holds that
whenever a person

x.

x, x

directly refer to, or
have a

does so only indirectly,
and then

virtue of having referred
directly to

whenever

person

a

x

Chisholm holds that

x.

has a belief about a
y distinct form

merely indirectly about

*

_x

and directly about x.

x.

the belief is

According to Chisholm

our beliefs about things
other than ourselves are
mediated through 0

„

beliefs about ourselves.
Chisholm's theory is stated in
terms of the following
primitive
doxastic locution:
T
PrOPerty ° f belng
it to y!

Chisholm holds that
only if y is

x.

a

person

x

£

iS SUOh that

I

attributes

can directly attribute a
property to y

For Chisholm, our beliefs
directly about ourselves are

our direct attributions of
properties to ourselves.

belief that

i directly

For example, my

am alive is my direct attribution
of the property of being

alive to myself (provided it is one
of my beliefs directly about
myself).
If a person x attributes a
property to

and y is diverse from x, then

jr,

that attribution is indirect rather
than direct; moreover,

attributing

property to

a
x.

property to such

a y

only if

Chisholm tells us that

x

x

thereby attributes

indirectly attributes

x

F to y if and only if there is a
relation R such that x bears

to

y

and

property:

x

directly attributes to
tz [Eu (zRu & Vu'

(

zRu

x
1

(i.e.,

u*

succeeds in

=

x

R

a
a

property

uniquely

self-attributes) this

u) & Fu)

].

For Chisholm,
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beliefs indirectly
about things are
indirect attribuf
ibutions of properties
to them
P or example,
Jones’s belief that
Smith
tall just is Jones’s
,
..
n
,
t bbtnibution
of the property
of being tall to
s
indirectly attributed
being tall

^

<?

^—

t
t0
S” lth -

^^

anith is the person

standing directly in
front of Jones, by
y airec
directlv
tly alt
k
attributing
this
property to himself:
Xx
[Ev (y
( v
is the person
~ [Ey
standing in front of
-x
is tall)].
.

& ^
y

When Chisholm states
his theorv'a
ys primitive doxastic
locution, he
adds:

^

predicative^xpression
^P^sion having
P.

28

a

may be replaced by
any
property as its sense.

(1931,

)

This comment is
significant because it
involves one of Chisholm's
principle theses: namely,
that an account of
reference and

intentionality can be given
in terms of a purified
theory of properties.
WHat 3 PUrifl6d the0
-haps best be understood by
contrasting it with a
"non-purified" theory of
properties.
A non-

-

- " “ties

puri fied theory of
properties entails that every
well-formed predicative

expression expresses

a

property.

expresses the P
property
perty of
ol hpincr
being

property of being

a

unicon,,

'

According to such
o
a

dog,

-is

a dog'

as a unicorn’ expresses
the

ls identical with London'
expresses the

expresses the property of beigg

a

and 'is a round square'

round sauare.

the first two expressions,

unicorn,' express properties,

theory,

»•
<

property of being identical
with London,

purified theory,

a

According to Chisholm's

'is

a

dog’

and 'is a

but the last two expressions,

with London,' and 'is a round
square,' do not.

predicative expression succeeds in
expressing

'is

identical

Chisholm maintains that
a

property only if it can

a
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be paraphrased so as
to eliminate any
reference to a particular
Accordingly. u „ le ss -Is
Identical with Londoncan he paraphrased
so as
to eliminate reference
to London, -is
Identical with Londondoes not

express

a

property.

(Oiisholm „ould llkely
malntaln

with London- does not admit
of suoh a paraphrase,

^^

Chisholm also holds
that although properties
need not be exemplified,
properties are
exemplifiable. Since it is
impossible for seething to
be both round and
square, the expression
-is a round square’
expresses a property onl; if
it

expresses an impossible

According ly,

'is a round

(i.e.,

unexemplifiable)

property.

square’ does not express a
property.?

Chisholm's views about properties
are important for us for two
reasons.
First, when we evaluate Chisholm's
treatment of Kripke’s puzzle
(and modifications of Chishoim-s
explicit statement of his treatment),
„e

will want to verify that they are
acceptable to Chisholm.
identical with London- expresses

a

Second, if -is

property, that property will be an

essence of London; and we want to
at least try to solve Kripke-s
puzzle
in a way that does not comnit us
to the view that (there are essences

and)

we

are acquainted with essences when
we use proper names. It may be

that a solution to Kripke's puzzle
coumits us to essences; however, until
we have good reasons for thinking
that we need essences to solve the

puzzle, we will reject any solution that
resorts to essences.
We are not in a position to consider
Chisholm's treatment of Kripke's

puzzle.

Recall that Pierre’s behavior toward
(1)

Londres est jolie,

in conjunction with Kripke's principles,

forces us to conclude that
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Pierre believes that
London is prettv

and 8130
i

P1

toward
(2)

—

S b

^-lor

London is not pretty,

in conjunction
with

Kri pke ’s principles,

forces
ces us to conclude
,
that

ierre believes that
London is not Pretty.
prettv

n our
On
reading Q f belief

ascriptions, we must
conclude thatthat Pierre uhas
inconsistent beliefs:
he
-Ueves both a proposition and
its denial. Chisholm
sa y s that Pierre
does not have contradictory
or inconsistent
beliefs. According to
Chisholm, Pierre does
not believe both a
proposition and its denialrather, according to
Chisholm the conclusions
that Pierre believes
that
London is pretty and
that Pierre believes
Deileves that London
a
is not pretty, when
properly understood, are
about Pierre's
self-attributions of noncontradictory (or consistent)
properties. Thus Chisholm
writes:
•

r

If we interpret the
two sentences-

pretty'

ip-,-^

u

£ ESSjJ

is true in virtue of

I

flnd

\

^^

t

.

the 3 “°" d sentence

h ® attributes to himself
the
property of being such that “th iw1
6 USUally uses '-"don'
to designate is pretty.^
(1981, p ."^)

Chisholm holds that we can truly
say that Pierre believes
that London is
pretty because Pierre
self-attributes property F, :
Xx [E y (* nornlally
uses 'Londres' to designate
y and y is pretty)].

In addition, Chisholm
holds that we can truly say
that Pierre believes that London
is not

pretty because Pierre self-attributes
property F 2 :
uses 'London' to designate
y

and

1

is not

pretty)].

exemplify both F, and F at one and the
same time:
2
F
1

/x

[Ey (x nontally

Pierre could
his self-attribution

and F 2 is neither contradictory
nor inconsistent.

F-|

and F 2

.

are

(

a PP

,e ntly)

purlfled properties;
nelther

to any P-rtioul.r.

_

^

^

Ill

However, Chishoim's
treatment of these
ascriptions is
unacceptable. This is because
the ascriptions could
be false even if
Pierre self-attributes
both F, and F,
Thls can be illustrated
by an
example involving F-j.

Suppose that Pierre things
he uses -Londres. to
designate southing
pretty,

when in fact he either
never uses 'Londres' or
uses 'Londres' to
designate the neighbor’s
gn
nrpi-f
v nop
T
pretty
cat.
In this case Pierre
self-attributes
F,! nevertheless - Pierre
might not believe that London
is pretty.

This example shows that
F, is not such that
if Pierre self-attributes
it, then it is plausible
to say that he believes
that London is pretty.
The problem with F,
seems fn
P that dto h
be
Pierre can self-attribute F-,
even
though he either never uses
'Londres,' but thinks he does,
or does use
1

'Londres'

to designate

something (pretty),

but something other than

London

Perhaps there is another property
such that if Pierre self-attributes
it,

then we may say that Pierre believes
that London is pretty.

property that might work is F3:

Xx

designate y and y is pretty and in
to designate y)L

Pierre lives in

Perhaps with F
a

3

One

[Ey (x normally uses ’Londres’ to

x’s

culture ’Londres’ is normally used

Chisholm could exploit the fact that

culture where ’Londres’ is used to designate
London.

However, another example will show that F^
will not do.

Suppose that Pierre wakes up one morning, and
sees, left over from
the preceding evening's word game, the word
'Londres.'

very sleepy fellow.

He says to himself,

He is still a

'Surely "Londres" is

a

He pronounces it a couple of times,
being pleased by the sound,

name.'

and says,
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-St

be in the habit of
using "Londres" to
deslsnate
pretty.'
He continues to say
the name. untii he
finally concludes,
•Indeed, like others in
my culture, I must
be in the habit
of using
'I

"Londres" to designate
something pretty.'

In this case Pierre
self-

attributes F ; nevertheless,
Pierre might not believe
3
that London is
pretty.
The problem with
3

i,
is -^u
much the same as that with
F
q

:

Pierre can

self-attribute F3 even though he never
uses 'Londres' (as a name
for
London). What we need is
a property the
self-attribution of which links
Pierre with 'Londres' and
London, and
-Londres'

appropriate way.

Suppose we try F,
:

[E y

(

with London in some

,

normally

to designate y and
y is pretty and in x's culture
'Londres' is normally
used to designate London)].
The proposal we are considering
is that we

may truly say that Pierre believes
that London is pretty because
Pierre
self-attributes F„. With regard
to the belief that Pierre
exhibits by
his assent to (2), this
proposal's counterpart is:
„e may truly say that
Pierre believes that London is
not pretty because Pierre
self-attributes
property F :
5

Xx

[Ey (x normally uses 'Londres'
to designate y and y is

not pretty and in x's culture
'Londres' is normally used to
designate
London)].

Is

it

reasonable to say that Pierre's belief that
London is

pretty comes to nothing more or less
than his self-attribution F, and
that Pierre's belief that London is not
pretty cones to nothing more or

less than his self-attributing F

?

?

Surely it is not.

There are two good reasons to reject this
version of Chisholm's

treatment of Kripke's puzzle.
properties.

First, F ^ and F are not purified
5

Each involves reference to London.

Therefore, this proposal
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~

unaooeptabie to chish ° im

^

^

;; 15 reaS ° nable

F5 ‘

Pl

—

th3t

™“,

he would

..ns

t0

second

"0^ self-attribute
both F

,

, and

^assenting

to <,, and (2) . Thls
because be would be worried
that bis assents to
(„ and (2) uere
misleading his auditors into
thinking that he bad
contradictory or
inconsistent belief's
d-,
Rnf
beliefs.
But Pierre has no such
worries.
So he

u

-

i

does not

self-attribute both F„ and r .
5
both that London is pretty

The concl usions-that
Pierre believes

and also that London
is not

supported by Pierre's
self-attributions of F„ and F c

pretty-are not

9

two versions of Chisholm's
treatment of Kripke's puzzle.

unsatisfactory.

„ ...
Each is

No doubt other versions
can be concocted.

However,
rather than considering them
here, we conclude our
discussion of
Chisholm's work on Kripke's
puzzle with a summary of what
a "Chisholmian"
solution to Kripke's puzzle must
do.
Such a solution must specify
two
properties F and G such that;
(i) it is reasonable to
say that Pierre

self-attributes
attributes

G;

attributes

F,

F;

(Hi)

(ii)
it

it is

reasonable to say that Pierre self-

is reasonable to say that if
Pierre self-

then he believes that London is
pretty; (iv) it is

reasonable to say that if Pierre
self-attributes
G;

(v) both F and G are purified
properties;

inconsistent to self-attribute both F
and

G.

G,

then he believes that

and (vi) Pierre would not be

This is

a

tall order.

Until it is filled, we may conclude
that Chisholm has failed to solve

Kripke's puzzle.
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Section Six

^^

recent article,
''boscription and
Identlfloatiorfl
arrxson presents a version
of t h e description
theory of proper
naaes and
proposes a soiution to
Krip.e's pu
a

22 le.

We

„m

critically evaluate Harrison's
proposed solution.
Harrison claims that,

T^Z

state, explain, a
„d

'
ls ' '
that Pierre
the na” e
'Londres' that it names
some othe^Jt^or
or ’otT
ot ^ er °l
which, as a
matter of fact, is nrpi-i-v
0
3
hav ing different
’
objects, in no way contrad
y contradict
ict^onp
one another.
(1982, p.

believes

'

""T*

'

:

'

,

.

^u^

338)

Harrison clearly intends to
avoid the conclusion that
Pierre has
inconsistent beliefs. According
to Harrison, when Pierre
assents to
(1 ) Londres est
jolie,

Pierre exhibits the belief
that 'Londres' names
according to Harrison,
(2)

a

pretty city.’O

Also>

when Pierre assents to

London is not pretty,

Pierre exhibits the belief
that London is not pretty.
are neither contradictory
nor inconsistent;

and,

These two beliefs

therefore, if Harrison

right, Pierres linguistic
behavior does not convict him of
an

inconsistency.
To understand how Harrison
would avoid the conclusion that
Pierre

believes that London is pretty, we need
to see how Harrison uses the
words 'object' and 'content.' As Harrison
uses the word 'object,' the
object of

a

property to.

belief is the thing the proposition believed
attributes a
As Harrison uses the word 'content,'
the content of a

belief is the property the proposition
believed thus attributes.

For

example, suppose that
Jones believes that
.

proposition that Smith
is tall
tan.

^
^
“
””
»

0

ThaiThat

^
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•

15 tall; Jones
believes

proposition attributes
the

»•

..

....

'

™ aas aj.

its content.

Harrison rejects the
conciusion that Pierre
believes that ionhon is
pretty.
Kripke derived that
conclusion from Pierre's
assent to (,) and
certain principles.
Harrison, who recommends
that we dismiss that
conclusion, must say where
Kripke's derivation breaks
do™. He tries

to

do just that in this
passage:
e

We
PO nt
the argument Whloh
Spates Kripke's
parado" is thn, tH
lS
a tl
Pri "° lple a " d what la
°';
that "it fans to dist i
wrong is
„«ufs h h
dlrect and lndlrect beliefs
about an
°° ntent
not the object of a
bUt
belief.

?

?
^
982,^^7^)
'

Wi.to

Tf,

0

’

Remember that Harrison favors
the description theory of
names.
He
holds that unless a speaker
has "actual epistemic
contact"" with a given
thing he cannot have a belief
directly about that thing; that
is, he
cannot have a belief whose
object is that thing. For
Prison, a belief
is directly about a given
thing if and only if that thing
is that

belief's object.

If Jones believes that
Smith is tall, Jones has a

belief whose object is Smith;

Jones’s belief is directly about
Smith.

But suppose that Jones only
believes that the man next door is
tall, and
not that Smith is tall, where
Smith is the man next door (to Jones).

Then Jones does not have a belief
whose object is Smith; he does not
have
a

belief directly about Smith.

Rather Jones's belief is indirectly
about

Smith and directly about the house
next door.
Now, suppose that

Jones has had no actual epistemic contact
with
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bUt ttat JO " eS SayS

,a" lth iS

«Wle associating the nane
wit, the definite
description -the man
next door,
KripXCs
disquotation principle infoms
us that dones
helieves that Smith is
tan
But, according to
Harrison, this is wrong
g.
He explains why
he takes this
position in the following
passage:

-it,

•

,

Bg 1 if* f'
about an indi^

•

.

^^

belief
idua^doLTeq^^
1 epistemic
contact with
the individual in question
Tf T
Y
mountain called
3
bo ra
which iTtaTl
tall, but
but’‘not which
mountain it is then t am
n
P Sit n t0 e " tertai " a "*
belief about the actual
rasfof sto„ e° anb veg e tation
called
’Chimborazo’ but onlv a hai
k
le r about
the word ’Chimborazo.'
(1982, p. 337)

Z^

'cZ

,

•

r

•

So,

according to Harrison,

a

necessary condition for

belief directly about an object

y_a

have actual epistemic contact
with

a

person

x

to

have

belief whose object is y-is
that

y .'3

a
x

Disquotation, when it involves

a

name sentence, correctly informs
us of both the object and
the content of
a belief only if the believer
has actual epistemic contact
with the
name's referent.

Otherwise it does not give us the
correct object,

but

only the correct content.
If Jones says,

-Smith is tali' but has never
had actual epistemic

contact with Smith, then, according
to Harrison, the most we can
infer is
that Jones believes that the man
next door is tall. The object of
that

belief is the house next door; its content
is the property of being
(inhabited by

a

man who is) tall.

Jones believes that Smith is tall.

Disquotation, however, informs us that
That belief's object would be Smith;

its content would be the property of
being tall .

Again, according to

Harrison, without actual epistemic contact,
disquotation yields the wrong

object but the

''right''

content. 14

We can now return to Kripke's puzzle.
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While

in

Franca,

when he assented to

epistemic contact with
London.

(1),

Plerre laoked aotual

Dlsquotation tells us
that Pierre

believes that London Is
pretty.

But,

by Harrison's lights,
this Is

wrong,

since Pierre lacKs actual
epistemic contact with
London, he
cannot have a belief whose
object is London. Harrison
reports that the
belief Pierre in fact exhibits
by his assent to (1) is
the belief that
'Londres- names a pretty
city.
The content of this
belief, given by
dlsquotation, is the property
of being (the name of) a
£retty city. The
object of this belief, not
given by dlsquotation but by
Harrison's tacit

assumption that Pierre associates
'Londres' with the French
translation
of 'the city named "Londres",'
is the word 'Londres.' Once
in London,
Pierre has actual epistemic
contact with London. So, when
Pierre
assented to

(2),

he exhibited his belief that
London is not pretty.

In

the case of Pierre's assent
to (2), dlsquotation yields
both the correct
content and the correct object of
the exhibited belief.
We have seen how Harrison would
block the move from Pierre’s assent
to

(1)

to the conclusion that Pierre
believes that London is pretty.

We

have also seen what belief Harrison
recommends as the belief behind
Pierre’s assent to

(1).

We will

Harrison’s proposed solution.

I

now consider two objections to

will suggest

respond to the first of these two objections.

way for Harrison to

a
I

regard the second

objection as conclusive evidence that Harrison's
proposal is
unacceptable.
The first objection goes as follows.

actual epistemic contact with London.
it

Once Pierre is in London he has

For if not, dlsquotation errs when

tells us that Pierre believes that London is not pretty.

Pierre

118

continues to assent to

(1)

T
hi „
r
T hl
s fact,
«.

principles and the fact
that Pierre

together with Kripke's
other

W

3 actual epistemic
contact with
yields the conclusion
that Pierre believes
eves that London
a
is prettv
T herefore.
„
Harrison is committed
to the view that
Pierre has
contradictory beliefs.
.

n on,

I

,

1

f ° rmUlate

thS f0ll ° Wi " S

hlS ™° Ve tC L° nd0n
’

,

Pl3rre 333e " tS

f

When, subsequent
to

«>. »e does so on the basis
of

dispositions he formed when
he was in France.

Those dispositions were
acquired before Pierre
had actual epistemic
contact with London and
they
survive the Journey to
Undo, Therefore, the belief
Pierre exhibits by
his assent to 0), once
he is in London, is
the sane belief he
exhibited
by his assent to
<„ before he arrived in Undo,
Tha t belief did not
have London as an object;
and, therefore, the
belief exhibited by
Pierre's current assents
to (1) does
j
aoes nntnot have London
as an object.
So,
Pierre does not believe
that London is pretty.
r

This reply would force
Harrison to modify his views
about
disquotation and actual epistemic
contact.
Let us assume that the
details of such a view could be
worked out; moreover, let
us assume that
Harrison can give a reasonable
account of actual epistemic
contact .

Despite our generosity,

Harrison's solution is unacceptable.

This is

because we would still be able
to show that any acceptable
version of
Harrison's view will protect the
conclusion that Pierre believes that
London is not pretty if and only
if it issues the conclusion
that Pierre

believes that Undon is pretty.

This can be illustrated by considering

the following simple modification
of Kripke's original story about

Pierre.

.
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The modified story
is ni«, v

that Pier

^
sto

:
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,

—
^ “

in that in tha

8 S60tl0n ° f

move.

,

mOV6d t0 thS U§ly
SeCti ° n

.

e

•

° rl8lnal

° f U)ndon ‘

^
—-

the ti me

W

•*-

Hls

Offers from the
French

-th Ulndon before hls
move 15
dlrect and intimate
as his contact
with London after
the
Therefore, Pierre hs-?
t
actual epistemic
contact with London

” OVS

"

and ° nly

before his move.

""

Hence,

after

»“ “‘“1 -Pi-t-ic

contact with London

Pierre’s assent to

<2 >
exhibits his belief
that
London is not P rett if
y
and onl y if his
assent to <„ exhibits
his belief
that London is prett

y.

How might Harrison
respond to this objection?

"

3

deS ° ripti ° n

Recall that Harrison

He might maintain
that we are right:

if

Pierre has actual
epistemic contact with
london *en he assents
to (2)
then Pierre has actual
epistyle contact with London
when he assents
(1)i

a"d

’

theref ° re>

lf P1

—

to

“‘“l

epistemic

contact with London,
He believes that London
is pretty if and only
if he believes that London
is not pretty. Harrison
might go on to say that
since this

would convict

who we know has consistent

beliefs-of having inconsistent

beliefs, it follows that
Pierre does not have actual
epistemic contact
with London, either before
or after he moves.
Of course,

if Harrison were to adopt
this position he would lose
the

conclusion that Pierre believes
that London is not pretty.

This is

because, according to Harrison,
Pierre cannot believe that
London is not
pretty unless he has actual
epistemic contact with London. This
conforms
to my original claim.
I claimed that any
acceptable version of
Harrison’s modified view protects
the conclusion that Pierre believes
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that London is not
pretty just in case it
also lssues the
conclusion that
Pierre believes that
London is Pprettv
Pp rha
u
y*
Perhaps
Harrison would reply
that
Pierre’s beliefs are not
really direct!l yv about
ah
London tut are, instead,
directly about areas, parts,
portions, ur
or sections of
h
London.
If he were
to .aKe this move he
*
would sacrifice the
conclusion that Pierre
believes
that london is not pretty;
Harrison says that Pierre
does believe that
London ls not pretty.
Furthermore, it is by no
means olear th>t the
sacrifice would be worth
train
c
the gain.
For
a version of Kripke's
puzzle
•

.

,

could always be generated
for an area, part,

portion,

or section of
After all, London is
nothing m0 re than an area,
part, portion,
or section of Greater
Metropolitan London.

London.

Looking back over this chapter,
it is clear that the
philosophers
whose views we have discussed
have a considerable stake in
the claim that
Pierre has consistent beliefs.
Kripke says that it is a mistake
to say
that Pierre is guilty of an
inconsistency.
Devitt's theory of the

meaning and reference of proper
names flounders on the discovery
that it
is

comitted to the view that Pierre has
inconsistent beliefs.

Finally,

the various philosophers whose
proposed solutions we have considered
all

mean to avoid the conclusion that
Pierre's beliefs are inconsistent.
Kripke's contention that it is a
mistake to convict Pierre of having

inconsistent beliefs is based on two
related considerations.

First,

no

matter how much Pierre compares his
various beliefs, so long as he is

unaware that 'Londres' and 'London'
codesignate,
to detect any inconsistency.

Pierre will not be able

Second, Pierre will not draw the sorts
of

conclusions readily available to one who has
premises p and -p at his
disposal

even if we tell him that every proposition
is entailed by an
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inconsistent set of
propositions.
It

would be a mistake
t0 exclude, from
the fanure of
Proposed solutions based
on the claim that
Pierre's beliefs are
not
inconsistent, that Pierre's
beliefs are inconsistent.
Nevertheless. the
ailure of such solutions
should give us pause:
DaU seu
perhaps
Pierre's beliefs
are inconsistent. In
the chapter
that foil
P
follows we abandon our
tacit
assumption that Pierre does
not have inconsistent
beliefs.
>

.
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Notes

1

e

th60ry refUted 13 ° ne
P resen ted by Michael
Devitt
2 The
solutions are given by
Poderick Chisholm

Harrison (1982), Harold
Noonan (1981)
v

will assume that

(4,

and

(5,

and D
ana
D.

F
E.

(, 9 81).

n
Over
(1983)

are sentences of
English.

interesting to note that
this account of belief
leaves Devitt
MltH the Pr0ble " ° f Sayl
" g Hhat
a person to cease
believing
something.
Such an explanation is
not given in Devitt
(1981).

“ -

S

6

I

the

Paderew3k1

’

example given by Kripke

have taken 'consequence

of'

to mean

This may not be Devitt-s
intended meaning.

of

to mean

.dispositional,

or causal,

(

1979 ,

p.

n™-;
logical consequence

265-266).

i

of.'

He may be using
.consequence

consequence of.

If so,

he owes

us an account of what it
is for one Devitt-proposition
to be a

dispositional consequence of
another Devitt-proposition,
or set of
Devitt-propositions.
As the story of

Pierre is presented, we do
not

expect every Devitt-proposition
to be

a

dispositional consequence of the

set of all Devitt-propositions
that Pierre believes.

But had we

concluded that Pierre believes
that london is pretty on the
basis of an
assent to sentence (3), rather than
sentence (1), we would expect every
Devitt-proposition to be a dispositional
consequence of the set of all
Devitt-propositions that Pierre believes.
Yet, in the two cases all and
only the same Devitt-propositions
are believed by Pierre. This
suggests
that something is amiss with the
notion of one Devitt-proposition being
a

dispositional consequence of another
Devitt-proposition, or set of
Devitt-propositions
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^Chisholm sets forth
his purified
theoryy of properties
Tho _.
First„ Person (1981,
.
5.9).

—

in his book
’

p

8

The principle
Chisholm is referring
to is:
If it can be
correctly said nr *
PerSO " - ln ^listi
he believes that a
that
isF' (where 'a' „,
proper name and 'F'
ouples th e place of
the place of =~
a
S has a belief
ex P r «sion), then
whi'ch could be
expressed
a way that its
la " gUage in such
English translation
00u id he ara Phrased
F,’ wherein the
name replacing -a°
as -a is
is the r
f
certain proper name
of a
in S's language.
(,» “(,
.

-

can say that Pierre
believes that L ondon
is

7*

pretty^

this principle.
9

t

looks like F

4

and F

Kripke's original puzzle.

using

FV

a

5

not violate

can be used to
generate a puzzle like

Putting the question
to Pierre in Fre„ch-by

French predicative
expression-Pierre will say
he self-attributes

But. if we put the
question to him in

E„glish_by using

an

English

predicative expression-Pierre
will deny that he
self-attributes F„.
this point,
not,

if, easy

to imagine Kripke
asking,

-Does

Pierre,

At

or does he

self-attributed F^?'
1°u

rn son

holds that when

associates U» with

a

a

speaker,

S,

uses a proper name,

'N,'

S

definite description which
wither makes reference

to <*' or makes reference
to an act of reference
to the referent of 'N.'
This is why,
the examples we consider,
we find Harrison using
definite
descriptions which contain proper
names as the definite
descriptions
backing uses of proper names.

m

"Harrison neglects to explain what
he means by 'actual epistemic
contact.'

His notion of actual
epistemic contact is similar to
Russell's

notion of direct acquaintance.

However,

Harrison's notion of actual

epistemic contact is not identical
with Russell's notion of direct

3.
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acquaintance.

Harrison allows that Pierre
has actual epistyle
contact
with London but Russell would
not have allowed that
Pierre has direct
acquaintance with London.
Let us say that Pierre
has actual epistemic
contact with London provided
he either sees, touches,
hears, tastes, or

smells
12

(a

part of) London.

It is because Harrison
typically uses definite descriptions
that

contain the proper names they back
that he says that the belief's
object
is a proper name.
1

Harr ison needs to explain what
happens to Pierre’s belief that

London is not pretty if Pierre leaves
London for the weekend and ceases
to have actual

epistemic contact with London.

If Pierre’s beliefs

directly about London are not lost, then
Harrison’s views about the
connection between actual epistemic contact
and direct belief are
violated.

Yet,

it seems odd to say that Pierre loses
all

(and hence his knowledge)
for a drive through the

directly about London as

a

his beliefs

consequence of going

English countryside, and (as we may reasonably

assume his must) that he regains such beliefs
(and knowledge) upon his
return

This is obviously false.

Strictly speaking, when disquotation

fails to correctly identify the object of

a

given belief, it is likely to

fail to correctly identify that belief’s content.

correctly identify

a

When it fails to

given belief’s object, disquotation really just

"helps" us determine that belief's content.

CHAPTER
KRIPKE'S PUZZLE ABOUT
BELIEF:

I

V

INCONSISTENCY SOLUTIONS

preceding chapter, several
atte.pt. to solve
Kripke’s puzzle
We re ° rltl0ally
6ValUated
E
h
preserved the consistency
of
Pierre’s beliefs.
So, there is a
significant sense in
which the chapter
was dominated by the
assumption that Pierre’s
beliefs are not
inconsistent.
That assumption is now
dropped.
I„ de ed, I win
maintain
that Pierre believes
both that London is
pretty and that London
is not
pretty; and therefore,
that Pierre has inconsistent
beliefs.
Kripke gave two related
reasons for rejecting the
view that Pierre
has inconsistent beliefs.'
first, Pierre is apparently
unable to infer
all that such beliefs would
entail. For example, if
Pierre believes both
that t°ndon is pretty and
that Undon is not pretty,
then he believes two
propositions which jointly entail,
say,
-

~

that New York is pretty;

nevertheless, we do not expect
Pierre to be able to infer
that New York
is pretty.

Second,

Pierre is apparently unable
to detect any

inconsistency among his beliefs.

No matter how much introspective

comparison occurs and no matter how
carefully Pierre thinks about his
beliefs, he will no t come to
see that his beliefs are
inconsistent.
Because

I

hold that Pierre has inconsistent
beliefs,

Kripke's assertion that such a
view is mistaken.

I

must deal with

In this chapter,

two

articles on Kripke's puzzle, and related
issues, by Ruth Barcan Marcus
are considered . 2

An

explanation of why there is nothing wrong
with

saying that Pierre has inconsistent
beliefs is constructed on the basis

of things Marcus says in the two
articles.
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It is argued that such an
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explanation is unacceDtahi
^
oceptable.
ewis is then considered.3

a
A

co^entary on Kripke's
puzzle by David

The general outline
e o
oft

a solution
so, rto Kripke's
puzzle, developed from nertain
certain things suggested
by what Lewis says,
Is
presented.
My solution comes
complete with an
explanation off why
h
there
is nothing wrong with
the view that Pierre
re has in™
inconsistent beliefs.
•

«.

Section One

Ruth Barcan Marcus
discusses Kripke's puzzle
(1)
in two recent articles:
"A Proposed Solution
to a Puzzle about Belief"
(1981) and "Rationality
and

Believing the Impossible"

(1983).

On the basis of Pierre’s
assents to

Londres est jolie
and
(2)

London is not pretty,

Marcus concludes that Pierre
believes that London is pretty and
that
Pierre believes that London is
not pretty.
She acknowledges that this
commits her to the view that Pierre
has inconsistent beliefs.
argues that it is
(3)

a

Marcus

mistake to conclude, from Pierre's
withheld assent to

London is pretty,

that Pierre does not believe that
London is pretty.

She modifies

Kripke's disquotation principle so that
Pierre's assent to
(5)

Londres is not London

does not yield the conclusion that, before
he learns that 'Londres' and
'London' codesignate,

London.

Pierre believes that Londres is not identical with

(Her modified disquotation principle allows
her to retain the
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conclusion that Pierre
believes that London
is pre
tty and the
P
th
conclusion
that Pi
Pierre ubelieves that
London is not pretty.)
y
finally,
Finallv Marcus
„
would
prohibit inferring from
Pierre's refusal
J

to assent to

(4)

Londres is London,

that before he learns
that the two names
codesignate Pierre does
not
believe that Londres is
London.

Knpke gave

two related reasons
for holding that
Pierre should not be

convicted of harboring
inconsistent beliefs. Pirst,
to the extent that
Pierre can compare his
various beliefs, no matter
how good

a logician he
no amount of introspective
comparison will help Pierre
detect any
inconsistency among his beliefs.
Second, no matter how
good a logician
Pierre is, he will „ 0t
draw-in fact it would be a
surprise if he did
draw-the kinds of conclusions
available to someone who
possessed

is,

inconsistent premises, even if
he is told flat out that
any proposition
is entailed by an inconsistent
set of propositions. A
proposed solution
which entails that Pierre has
inconsistent beliefs but which
fails to
ease our worries-worries
shared by Chisholm, Devitt,
Harrison, Kripke,
Noonan, and

Over— about

saying that Pierre has inconsistent
beliefs is at

best only half complete.*

It is one

thing-™

assert that Pierre has inconsistent
beliefs.
a

far more difficult

easy thing at that-to
It is quite another

thing-to explain why there

thing-

is nothing wrong with

saying that Pierre has inconsistent
beliefs.

Marcus denies that Pierre believes
everything.

There are certain

propositions that Marcus says Pierre does
not believe.

She is aware of

Knpke's claim that Pierre does not have
inconsistent beliefs.

She does

not say why she thinks it is worth pointing
out that Pierre does not
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believe the propositions
she says he does not
believe
neve.

So,
So
we cannot be
certain that she denies
that Pierre
rierre hpiio
believes what she denies
that he
believes in response to Kripke's
claim that Pierre does
not have
inconsistent beliefs.
Nevertheless, it is in our
interest to see if a
response to Kripke can be
crafted from
,

her remarks.

Among other things. Marcus
contends that despite the
fact that Pierre
is disposed to assent
to both
(5)

Londres is not London

(8)

Londres is pretty and London
is not pretty,

and

Pierre believes neither that
Londres is not identical with
London nor
that Londres is pretty and
London is not pretty.
Of course. Pierre's

assents to

(5)

and

(8),

in conjunction with

Kripke's disquotation

principle, entail that Pierre
believes that Londres is not identical
with
London and that Pierre believes
that Londres is pretty and London
is not
pretty. ^

Marcus tries to avoid these, and
similar, results by replacing

Kripke's disquotation principle
with one of her own.

Recall that Kripke presented his
disquotation principle as follows:
Let us make explicit the disquota
tional principle
presupposed here, connecting sincere
assent and belief.
It can
be stated as follows, where 'p'
is to be replaced, inside and
outside all quotation marks, by any
appropriate standard English
entence:
If a normal English speaker on ref
lection,
s incerely assents U)
then he believes that p."
_|p,'
(1979. d.
—
248-249 )
,

’

In

place of Kripke's disquotation principle,
Marcus recommends:
Again assuming that assent is sincere and
reflective, if
normal speaker assents to 'p' and (ii) 'p» is a sentence
of English and (iii) p is possible, then he
believes that P
(1981, p. 505)
(i)

a

™
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Since

(5)

and

(8)

exn rp«

., ,
m possible

propositions, „ e cannot
go via
Marcus's disquotation
principle from Pierre's
assents to
t
(5) and (8) to
the conclusions that
Pierre believes that lo a
Londres is not
identical with
London and that Pierre
believes
a
eves th,t
that U>ndres
Pretty and London is
not
pretty.
Marcus recommends her
er disauotaiaisquotation principle
over Kripke’s
because hers, unlike his,
accords with the foil
nun
following
principle (which she
calls "Principle C"):
.

i

'

x

Principle

believes that

C is true,

p,

then It is

not believe every
proposition:

then p is possible.
(1981, p

505)

quite easy to explain why
Pierre does

'According to Principle C
there are

constraints on what one can
believe.
proposition.

.

One cannot believe an
impossible

Therefore, despite the fact
that certain impossible

propositions are entailed
-tea bv
oy the set
<?er nr
n*.
of propositions
Pierre believes,
they are not propositions
he believes. So, it
should come as no surprise
that Pierre does not believe
everything. Given that he
believes both
that London is pretty and
that Undon is not pretty,
since he does not
.

believe that Londres is not
identical with London, it should
cone as no
surprise, and we should not worry
about saying, that
Pierre does not

believe, say, that New York is
pretty.’
This explanation has at least
three major problems.
C is the basis for this

First, Principle

explanation and Marcus has failed to
give us good

reasons for thinking that Principle
C is true.

yields some counter-intuitive results.

Third,

Second, Principle C
it is by no means clear

that this explanation succeeds in
mollifying our legitimate fears about

attributing inconsistent beliefs to Pierre.
of warrant.

We turn first to the problem

1

°
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We want to know why
there is

n

m-M« 8

WPOng with saying
that Pierre

.

has inconsistent
beliefs
oeiiei s.

The0 account before
us i1Ss ho
based^ ° n Principle
C
tv,

Moarcus
makes her case for
Principle
incipie

C

in
m

ih
the passage below:

Suppose that someone
were to claim fw
that he believes
Hesperus is not identical
that
with Phosnhn
identical with Cicero,
Tul
is not
or that
n0t ldentlcal
London where in those
with
contexts of usp the
names of the "Pairs"
question do .
re f er to thi
1
post-hoc, intuition
is
<»»n
tLt
on di.cove^^^
?;
at
those ^entities
hold, and consequently
that ~th7~^~^ ^
same thing, I would
Pairs name
not say that I ad
changed my belief or
acquired a new belieTto
"
real
ld bUt that 1 was
mistaken in claiming
that I Lh
After all, if x ha db
to bei
with.
1S nob ldentlca l
Cicero, I would have
with
been believing th
that somethl ng is
same as itself and I
not
the
surelv din
^ Kb , leve that, a
impossibility, so I was misfa,
blatant
60 10 cl aiming to
have the belief.
(1981, p. 505 )

^

m

.

^

.

^

“

^

•

ZT^ "T

e^

’

^

f

The preceding passage
falls short of having
giving us good
eood reasons for
thinking that Principle
c is true .
We oa „ easUy aooept

actually assents
propositions

in the

^^

passage-that she neven believed
any one of three

and still consistently
hold:

believes, other impossible
propositions;

(

tii)

1)

that Marcus believed,
or

that we, or others,

believed, or believe, the
three impossible propositions
that Marcus
mentions; and (iii) that we,
or others, believed,
or believe, still other
impossible propositions.

Marcus claims to have an
intuition about how she would
react in
certain situations.
It is by no means clear
that there is a sound
argument from this reported
intuition to the conclusion that
Marcus never
believed any of the three impossible
propositions she mentions, let alone
to Principle C.
Perhaps an argument with Marcus's
reported intuition as
premise and with the claim that
Marcus never believed, say, that
Londres is not identical with
U>ndon as a conclusion can be fashioned.
a

.
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?lrta£3 we could use
that argument as
a blueprint
ueprint ,
constructing an
argument with Principle
o
f
Pie C
its conclusion.
But, this is sheer
speculation. Marcus has
not P
provided
ovided such arguments;
,
moreover, she has
given us veryy little,
little If
if anything,
that will help
ej p us to h
0
1
develop
such
arguments

m

i

-

Not only does the
preceding passage fail
fail to give us
good reasons for
thinking that Principle
C is true
itt also raises
•

’

Marcus's own position
on Pierre's beliefs.

suppose that

serious problems for

For it is reasonable
to

person who would deny
that he ever believed
that Londres
is not Identical
with London, upon
discovering that .Londres.
a

and

'London- codesignate,
is

pretty

a nd

would also deny that he
believed boU, that London

that London is

and 'London, codesignate.

not-

nrotf
pretty,

Furthermore,

upon discovering that
'Londres'

it is hard to imagine
a

Plausible, non-question begging
response to the claim that
the first
denial is no better evidence
of non-belief than the
second

denial.
Therefore, if Marcus does
have evidence, based on her
reported intuition,
that Pierre does not believe
that Londres is not identical
with London,
then we have equally good
evidence that Pierre does not
believe both that
London is pretty and that
London is not
pretty.

We have reached two conclusions
about the evidence Marcus
presents
for Principle

C.

First, we have concluded that
there is no clear

connection between that evidence
and Principle

C.

Second, we have

concluded that if the evidence Marcus
presents for Principle

C

undermines

claim that Pierre believes that
Londres is not identical with London,
then it jeopardizes the claim
that Pierre believes both that London
is

pretty and that London is not pretty.

From the question of evidence for
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Principle

C,

we turn to problems
raised by Principle

C.

Marcus never discusses the
intended modal status
of Principle C;
however, in order for PrinciDle
nnciple rC to he
have any interesting
application to
Kripke's puzzle it must be
such that if lt ls true

^

,

necessarily true,

the „

u ^

for if Principle C is
a mere contingent
truth, it has

the status of an accidental
generalization.

It would lack any of
the

explanatory power Marcus might
hope to attribute to it and
Marcus would
have to concede that although
Pierre (supposedly) does not
believe that
Londres is not identical with
London, in a possible situation
similar to
the one Pierre is in. save
for the fact that Principle
C is false, Pierre

would believe that Londres is
not identical with London.

This is one

reason for thinking that Principle
C’s intended modal status
is one of
necessary truth.

Marcus seems committed to the view
that Principle C is
truth.

a

necessary

She likens possibility as a
constraint on the objects of belief

on a par with truth as a
constraint on the objects of knowledge.

This

much is clear from the following
passages:
It is generally held that if
someone knows that p, then as
contrasted with belief, p is the case in
that epistemological
subject s world,
p obtains, p is actual, or, if we use "true"
for propositional contents as well
as sentences, p is true.
A
asis for that claim is the widely shared
intuition that if
someone claimed to know that
p, he would say, on discovering
that p did not obtain, was not actual in
his world, was not, if
you like, true, that he was mistaken in
claiming to know that p.
His clinging to his knowledge claim on the
known falsity of p
(on the knowledge that the state of affairs
does not obtain)
would be seen as a conceptual or linguistic confusion.

The analogy between this intuition about belief
claims
the one Marcus reports she has in the passage quoted
on
page 130 above] and the more universally accepted ones
about
knowledge is close. Just as a condition for knowing that
p is
that p obtains, so a condition for believing is
[i.e.,

"
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If

*

505)
It

belle '' es

is necessarily
true that if a

then possible

p,

p.

(

1981>

p.

5M _

b position
proposing

p 1S an object of
knowledge
By an analogy
that Marcus
encourages
courages, it would
1H seem to
be the case that
if ‘i
Princi
-uu-ipie
D ]p t
c iis
« true,
thpn
if is
„
hen it
necessarily true that
if a
» *• ••
•<
..

then

.

Pls

true.

4-

,•

.

«•«

"* *“•
Principle

C is

-—

“•

true oni v

s

r

«...

.. .... ...... ....

•

i+-

ia necessarily true.

Of related problems.
If Principle c is
true, it is necessarily
true.

necessarily true. then,
since it is
identical with London,
it is
is not

identical with London.

If Principle C is

that Londres is not

i mp

ossible that Pierre believes
that Londres

Therefore, no one. not
even Pierre, ever

believed, or ever could
believe
identical with London.

possible

This raises a series

’

t

that Pi
Pierre kbelieved that
Londres is not

Furthers,

if Principle C is
true,

no one ever

believes that someone could
believe an impossible state
of affairs. I„
fact, if Principle c is
true, it is impossible
to believe that s«eo„e
can believe an impossibility.
These results are counter-intuitive,
to say the least. This
is
especially so in light of something
Marcus acknowledges: namely,
that
is firima facie true that
we do sometimes believe
the impossible.

it

Marcus

concedes this much in the following
passage:

-all evidence seems to support the
claim that the
necessary falsehood of
does not preclude believing
that P
p
Mathematical conjecture, it is argued,
are. if false
necessarily so; yet some mathematical
conjectures, purportedly
elieved by competent mathematicians
who do not suffer from
conceptual confusion have subsequently
been demonstrated to be
one accepts (as I do) the principle
that logically
Sentenoes (i - e - sentences where the
names
lanking the id^^t
flanking
identity sign are proper names) are,
if true,
.

.

V

‘

.

)
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necessarily so, then
there are ha^in
n ° n ~ complex
support the claim that
examples that
we can believe
prefer to put it, that
SSible or as 1
we can enter i„t n
with an impossible
bellef elation
state of affairs
F
false identity sentence
15 described b
is an imposs'ibn
y a
mpossibl 1 lb
n y> metaphysically
speaking.
(1933, p# 322-323)

!hT

’

’

^

Thus,

if Principle C is trup
true,

the proposition
that we sometimes
believe

impossible propositions
is prima faoip
facie true, and
perhaps even known
by us
to be prima facie
true, even though
It Is never in fact h ,
tact believed.
This
13 3130 qUU<!
"arcus owes us an

^

emanation

of how a

proposition could be known
to be prima facie
true and .till not be
possible object of belief.
It

looks like we can use
what we know about
Principe

C to

a

lead Marcus

into a trap.

Suppose Pierre behaves
just like Marcus says
she would
behave had she discovered
that -Londres. and
.London, codesignate,
having
earlier claimed to believe
that Londres is not
identical with London.
Suppose, that is, that Pierre
says he was mistaken to
have claimed to
believe that Londres is not
identical with London. But,
when Pierre says
he was mistaken when he
claimed to believe that
Londres is not identical
with London, it would seem
to follow that he is right
only if he

mistakenly believed that he
believed that londres is not
identical with
London.

Yet, if Principle C is
true,

Pierre never believed that he

believed that londres is not
identical with London; and,

so,

Pierre never

mistakenly believed that he believed
that Londres is not identical
with
London.

Apparently, then, Pierre would be
mistaken to report that he

mistakenly believed that he believed
that Londres
London.

is not identical with

(Just as Marcus would be mistaken
were she to report that she

mistakenly believed that she believed
that Londres is not identical with
London
.
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Marcus can counter as
follows*

*t

m not c °«itted
to the view that
4.

Pierre mistakenly
believed that he believed
that
a
" dreS
13 not identical
with
„
on a on.
Rather, I am committed
to one
the view that
that pPierre mistakenly
c aimed that he
believed that Undres
is not identical
with London. This
<oes not entail that
Pierre stood in the
belief-relation to the
proposition that he believed
that iondres is not
identical with London
instead, it entails that
Pierre stood in some
oth^ ^itive eplstemlo
relation say thinkinR or nnrpeim’vm
&
££Il£e2L V3 ng
toward the proposition
that he
believed that Londres is
not identical with
London; that is, that
Pierre
mistakenly thought or
conceived that he believed
that Londres is not
identical with London. That i
hv he claimed
is U
why
to believe that Londres
is
not identical with London.
Indeed, we often err and
use bellevers „ when
it would be more
accurate to use either "thinks"
or "conceives." You can
think or conceive an
impossibility, but you cannot
believe one.'
,

,

1

<3

i

..

This response has two
problems.

First,

it is obvious to one who
has

been present when Marcus has
plied this response that it
is counter-

intuitlve
in fact,

has received nothing even
remotely like universal consent;

the opposite is true.

With this response we have
reached

point where Marcus is defending
Principle

where there is no genuine difference.

C

a

by an appeal to a distinction

Second, a puzzle just like

Kripke's original puzzle can be
generated about thinking and conceiving.
For Marcus's defense of Principle
C to work, she must explain how
Pierre

can think that London is pretty
and think that London is not pretty

without also coming to think that New
York is pretty.

Therefore, for

Marcus's defense of Principle C to
succeed, she must explain

a

phenomenon

.
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strikingly similar to the
one Principle

C was

explain
We pay a heavy price
for Principle

C.

intuitive results and its
defense leads to
original

originally supposed to
help

It saddles us with
counterp UZZ les

similar to Kripke’s

p UZZ le.

Now that we know something
about the cost of Principle
C, let us see what
we get for the price
we P
p
oav
a yLet us consider the
strength of the proposal
that it supports.
i

Kripke says that it is

inconsistency.

a

mistake to convict Pierre
of an

Marcus, who says that Pierre
has inconsistent beliefs,

must explain why Pierre will
not infer what his beliefs
entail.
If
Pierre has inconsistent beliefs,
then he has at his disposal
premises
which, when taken together,
entail every proposition. But
Pierre will
not assent to every sentence;
for example, Pierre will
not assent to
(7)

London is not London,

and Marcus explicitly denies
that he believes that London is
not

identical with London.

Principle

C is

supposed to help us explain why Pierre
does not

believe that London is not identical
with London.
as follows:

can believe.

’According to Principle

C,

Our explanation runs

there are constraints on what one

Pierre cannot believe an impossible
proposition.

Therefore, despite the fact that Pierre
believes both that London is

pretty and that London is not pretty he
does not believe that London is
not

identical with London.

So,

contrary to Kripke, it should come as no

surprise that Pierre will not come to believe
everything.'
We already know that there are many sentences
which Pierre will

assent to but which, if Principle

C

were true, would not express objects

.
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or his beliefs.

This

undines

Principle c . the
principle upon whloh
preceding explanation
is built; however,
beyond that it does
not
undermine the explanation.
I„ Principle C
Marcus
cus h
has
as a principle
she
could appeal to in order
to explain why
Pierre does not
believe
everything. However, the
preceding explanation
is unsatisfactory.
for
there are many sentences
Pierre will not assent
to but which express
propositions Pierre would
be
oe free
tree tn
to believe even if
Principle C were
true
•

•

Suppose that Pierre is
told that if london is
pretty, then New York
is pretty.
As a result he acquires
the disposition to assent
to
(9)

If London is pretty,

then New York is pretty.

This, in conjunction
with Marcus's disquotation
principle, entails that

Pierre believes that if
london is pretty, then New
York is pretty.
Putting this new belief
together with his old belief
that London is
pretty.

Pierre ''should" be able to
infer that New York is
pretty.
But
Pierre may not believe that New
York is pretty.
Certainly, we would not
expect him to assent to
(10)

New York is pretty.

Pierre may have no beliefs about
New York, save his belief that
if London
is pretty, then New York is
pretty and what he is prepared
to infer from
it

and his other beliefs.

Neither Principle
C

C

nor anything Marcus says in support
of Principle

explains why Pierre is unable to infer
that New York is pretty.

proposition that New York is pretty is

a

The

contingent proposition, and it

is entailed by a pair of propositions
that Marcus would agree that Pierre

believes.

In addition,

the proposition that New York is pretty
is a
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consequence of two
Propositions that Marcus
as serts t hat
Pierre believesnamely, the Proposition
that Uindon is pretty
and the proposition
that
onhon is not pretty.
Therefore. althou h
g
Principie C might help
explain
why Pierre does not
believe i-hai^
that London
ls not lde „t ioal
wlth London __
despite his willi ngneS s
to assent to a
sentence that expresses
it and
despite the fact that it
is entailed hy his
heliefs-we still laok an
explanation for Pierre*s
«
erres inahi
i it,,
inability
to infer that
+.

•

New York is pretty.

Putting aside problems
for Principle
to repair the preceding
explanation.

C.

we will consider an
attempt

In pi ace of the
original

explanation, we shall consider
the following:

'Although a person can
cone by reason to believe
any logical consequence
of each of his beliefs
taken individually, it is
not he case that a
person can come by reason to

believe any logical consequence
of every subset of the set
of all things
that he believes. For example,
a person might believe
a proposition,
p,

and also its denial,
-p, and still be unable to
infer all that he could
infer if he believed their
conjunction, p and -p.
If this were correct,

then Pierre could believe both
that London is pretty and that
London is
not pretty but be unable to
infer all that their conjunction
entails. Of

course, if Pierre did believe
their conjunction— if he did
believe that
London is pretty and London is
not pretty-then he could infer
all that
it entails.
C

It entails that New York is pretty.

comes into play.

For,

Here is where Principle

if Principle C were true,

Pierre would not

believe that London is pretty and London
is not pretty, despite the fact
that he will assent to a sentence that
expresses

it.

This is because the

proposition that London is pretty and London
is not pretty is impossible.
Therefore, we should not be surprised that
Pierre is unable to infer that

139

New York Is pretty.

Pierre does not believe
ve any proposition
D r„™
that entails
that New York is pretty.'

One problem for the
preceding explanation is
its dependence on
Principle C. still, troubles
with Principle C aside,
the explanation is
unacceptable. It is not
unacceptable so much for what
it says as for
what it fails to say.
The explanation does not
explain the phenomenon we
find puzzling; it codifies
it.
We know that Pierre is
unable to infer
that New York is pretty.
We want to know why Pierre
is unable to infer
York is pretty.
We want to know why
despite the fact that it
,
is entailed by things he
believes.

York is pretty.

Pierre is unable to infer that
New

The explanation is really
nothing more than a

generalization drawn from cases like
Pierre’s.
best) analogous to a scientific
law.

In this way it is (at

We want something analogous to
a

scientific theory-we want something
that explains such generalizations. 6
A

solution to Kripke’s puzzle which
ascribes inconsistent beliefs to

Pierre must exp lain why Pierre is
unable to infer that New York is pretty
(and why Pierre is unable to detect
any inconsistency among his beliefs).

We have tried, and failed, to develop
an acceptable explanation based on

what Marcus says about Kripke's puzzle.

have an acceptable explanation.

It appears that Marcus does not

We may conclude that she has not solved

Kripke's puzzle.

Section Two

David Lewis considers Kripke's puzzle in
not Believe" (1981).

''What

Puzzling Pierre does

Lewis discusses Kripke's puzzle in terms of the

)
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following sentences:
(LI

(L2)

0-3)

Pierre believes
that London is
pretty
Pierre believes
that London is
not pretty
Ci.e„ Pierre]
cannot be convicted
to do so would
of an in co ns i
be incorrect
stency

Lewis writes:
S

and [(L3) ]

are

“mpatme.^O 981*

h °" [<L,)]

'

p? 284)

father than tr ying
to solve Kripke's
puzzle Lewls
major claims.
These claims
ni aim o
involve sentences <L„,
(L2)>
addition, they Invol
ve the fol lowing
s en t enoes:
,

•

<U>

i e rr e b 1 eV
eS
na m e a „d F is a „

and

,

^

a " -dinary
proper
ea^ll v^'d'
P edicate ’ scribes
Pierre a belief
to
whose obJ^t7,
J
the P^ ro Position
“thV
expressed by 'F(A)'
(actually)

(L5)

This proposition M p
4-u q
31
0 " ^pressed by
'F(A)'] holds at
exactly
- e worlds
SS
lb
P
thing which is (actually)
where the
denoi °H K \ haS
the propert
which is (actually)
y
expressed by

thos^

(L6)

Beliefs are jointly
inconsistent if f u
world where the
positional objects £1 / true
^eth/r
We will consider
Lewis's two claim.
However, before we do,
it is
important that we take a
closer look at (LV
n
3).
Owing to the occurrence
of
the phrase ’convicted
of' therein
n 3) admits
^ .. of two significantly
different interpretations.
They are
•

*

(L3')

It is a mistake to
conclude that
i-haiPl
Q„
Pierre
has inconsistent
-

beliefs,
and
<L3

"

>

Ik 1S a '"istate to
conclude that because Pierre
has5
inconsistent beliefs that Pierre
is doxasticany^

Suppose that Kripke's puzzle
involves

a

situation where Pierre's beliefs

j
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are inconsistent,

tut where Pierre's failure
to spot the inconsistency
is, in sene reasonable
sense, beyond his
control-is southing Pierre
should not be held responsible
for.
In suoh a oase (L3I)
woul(J be falge
but <L3") would be true.
Indeed, I shall maintain
that Pierre is in
such a situation.
Pierre has inconsistent
beliefs, but he is in no
way
blameworthy. In addition, I
will maintain that (LI) and
<L2). as well as

<M), as), and

(L6> art tru«.

.3 we are about to see

this puts me at

,

odds with Lewis.
The first claim that Lewis
tries to establish is that
The case of Pierre refutes
this analysis [i.e.
the set
(1981, p. 284)

consisting of sentences (L4), (L5),
and (L6)].
By this,
(L6)

is

true.
is

Lewis apparently means that
the set consisting of

inconsistent.

According to Lewis,

He intends to demonstrate that
at

(LI),

(L2),

and

(LI)

through

(L3) are

least one of (L4),

(L5),

all

or

(L6)

false.
Let us consider the line of reasoning
behind Lewis’s first claim.

Lewis holds that (LI), (L2), and (L3) are true.
(L 4)

1S true

*

Pierre believes the proposition actually
expressed by the

sentence ’London is pretty.'
true,

If (LI) is true, then if

Similarly,

if (L2) is true,

then if (L4)

is

Pierre believes the proposition actually expressed
by the sentence

’London is not pretty.’

Now, if (L3) is true, if (L6) is true, and if

Pierre believes the proposition expressed by 'London
is pretty' as well
as the proposition expressed by 'London is not
pretty,' then there is a

possible world where both the proposition expressed by 'London
is pretty'
and the proposition expressed by 'London is not pretty'

there is such

a

world, then if (L5) is true,^ there is

London both is and is not pretty.

Of course,

are true.
a

If

world where

there is no such world,
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since the properties
of being prettv and h

•

be)’ m „rtU3lly
, ,
eX ° 1U3lVe:

8 n0t Pretty are
(assumed to

ab Lewis holds,

and (L3) are true,
then one of (LH). (L5),
or (L6)
It i. important
to realize that
0-3)

is

fal

a „.

<L 2

,

„

Lewis's argument
is valid onXy if

is

interpreted as

(L3>).

and invalid if
it (Li)
(L 3 ) is
t
interpreted
as

If <L3) is interpreted
as (L 3 "), rather
than as CL3'), then
we

re believes both
the proposition
expressed by 'London is
pretty'
and the proposition
expressed by 'London is
not pretty,' then there
is

a

possible world where both
propositions are true.

Uwis, who claims that Kripke's
puzzle refutes the analysis
given by
(i.e.. the set consisting
of) (Lit), (L5), and

(L6), reads (L
3 ) as (L3-).

I

shall maintain

a

position opposed to Lewis
in this regard.

I shall
maintain that Lewis's argument
is unsound either
because (L 3 ) is fal seas when it is interpreted
as (L 3 ')_or because the
argument is invalidas when L 3 ) is interpreted
u„,,.
pretea as n
Uo ). However,
Lewis is certainly right
about this much: if v(Li) (L2)
^
and n
(L3on> are true, then
one of (L4),
(

r

(L5), or (L 6) is false.

The second claim that Lewis
makes is that
set consisting of CLK),
(LI).

In

this regard,

(L5).

''the

refuted analysis"-the

and (L6)-fails to account for
the truth of

Lewis writes:

t0 th6 0336 ° f Plerre and
“"aider whether
the refuted analysis accounts
even for the truth of [(LI)]
I
d0
y
n0
(U
falla t0
the
truth
of
(L 2)])
LCL2)
J )
p-e r re does
Pierre
d
not have as an object of his
belief
the
proposition (actually) expressed by
'London is pretty'.
For
there is a possible world which fits
Pierre's beliefs
perfectly it is one of his 'belief-worlds'—
at which that
proposition is false.
'

V
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1 Clty Plerre
heard about was not London
but Bristol
I
Ima Sme a world just
like ours until very recently
Cpyo ept lto the
extent that it must
differ to fit Pierre’s mis™/
rller hlst °^any).
Then the
Was undertaken
the same time it was renamed
and at
o
in hnn
°r Slr
°gdred Londer French called this beautifni ?.
u
its beauty, and
d
rre
t-

.

T“

.

«

.

1’

aU

-

at

"•

srss’

While Bristol was beautiful,
London fell into decay
The
partd uer dem °lished copies were
sometimes built in
,
,f
Bristol,
alias Londer'— and only the slums

™

remained
London
gh “*>. “thing of c^sequenSe
happened^there
Th^ French had little
occasion to speak of the
,
name ’
ind ® ed
never Was ment ioned in
Pierrp'T
t0 fchiS plaCe that the unfortunate
Pierre
ierre^ was
"/ to go.
was*" mad
made
Again, what happened at the end
of
3
jUSt like What ha PP ened at
r

°

^

the^ea"!

-he ?

^

d

th

^

^

T

XTd"^

This world fits Pierre’s beliefs
perfectly. For all he
elieves, it might every well be the world
he lives in.
Tell
him and show him all about it, claiming
that it is the real
world; he will never be at all surprised;
unless it surprises
him to find that he has been right in
all his beliefs without
exception.
Nothing he believes—no propositional object
of his
belief is false at this world.

—

However, the proposition (actually) expressed
by 'London is
pretty' according to [(L5)] ... is false at
this world.
’London’ denotes London and 'is pretty'
expresses the property
of being pretty, and this is a world where
London ... is
present and is not at all pretty.
(1981, p. 286)
I

true,

hold with Lewis that

(LI) is true.

then, since (LI) is true,

(So is (L2).)

at the actual world, w

Now, if (L4) is

p,

the proposition actually expressed by 'London is pretty.'
Lewis, at w

b,

Pierre believes

According to

the Bristol-is-beautiful-world Lewis describes, Pierre

believes everything he believes at w
r

.

If this is so,

then at w^ Pierre

believes the proposition actually expressed by 'London is pretty.'
according to Lewis, everything Pierre believes at w^ is true at

w^.

Also,
If

l
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SO,

and if at Wu Piprro k»i
lieves
b
•

the proposition
actually expressed
,
by
Inn
London i, pretty,,
then the proposition
actuallyv expressed
actual
by .London is
pretty
prettv- is true
f
at w L
Rnir j.i_
But,
if
the proposition
b*
actually ov
expressed bv
IT
London is pretty, is
true at w h then if „
>
is true, w
b is a WO rld
v/n6P0 London is nrpt'i-v
where
op
.

•

-i

.

la-

^

,

.

Lewis maintains that
one of (L4) or (L5)
is false.
Lewis notes that (L6)
plays no rol
in his
w argument and
olep in
says that he
has no quarrel with
8
(L6).
At bott™.
bottom, Lewis is trying
to show that one
of (L 4 ) or (L 5 ) is
false.
t

This conflicts with
the view

obliged either to point
to
of Lewis's premises.

(LD is true.
believes

in w

I

I

•

•

intend to defend.

!

am

,

therefore,

flaw in Lewis's reasoning
or to dispute one
The reasoning is
flawless.
I agree with
Lewis that
a

also agree with Lewis
that everything that
Pierre

b is true at w b .

I

reject lewis's claim that
Pierre

believes everything in w
b that he believes in w
r
every general, or qualitative,

.

Pierre does believe

proposition in w that he
believes in w
b

but he does not believe
every proposition in w
b that he believes in
I shall maintain
that Pierre believes certain
singular propositions-for
example, the singular
proposition that London is
pretty_i„ w that he
r
does not believe in w
b*

So the preceding derivation
depends on two claims; the two
claims

jointly entail that everything
that Pierre believes in w is
true at w b
r
The first claim is that
Pierre believes everything in „
b that he believes
.

in w r .

at w

b.

The second claim is that
everything Pierre believes in w is true
b
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In support of the

believes in „
r

,

claim that Pierre believes
everything in w that he
b

Leuis wrltes of Pierre

,

s

experle „ oes

What happened at his end was
iust
real world.
(1981, p. 286)
And of

Pierre’s experiences in London
at w b
nn

,

p

J

l i

^

^
u

iro

happened at the

,

gain what happened at Pierre's
end of his encounters with
WaS JUSt llke What ha ened a t
PP
the real world.
(1981,
’

286)

The claim that Pierre believes
everything in w, that he believes
in
w r is supported by the fact that
Pierre’s experiences in w
b
from Pierre’s perspectiv e-qua 1 itativ
ely

are-at least

indistinguishable from his

experiences in w
r

.

For if his experiences are thus
indistinguishable,

is hard to see what could give rise
to divergent beliefs.

it

Anyone who

disputes the claim that w is one of Pierre's belief
worlds, but who
b
accepts the claim that everything Pierre believes
in w is true at w
b
b
must explain how, despite the qualitative
indistinguishabil ity of
Pierre's experiences in the two worlds,

from his beliefs in w
r
I

,

Pierre's beliefs in w can differ
b

.

hold that Lewis is correct with regard to Pierre's qualitative

beliefs:

w b is one of Pierre's qualitative belief worlds.

believes every qualitative proposition

in w

b

Pierre

that he believes in w
p

.

This is because his experiences in w are qualitatively indistinguishable
b
from his experiences in w .
r

Still, in both w r and w
b

kinds of non—qual itative beliefs.

I

,

Pierre has certain

will need to explain why qualitative

indistinguishability of experience does not guarantee that Pierre has all
and only the same non-qual itative beliefs in w that he has in w 10
b
p
.

In support of the claim that everything Pierre believes in w
at w b ,

Lewis writes:

b is true

146

This world fits Pierrp'^ hoi
he believes, it might
F ° r a11 that
very welAe h W
° rld he lives
him and show him all
in
Tell
about it Claiming
that it is the real
world; he will never
be at al’i
him to find that he
SUrprises
has turned out"
be"
1 " 311 hlS
eliefs without exception.
Nothing he belilves
believes— no
propositional object of his h^iiof
"
f ~ ls false
at this world.
(1981, p. 286)

7^'

-

^

Let Pierre wander through
w

about „ .
b

At no time will

.

’

“

.

Let him discover all
there Is to know

b-

Pierre see

m

to dlsoard

^

Qf
Apparently, everything Pierre
believes at w, is true at
w .
fe
Once he has presented his
alleged counterexample, Lewis
entertains
several objections to his line
of reasoning. One of these
objections
together with Lewis's reply
are of special interest
to us.
That

objection and Lewis's reply are
contained in the passage that
follows:
00U ter Xa nPle W ° rld 15 n0t a
1
world that
fits ffi7F?f belIefs
? or p
Plerre believes bb at London
is
prettv where, ,
^
counterexample
world is one where London is
not pretty.
1
nrettv
r reply
I
by posing a dilemma.
When we characters
the content of belief by
assigning propositional (or other)
0hara =terizing an inner, narrowly
psychological
s^ate of the believer?
state
Are beliefs in the head? Or
are we
characterizing partly the believer's
inner state, partly the
0
bhat state to the outer world?
If it is the
latter "?),,
e objection may succeed;
however, Kripke's puzzle
vanishes. For if the assignment
of propositional object
characterizes more than the believer’s
inner state, then there
rSaSOn t0 SUppose that a fading
philosopher and logician
would never ,let, contradictory beliefs
pass, or that anyone is in
principie in a position to notice and
correct contradictory
S
6 has them
Anyone is in Principle in a position
to
n oh>p and
^ correct a state of the head which
notice
can be
characterized by assigning contradictory
propositional objects,
u
w y s ould philosophical and logical
acumen help him if the
trouble lies partly outside? As soon as
we accept the
consistency of Pierre's beliefs as datum— as I
did, on Kripke's
invitation we are committed to the narrowly
psychological
conception of belief and its objects. (I would
like to think
hat this is what Kripke intended in instructing
us to consider
elief dj? jj cto .) But on the narrowly psychological
conception,
ohe counterexample world does fit Pierre's
beliefs, as witness
the fact that it would not at all surprise him
to be persuaded
that the world was just that way.
(1981, p. 288-299)
'

"

.

,

*

.

—
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—

The objection is
„uite simple:

"

0

eVerytMng Pier

-

w b ls one of Pierre ,
s

beUef

^

^ l"

-r I- tn. at w„ : however. since
w r Pierre believes that
London is prettv
Pretty and the
proposition that London
is pretty is false at w
b- "b 1S not one of Pierre's
belief worlds
As
noted above, the claim
that w b is one of Pierre's

„

belief worlds is
ailed by the claims that
Pierre believes everything
in w that
b
he believes in w and
that everything Pierre
r
believes
in w b is true at

V

By his reply,

Lewis suggests that he
takes the objection as
a threat
to the former claim,
not to the latter claim.
Lewis says nothing „e„~
nothing he has not already
said-about the claim that
everything Pierre

believes in w b

is true at w .
b

Henceforth, we will assume
that Lewis is

concerned with the claim that
Pierre believes everything
i„ „
b that he

believes in w .
r
Lewis responds to the above
objection by asking us to reflect
on
"what we are doing when we
characterize the content of belief
by
assigning propositional objects"
(1981, p. 288).
He suggests that there
are two basic alternatives.

The first alternative is that
when we

characterize belief by assigning
propositional objects, we are

"characterizing an inner, narrowly psychological
state of the believer"

0 981,

p.

288).

The second alternative is that when
we characterize

belief by assigning propositional objects,
"we are characterizing partly
the believer's inner state,
to the outer world" (1981,

and partly the relations of that inner
state
p.

288).

Uwis

then traces the implications

of each alternative.

According to Lewis, if the first alternative
is correct, then "the

counterexample world does fit Pierre's beliefs"
(1981,

p.

288);

if the
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first alternative is corr^oicorrect, the objection
fails
Aeain
o
^Sain, according
to
Lewi s, if the second altprnafiwo
alternative 13 correct,
then "the objection
may
succeed; however, KrinU-p’-?
ipkes puzzle vanishes"
( 1 981,
p.
.

•

•

288).

reached the crucial
point in Lewis’s
commentary on Kripke’s
puzzle.
Before we continue, a word
of caution is in order.
We will soon
see why Lewis maintains
both that if the first
alternative is correct, „
is one of Pierre's
belief worlds and that if
the second alternative
is
correct, then, although
the objection may succeed,
Kripke's puzzle
vanishes.
It is, however,
important to realize that I
am not so much
interested in interpreting
and developing Lewis's
position as I am in

solving Kripke's puzzle.
for anything

I

say when

by what he says.

Lewis is neither committed
to nor responsible
I

develop

a

position based on what is
suggested

Bearing this in mind,

let us see what Lewis says.

Lewis maintains that to solve
Kripke's puzzle one must show
that the

following are compatible:
(LI)

Pierre believes that London is
pretty,

(L 2

Pierre believes that London is
not pretty,

)

and
(L3)

He [i.e., Pierre] cannot be
convicted of an inconsistency;
to do so would be incorrect.

Lewis says that when we characterize
the contents of beliefs by assigning
them propositional objects, we are
doing one of two things— what I have
been calling the first alternative and
the second alternative.

He claims

that if the first alternative is
correct, then w is one of Pierre’s
5

belief worlds; and, therefore, that one of
the following is false:
(L4)

’Pierre believes that F(A)\ where A is an
ordinary proper
name and F is an easily understood predicate,
ascribes to

.
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Pierre a belief whose
object is
expressed by 'F(A)',
(L5)

t-h«

Proposition (actually)

This proposition Tip
«-u Q
Slti0n <actuall
by 'F(A)'] h0ld3 a
y> expressed
t ;xactly t ho°r
thing which is (actual
“° rlds Where the
ly) denoted 'S’v^A h
which is (actually)
® propert
*
expressed by
>'

f!

Uwis allows

that 1, the second
alternative is correct,
the objection to
hie argument by (alleged)
counterexample may succeed.
Flnally he olalms
-at 1, the second alternative
is correct, then
Kripke's puttie vanishes;
that is, there ls no longer
any need to show that
(LI), <L2), and L3)
(
are compatib le-since
one of them, namely (L
3 >, may be regarded
as false.
What are these two al
ternatives? They are rival
views about what
*tnds of propositions we
believe and what kinds of
beliefs we attribute
when we use belief ascription
sentences whose that-clauses
have n»e
sentences for sentential
components. To explicate
the two alternatives,
I will make use
of the distinction between
general, or qualitative,
,

propositions and singular, or
individual, propositions.

The first

alternative is the view that the
objects of belief are qualitative
propositions and that we use belief

ascription sentences whose that-

clauses have name sentences for
sentential components to attribute
beliefs whose objects are
qualitative propositions. The second

alternative is the view that the
objects of beliefs may be either
qualitative propositions or singular

propositions and that (typically) „e

use such sentences to attribute
beliefs whose objects are singular

propositions
Lewis apparently favors the first
alternative.

claim that one of

(LD) or

(L5)

is false.

alternative is correct, then w
fc

He does, after all,

He holds both that if the first

is one of Pierre's belief worlds and
that
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if W b is one of Pierre's belief
worlds,

then,

if (LI) is true (and he

says it is), one of (L4) or (L5)
is false.
I

shall hold that the second
alternative is correct.

Lewis alio,
)WS

that if the second alternative
is correct, then the
objection to his

claim that w b is one of Pierre's belief
worlds

(and,

therefore, to his

attempt to demonstrate that one of
<L«) or <L5> is false) may
succeed.
Lewis claims that if the second
alternative is correct, then Kripke's

puzzle vanishes— presumably because we
no longer need to hold that
(L2),

and

(L3)

are

compatible.

It is clear by now that our
interests

these three statements from Lewis’s reply:
is correct,

then w

(LI),

b is one of Pierre's

since (LI) is true, one of

will be served if we consider
(i)

if the first alternative

belief worlds (and, therefore,

(L4) or (L5) is false);

(

i i)

if the second

alternative is correct, then the objection may
succeed; and

(iii)

if the

second alternative is correct, then Kripke's puzzle
vanishes.
We begin with the claim that if the first alternative
is correct,

then w b is one of Pierre’s belief worlds (and,

true, one of (L4) or
(at w ).
r

(

L 5 ) is false).

I

therefore,

since (LI) is

hold with Lewis that (LI)

If the first alternative is correct,

is true

then (LI) is true at w
in
f

virtue of one of Pierre's qualitative beliefs.

Pierre believes every

qualitative proposition in w that he believes
b

in w p .

This appears to

follow from the qualitative ind istinguishabil ity of Pierre's experiences
in the two worlds.

If the objects of belief are qualitative

propositions, then Pierre believes everything in w that he believes in
b
wp .

So it appears that if the objects of belief are qualitative

propositions, then everything Pierre believes at w is true at w
p
b

;

that

.
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1S

Wb 1S one of Pierre's belief
worlds *

’

worlds ’ then (if 0.1)
were true at w ) „
b
of ..
QUalitatlVe bSlief
and

(L5) were true

,
If w
b ls one of

—
n
’

U° Uld be true at
w

and if (LI) „ere true
at w

wherein London is pretty.

it true at
b>

w,

But London is not
pretty at „ ;
b

in •_
sino** a
since
(LI)
is true,

b i„

vlrtue

if both

(w)

fh
then
w^ would be a
world

therefore, if the first
aiternative is oorreet.
w,

belief worlds and.

Pierre's belief

t.

and.

one 8f Plerre s
,

,

one of 0.4) or (L5)
is false

We have verified the
first of the three
statements in Lewis's reply
Let us consider the
second stat^ent:
if the second alternative
is

correct,

then the objection to
Lewis's argument by
(alleged)

counterexample may succeed.
To say that if the second
alternative is correct, then
the objection

may succeed is tantamount
to saying that if the
second alternative is
correct, then w may not
be one of Pierre's belief
b
worlds.
(I shall
regard the modal expression
in this claim as one
expressing epistemic,
rather than metaphysical,
possibility.)

shall maintain that if some of
Pierre's beliefs are
non-qualitative
beliefs of a particular sort, then
the qualitative indistinguishability
I

of Pierre's experiences in the
two worlds is no guarantee
that he has all
the same beliefs in the two worlds.”
He may have qualitatively

indistinguishable experiences and yet not
believe exactly the same
singular propositions.
then w

b

ma y not b e

a

If so,

and if the second alternative is
correct,

world wherein Pierre believes everything
he believes

in w , despite the qualitative
r
indistinguishability of his experiences.

Therefore,

if the second alternative is correct,
even though everything

;

;
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Pierre believes at wu
true at w
b is trup
b
worlds.
We have

censored

,

w b may not be one
of Pierre's belief

one way of defending
the second of these

statements In Uwis's reply.

Let us consider the
third statement:

if

the second alternative
is correct, then Kripke’s
puzzle vanishes.

Recall that, according to Lewis,
to solve Kripke's
puzzle one must
show that <L„, <L 2 >, and
0 3 ) are compatihle. We have
a puzzle just so
long as we seem committed
to the view that
.

(LI),

(L2),

and also to the view that
they' arec inconsistent
‘•‘consistent.

one kind of solution:
(L2),

and

(L3>

interDret
luerprei

are not inconsistent.

conjunction of

(L4)

and 0.5).)

ana
and

(LI")
IL
i;

n
(L2)

and (L3) are true

Toin
Lewis seems to favor
-

u
in such
a way that
a

(LI),

(This leads him to reject
the

He favors the first
alternative and

prefers that (LI) and (L2) be
understood so that their truth does
not
entail that Pierre believes both a
proposition and its denial.
I favor
the second alternative and I wish
to retain both (L4) and (L5).
This

means that

I

cannot pursue the sort of solution that
Lewis prefers.

favor a second kind of solution.
0-3)

I

will maintain:

I

that (LI), (L2), and

are incompatible— when (L3) is interpreted
as
(L3

')

It ls a mistake to conclude that
Pierre has inconsistent

beliefs
that

(LI),

(L2),

and

3”)

!t is a mistake to conclude that because
Pierre has
inconsistent beliefs that Pierre is doxastically

(L3)

are not incompatible— when (L3) is
interpreted

as
(L

culpable

and that although (L3 M ) is true,

(L 3*)

position to reject the claim that

(L3)

is false.

If we are in

a

is both true and inconsistent with

.

^

3

153
<L1>

and 0.2, . then we
no longer have a
puzzlee
P
xt
it „n
Wl11, „
have vanished,
..
n
dissolved,
or been solved.
’

will interpret the claim
a
that if fv,
the
second alternative
is correct
then Kripke's puzzle
vanishes so that it
h
depends
on the claim that
if the
second alternative is corroot- <-u
correct, then we no
longer have reason to
think
that (L ) is true.
1

f

*en

Lewi s claims that
Kripke's puzzle vanishes
under the second
alternative, he adds the
following by

way of an explanation:

For is the assignment
of proDositi nnai
S
characterizes more than the
believer’s inner state then th
is no reason to suDDose i-hat- a
there
Q ^
would never let contradictory
l0gician
*.

»

.

i

beUef^asV T/that^

notice and correct

phu::o^c:^ d
partly

^
a

state

a

n ° tiCe

-^ect^a=
3

o^th^head^hic^can'be
ntra

i:sr "i
0 98^ ts")

tory objects

’

1S

"

y

P° Siti ° n t0

but why sh° uid

Le^s holds

that if the second alternative
is correct, then we no
longer
have reason to believe that
Pierre has inconsistent beliefs.
This
suggests that he would agree
that if the first alternative
is correct,
then we have reason to believe
that Pierre does not have
inconsistent
beliefs

shall maintain that when we reason
from our beliefs, we reason only
from either our qualitative beliefs
or our own personal beliefs
and that
I

;

when we reason via propositions,
the propositions that we reason from
are

either qualitative propositions or our
own personal propositions

belief is qualitative when its object
is
proposition, p,

is personal to x,

a

constituent of

p,

A

qualitative proposition.

or is one of x’s personal

if and only if p is a singular
proposition,

.

x

A

propositions,

is an individual

and nothing else is an individual constituent
of p.
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belief is persona! to
ltS 0bJ60t

U

°" e ° f

*.

or is one or

,s persona!

b e!i efs.

provided

'

X S

propositions.^

Th e sin g u!ar
proposition that Ronald Reagan
is wise is one of
Reagan's personal
propositions Reagan is its uni
q ue individual constituent,

it is not one
of George Bush's personal
pro^sitions-it does not have Bush
as a
constituent.
Although the singular proposition
that Reagan is older than
Bush has Reagan as a
constituent, it is not one of
Reagan's personal

propositions because it also has
Bush as
reasons,

a

it is not one of Bush's
personal

constituent.

For similar

propositions.

The proposition
that all men are mortal is
no one's personal proposition
because it is
not a singular proposition.

When we reason from our beliefs,
we reason only from either
our
qua

itative beliefs or our own personal
beliefs; we do not reason from
our non-qua 1 itativ
e, non-personal beliefs.
If the set of beliefs we
1

reason from is inconsistent, we are,
at least in principle, in
to detect the inconsistency.^

However,

a

position

if the set of beliefs we reason

from is consistent, then, even if the
set of ^11 of our beliefs is

inconsistent, we are not, even in principle,
in

a

position to detect the

inconsistency.
As noted above, Lewis seems to hold
that if the first alternative is

correct,

then we have reason to believe that (L3

1

)

is true.

If the first

alternative were correct, and if Pierre had inconsistent
beliefs, then,
since we reason from our qualitative beliefs,

position to detect the inconsistency.

Pierre would be in

This is because,

a

if the first

alternative were correct, the inconsistency would be among Pierre's

qualitative beliefs.

But,

as Kripke says,

Pierre cannot detect any
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inconsistency.

"

^

Therefore, if the first ailalternative were correct,
and if

reason from our

*»liU„v.

^

the , sinoe
detect a„ y inconsistency,
we would need to
concede that Pierre does
not
h3,e ln ° 0nSlStent bellefS
«“
alternative were correct,
the „
Pierre's inability to
detect any inconsistency
among his beliefs,
would
be reason to conclude
that he does not have
inconsistent beliefs.
If, however, the
second alternative
ive is correctfl
correct, it
would be a mistake
to conclude, from Pierre's
res inahii-it-v
inability to detect any
inconsistency, that
Pierre does not have
inconsistent beliefs
ueneis.
'

^

^

"

-

.

.

This
k
ihis is because,
if the

second alternative is corr pnt- j-irect, the inconsistency
could be among Pierre's
non-qualitative, non-personal
beliefs; it could be among
those of his
beliefs he does not reason
from. The singular
proposition that London is
pretty and its denial, the
proposition that London is not
pretty, are

contradictory.

If,

as we think they are,

Pierre's inconsistent beliefs,

they are the objects of

then the inconsistency is
not one that

Pierre is, even in principle,
in

a

position to detect.

The second

alternative admits them as possible
objects of beliefs.

But they are not
among the beliefs that Pierre can
reason from, for they are not
among
Pierre's qualitative or personal
beliefs.

If the second alternative is
correct and if

I

am right about the

propositions we reason with, then Pierre
can have undetectable,
inconsistent beliefs.

If Pierre can have undetectable,

beliefs, then the fact that he is not in

inconsistency,

a

position to spot any

is not a reason to think that (L3')

if the second alternative is correct
and if

inconsistent

I

is true.

Therefore,

am right about the

propositions that we reason with, then, since there
is no longer any
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reason to thin, that each
of CL„,

(L 2 ),

puzzle has vanished.

and (L31) ls true>
Kripke s
,

We have examined one way
of defending the third
atatement from
twin's reply. In so doing,
„e have discovered
a solution to at
least
one of the three parts
of Kripke's puzzle.
Prior to concentrating

exclusively on Kripke's puzzle,
that

Uwis makes

let us return to the
two major claims

in his commentary.

The first of Lewis's two
major

claims is that Kripke's puzzle
refutes the analysis given
by
and

(L6).

(Lk),

(L5),

The second major claim
is that (L 4 ) and (L5)
fail to account

for the truth of (LI

).

When Lewis asserts that (L4) anH
and
^

)

(LD, he sets out to prove that if

c;')
a
(L5)
do not account for the
truth of

(LI) is true,

then one of (Lk) or (L5)

is false.

Let us simply take Uwis's
second claim to be the claim
he
attempts to prove: if (LI) is true,
then one of (Lk) or (L5) is false.
The discussion above

clearly indicates where, according
to my view,

Uwis's attempt to prove this claim
goes astray.

I

hold that despite the

fact that everything Pierre
believes at w is true at w
b
b „e need not
conclude that w is one of Pierre's belief
worlds.
b
For we need not agree

that Pierre believe everything in w
b that he believes in w r even though
his experiences in the two worlds are
qualitatively indistinguishable.
My view allows me to retain both (Lk)
and
Lewis about the truth of
(Let us agree that)

I

(L5),

even though

I

agree with

(LI).

believe that Socrates is wise. The object of my

belief is the non-personal, singular proposition
that Socrates is wise.

Given the mediacy of my connections with Socrates,
it should be clear
that there is a possible world which is, at least from
my perspective,

.

)

.
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qualitatively indistinguishable
from the actual
world but where Soorates

"
“

^

W1Se ’’

makeS

r6tain 311 ° f

1Utle

Se " Se t0

^

-

“» «"* -

qualitative and personal
beliefs

->

a world X believ e
tbe singular
proposition that Socrates is
wise,
wise* in faot
fact, i-h
there is little reason
to
.

m

sue hi 3 nro
An
proposition

thsfc

Soerates-even exists at such

a
a

•

proposition partly constituted
by

world. If the inhabitants
of such a world

uae the name -Socrates' to
designate someone, then,
at such a world, the
belief exhibited by my
disposition to assent to
-Socrates is wise- is
a

belief whose object is some
singular proposition
believe.

For these reasons,

I

I

may not actually

deny that qualitative
indistinguishability

of experiences guarantees
identity of non-qualitative,
non-personal
beliefs
When Lewis says that Kripke's
puzzle refutes the analysis
offered by
a-O, (L5), and (L6), he proceeds by
arguing that if (LI), (L2), and
(L3)
are true, then one of (L4), (L5),
or (L6) is false. Let us simply
take
Lewi s s first claim to be the
conjunctive claim that (LI), (L2), and
(L3)

are true and if

(LI), (L2), and (L 3 ) are true,
then one of (L4), (L5),

or (L6) is false.
I

wish to retain (L4), (L5), and (L6).

As previously noted, (L3)

admits two distinct interpretations:
(L3’)

It is a mistake to conclude that
Pierre has inconsistent

beliefs,
and
(L 3

*
'

It is a mistake to conclude that because
Pierre has
inconsistent beliefs that Pierre is doxastically

culpable
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According to my view,
although it is true
that if

'

A1S ° a0 ° 0rdlng

—

"-

0.1),

(L2),

and

-

*
is true that
«,, 0.2),
and 0-3”) are true,
it is not true
that II
if (ui),
L l)
(,,,
(L2), and (L3**)
are

true,

then

0*.

and

<L6>

reject the conclusion
that one of (H>,

UWlS

^

1

rea ° h dlfferent

f alse .

is

<L5).

-Elusions

or

My

v i ew

(L6)

is

al lous

rae

t0

false

about issues raised by

Kripke's puttie.

This is because we hold
opposing views about what
kinds
of beliefs people have
and the function of
belief ascription sentences
whose that-clauses have
name sentences for
their
tneir senf^nf
sententiali components.
We do, however, seem to
agree about
aboni- the
i-ho :
implications of the two views.
1

•

Section Three

Let us consider,

Kripke-s puttie.

one part at a time, each
of the three parts of

shall explain how my view
can be applied to each
part.
The first part of Kripke's
puttie involves Pierre's
dispositions
toward sentences
I

(1)

Londres est jolie

(2)

London is not pretty.

and

Pierre assents to each sentence
and, so, we conclude that he
believes
both that London is pretty and that
London is not pretty.
He has

inconsistent beliefs.

He believes both the singular
proposition that

London is pretty and its denial, the
proposition that London is not
pretty.

Kripke cited two related reasons when
he said it is

a

mistake to
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convict Pierre of any inconsistency.

First,

In a position to spot any
inconsistency.

Pierre is not in principle

Second, Pierre will not
infer

all that is entailed by the conjunction
of the two inconsistent
propositions (I say) he believes.
Since I hold that Pierre has
inconsistent beliefs,

I

must explain why there is nothing
wrong with

saying that Pierre has inconsistent
beliefs.
I

hold that when

we-

reason from our beliefs, we reason
from those of

our beliefs that are either qualitative
beliefs or our own personal

beliefs.

The set of beliefs that Pierre
reasons from is not

inconsistent.

The inconsistency lies among Pierre's
non-qual itativ

e,

non-personal beliefs, and that is why he is unable
to spot the
inconsistency.

It is a mistake to think that he is
unable to spot any

inconsistency because there is none.
This also explains why Pierre will not infer all
that is entailed by
the pair of contradictory propositions

I

say he believes.

neither qualitative nor personal to Pierre.

Hence, according to my view,

they are not among the premises Pierre reasons from.
then,

Little wonder,

that he will not infer all that they jointly entail.

Kripke

s

claim that it is

a

mistake to convict Pierre of any

inconsistency may be understood in at least two ways.
way,

They are

Kripke is right:

Understood one

Pierre has done nothing doxastically blameworthy;

he has neither reasoned incorrectly nor neglected to keep a tidy

inventory of what he believes and what his beliefs entail— he has done
the best he can do.

Understood another way,

does have inconsistent beliefs.

Kripke is mistaken:

Pierre
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The second part of
Kripke':

puzzle involves Pierre’s
dispositions

toward sentences
(1)

Londres est jolie

(3)

London is pretty.

and

Pierre assents to

(1)

but he

events

from

( 3 ).

His assent to („ leads

us to conclude that he
believes that London is pretty.

His dissent from
leads us to conclude that he
does not believe that
London is pretty.
It cannot be the case
that Pierre both does and
does not believe that
London is pretty. Since I
accept the conclusion that
Pierre believes
that London is pretty. I must
explain why, in spite of his
dissent from
(3)

(3).

it

is a mistake to conclude
that Pierre does not believe
that London

is pretty.

If Pierre's decision to dissent
from (3) were based on his having

considered and deemed false the
singular proposition that

(3)

expresses,

then it would be unreasonable not
to conclude, from his dissent,
that he
does not believes that London is
pretty. However, he did not decide
to

dissent from

(3)

as a result of such reasoning.

London is pretty is not

a

qualitative proposition, and it is not one of

Pierre's personal propositions.

deliberations.
assenting to

(1)

It

or

The proposition that

cannot be

a

As such,

it does not enter

part of Pierre's reasons either for

for dissenting from (3).

the dispositions he has toward

into Pierre's

(1)

and

(3),

To explain why Pierre has

we must make reference to

propositions that Pierre can reason with.
Pierre has the personal belief that the city his friends
call
Londres*

is

pretty.

That personal belief leads him to conclude that

(1)
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""

^ "““ ta

that the city

Ms

friends

t0

*>

can

Edition to

'Londres' Is pretty,

Ms

personal

beUef

Pierre has the

Persona! teller that the city
his friends call
-London. Is not pretty
That personal teller
leads M™ to conclude
that (3, Is false

and, so, he

dissents fro™

His decision to dissent
from

(3).

(3)

did not ste™ fro™

his having considered and
rejected the singular
proposition it expresses.
My view allows ™e to
reject the conclusion that
Pierre does not
believe that London is pretty,
despite Pierre's dissent fro™
( 3 ).
I„
this way It avoids the
contradiction that Pierre's
behavior se^ed to

commit us to.
Because

I

deny that Pierre's dissent
for™

(

3

)

co™™its us to the

conclusion that he does not believe
that London is pretty,

I

to rejecting Kripke's strengthened
disquotation principle.

a™

coated

Kripke

presented that principle as follows:
A

normal

linpce
I

333

must explain why

I

speaker who is not reticent will be
disDosed to

^ X
to

if and onl*

irteHSvsTthM^ (T979,

do not accept this principle.

Kripke calls this principle
his disquotation principle.

a

strengthened biconditional version of

have no doubts that we need something like

I

the weaker disquotation principle:

a

principle to license the move from

dispositions to assent to attributions of belief.

But it is

think we need the "other hair* of the strengthened
principle:

implying that belief (held by

a

a

mistake to
the half

speaker who understands the relevant

sentence) will manifest itself in assent.
If our dispositions to assent to sentences were
always based on

reasoning about the propositions they express, then some principle
moving
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l£om belief to assent would be
called
oxxea for
tor.

However, our dispositions
me sentences are usually
not based on reasoning
about the
propositions they express.
Rather, our dispositions
toward name
sentences are based on reasoning
that involves either
qualitative
propositions or our own personal
propositions.

Therefore, when we are

considering name sentences and
the propositions they
express, although we
may allow both that withheld
assent is evidence of a lack
of belief and
that dissent is evidence of
a disbelief, it would
be a mistake to allow
either that withheld assent is
a guarantee of a lack
of belief or that
dissent is a guarantee of a
disbelief.
The third part of Kripke’s
puzzle involves Pierre's dispositions

toward the following sentences,
both before and after he learns
that
Londres' and 'London' codesignate:
(1)

Londres est jolie,

(2)

London is not pretty,

(3)
(8)

London is pretty,

(4)

Londres is London,

(5)

Londres is not London,

(6)

London is London,

(7)

London is not London,

and

Londres is pretty and London is not pretty.
Before he learns that 'Londres'

assents to
and

(7).

before he

(1),

(2),

(5),

(6),

and

'London'

codesignate,

Pierre

and (8), and he dissents from (3), (4),

Using Kripke's principles,

we infer from Pierre's assents that

learns that 'Londres' and 'London' codesignate,

Pierre

163

believes:

that London Is pretty;
that London Is not pretty;
that London

is not Identical with

Undon; that Undon is
identical with London; and

that London is pretty and
London is not pretty.

Using Kripke's

principles, we infer from Pierre's
dissents that before he
learns that
'Londres' and

'London'

codesignate,

Pierre does not believe:

that London
is pretty; that London is
identical with London; and
that London is not

identical with London.
When

Pierre

•

learns that -Londres- and -Londoncodesignate, his

assent/dissent dispositions will be
modified.
dispositions toward
assent to

(1),

He will

(4).

(2),

acquire

will continue to assent to
acquire

and
a

He will

(3).

acquire

and to dissent from (7).

(6)

a

disposition to

disposition to dissent from

disposition to dissent from

a

He will reconsider his

A

(8).

(5).

He

Finally, he will

solution to Kripke-s puzzle

must say what, if any, new beliefs
Pierre acquires, or old beliefs he

discards,

once he discovers that -Londres-

and

-London-

codesignate.

According to my view, before Pierre learns
that -Londres' and
'London' codesignate,

expressed by

he believes each of the singular propositions

(1), (2), (5), (6), and (8).

Despite Pierre's dissents from
'Londres'

and -London'

codesignate,

propositions expressed by
expresses

a

assents to.
(1),

and

(3),

(3),

(4),

He has inconsistent beliefs.
and

(7),

before he learns that

Pierre believes each of the singular

(4),

and (7).

Each of (3),

(4),

singular proposition expressed by some sentence Pierre
(3),

for example,

expresses the same singular proposition as

Pierre believes the singular proposition expressed by

-But,'

and (7)

one might object, 'Pierre dissents from

has reasons for doing so.

(3),

(4),

(1).

and (7).

He

Finally, he does not believe that he believes

164

the propositions
that they express.'

This is all quite
correct.

reasons for dissenting
from

-t

he believes the

(

Pierre has
has. what seem
to him to be, good

3 ),’

(

positions

m

4)

and (7)

and he does not
believe

’

that they express

-

Pierre dissents
because he believes that
the city his friends
call 'London' is
not pretty.
Given his belief thai•<.
that the city
his friends call
'London' is
from

(3)

,

.

not pretty, he certainly
has good reasons to
believe that

(3)

expresses a

false proposition, and
(so far as we know)
he has no reason to
believe
that he believes
false position that it
might express.
Pierre
dissents from (4) because
he believes both that
the city his friends call
'Londres'

is

pretty and that the city
his friends call 'London'
is not
pretty.
He has reasons for believing
that (4) expresses a false
proposition, and he has no reason
to think that he believes
any false
proposition if might express.
Finally, Pierre dissents from
(7) because
he believes, say, that
'London' and 'London'
"codesignate."
He has

reason to think that

(7)

exDres^p^
expresses

_
false
proposition,

a
a

.

and no reason to

think that he believes any false
proposition it might express.
We have considered Pierre's
doxastic state before he learns
that
'Londres'

and

'London'

once he discovers
When

codesignate.

that 'Londres'

Let
and

(5)

assent to

now consider what happens

'London'

codesignate.

Pierre learns that 'Londres' and
'London' codesignate,

reconsider his dispositions toward
from

us

and

(8);

(4);

(1),

continue to assent to

(

2 ),

(6);

and continue to dissent from

Pierre will reconsider

(1),

(2),

and

(3)

and

withdraw his assent

(3):

acquire

he will:

a

disposition to

(7).

because he believes:

'Londres' and 'London' codesignate; that if
’Londres' and 'London'

that

.
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codesignate,
'London,

then

( 1 )

codesignate,

is equivalent to

and that if

(3);

.

Lo „dres'

then <2> is equivalent
to the denial of

and
„e

(,).

also has reason to believe
that if he believes both
the proposition
expressed by ( ) and the
proposition expressed by ( 2
1

),

inconsistent beliefs.

then he has

Since he does not want to
have inconsistent

beliefs, he will set about deciding
whether or not London is pretty
(or
whether or not there is- a sense
in which one and the same
city can be
both pretty and non-pretty).
Pierre with withdraw his assent
from

(5)

(alternatively,

from (8))

because he now believes both that
’Londres’ and ’London’ codesignate
and
that if ’Londres’ and ’London’
codesignate, then the proposition

expressed by

(5)

(alternatively,

by

is false.

(8))

Pierre will remain disposed to assent
to

given no reason to believe that

(6)

because he has been

it expresses a false proposition
(and he

still has reason to believe it expresses
acquire a disposition to assent to

(4)

a

true proposition).

He will

because he now believes both that

’Londres’ and ’London’ codesignate _and that if
’Londres’ and ’London’
codesignate,

then

(4)

is equivalent to

(6).

Finally, Pierre will remain disposed to dissent form

(7)

because he

has been given no reason to believe that it expresses
a true proposition
(and he still has reason to

believe that

it expresses a false

proposition)

Before he

learns that ’Londres’

and

’London’

believes the singular propositions expressed by
(8);

he has inconsistent beliefs.

’Londres’

and

’London’

codesignate,

codesignate,
(1),

(2),

(5),

Pierre
(6),

and

Subsequent to his discovery that
Pierre will withhold his assent to
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and

(1>

(

2 ).

until he straightens
things 0Ut
out '

^

aa, „„
that he believes the
singular
that he believes the
singular

position

position

«lll be disposed to
dissent from

(5))

it
lt

, „
uould
be premature to

that London is pretty
or

that London is not
prett.

He

and win
will not. otherwise
behave as if

ondres is not identical
with London; and,
therefore, based on what
we
*now about Pierre, we
conclude that he stops
believing the singular
Proposition that Londres is
not identical with
London.
He continues to
believe the singular
proposition that London is
London. Finally, since
Pierre is no longer disposed
to behave as if Londres
is pretty and London

-

not pretty,

and no longer assents
to (8), we conclude
that he no
longer believes the singular
proposition that Londres is
pretty and
London is not pretty.
In Chapter

what,

when

IV,

I

said that a solution to
Kripke's puzzle must explain

if any, new beliefs Pierre
acquires (or old beliefs he
discards)
he discovers that 'Londres'
and 'London' codesignate.
I have now

done just that.
I

have said that (before he
learns that 'Londres' and

'London'

oodesignate) Pierre believes both
that London is pretty and that
London
ia not pretty; and, therefore,
that Pierre has inconsistent
beliefs. I

have explained why, if the second
alternative is correct, and if we
reason only from either our
qualitative or our personal beliefs,
there is
nothing wrong with holding that Pierre
has inconsistent beliefs. I have
explained how we can avoid the contradiction
entailed by Pierre's
dispositions toward

Finally,

I

(1)

and

(3)

together with Kripke's principles.

have explained what happens to Pierre's
doxastic state when

learns that 'Londres' and 'London' codesignate.

In

doing these things,

he
I

have given the general
outline of

a

solution to Kripke's
puzzle.

.
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Notes

'

In

frlPke <1979 ’

P'

257 -258, ‘

In

P^vate conversation

Kripke

inconsistent beliefs.

In Marcus
3

(1

981,

In Lewi s (1981

1

983).

•

).

“These views were discussed
in the preceding
chapter.
are aSSUmlng th3t <5)
count as sentences of
English.
There is another problem
for this explanation.
Had we reasoned

^

to

the conclusions that Pierre
believes that London is pretty
and that
Pierre believes that if
London is pretty, then New
York is pretty via
Pierre's assents to English
sentences, we would expect
him to be able to
Now York is pDPoifv
D.,f
r ett y
But, we reasoned to the
conclusion that
Pierre believes that London is
pretty via his assent to a
French
sentence, and do not expect him
to be able to infer that
New York is
pretty.
The explanation at hand offers
nothing to account for this
.

difference in expectations.

But,

in

light of the fact that Pierre's

beliefs are the same in both cases,
an acceptable explanation
must
account for such a difference.
7

0f course, this does not follow
from (L5)i it follows when the

semantics Lewis has in mind are extended,
in the usual way, to handle

negations

wb .

8

In Lewis (1981, p. 286).

9

It should be clear from these two
passages that Lewis has Pierre in

Of course,

Lewis's own "official view" is that

Pierre in not in w
b

,
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rather one of Pierre's
counterparts
is in
f
in w
b
present his case so that- it- a

^ *

,

0

•

Lewis is careful to

.

d ° eS " 0t de e " d
>

on his own official

view.

This is taken up on
page 156.

"The sort of no„- q ualitative
beliefs

have

I

in mind are

beliefs
whose object are singular
propositions which are not
personal to the
believer. This is discussed
in detail starting
on page 153. The
claim
itself is considered on'
pages 156.
12

«e might want to allow
that a proposition,
p, is personal to

Person, x, (at his current
time, t,
in

case (i) p is a singular

individual constituent of
and

1

and in his current location,

position
p or (b)

and

either

(ii)
x

'I

am wise,'

(a)

x

jU st

1),

is the sole

and t, or x and 1, or x, t,

are the sole individual
constituents of

^Suppose that Pierre says,

either

a

p.

and that he sees a man,

dubs

him 'Peter,' judges him unwise,
and says, 'Peter is not wise,'
when,
unbeknownst to Pierre, he is the
man
he is seeing.

Apparently,

believes both that he is wise and
that he is not wise.

As

Pierre

have
characterized personal beliefs, Pierre
seems to have inconsistent
I

personal beliefs; nevertheless,
Pierre is in no position to spot the
inconsistency.
Such an example points out

personal belief.

A

a

defect in my characterization of

a

belief can be non-personal even though its
object is

one of the believer's own personal
propositions, but only the believer's

personal propositions can be objects of his
personal beliefs.

In

addition to having one of the believer's own
personal propositions for
its object, a personal belief is a belief such
that its believer is

disposed

to use

sentence

’0(1),'

where

>0(1)'

is

a

sentence that contains
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st

least one occurrenop nr <-u~ „
of the personal
pronoun 'I,' contains
no other
non-descriptional singular
terms that de3ignate
i ° naie the
believer, and is such
that if used by the
believer, it would ex
express
P ress thp
the personal
proposition
which is the belief’s
object.
By this definition,
one of Pierre's two
beliefs, namely his
belief
that he is not wise, is
not a personal belief.
Pierre is not disused
to
assent to 'I am not wise.
As such an ex^ple
does not enter into
the

issues we are discussing,

will continue to use the
original definition
in the main body of the
text.
I

'“That is, for example,
Pierre does not believe
this:

believes the proposition that
Pierre does not believe this*
London is pretty.

(3)

expresses
expresses.

that he

Tii ^
it
is
not to say that
*.

n
at he Kbelieves
the proposition that
•

chapter

V

belief, linguistic
behavior, and propositional
content

in this chapter
three views about the
connection between belief,

linguistic behavior, and
"the naive view,.' what

positional
I

content are compared:

what

call
call »the Russellean view,.
and my oun vlew
,
I

.

show how the view

hold can be applied to the
problem, of significant,
true, identity sentences
and to the problem of
the apparent failure of
the substitutivity of
codesignating names. Finally,
I explain why I
prefer my view, and the
solution it affords to Kripke-s
puzzle,
I

to the

sort of view, and solution,
that Lewis apparently favors.

Section One

Each of the three views about
the connection between belief,

linguistic behavior, and
propositional content consists of two
theses.
According to the naive view, when a
speaker uses a name sentence, and
thereby succeeds in expressing

expresses is

a

a

proposition, the proposition he

singular proposition partly constituted
by the object(s)

designated by the name(s) contained in the
sentence he uses.
according to the naive view,

Also

such a speaker says what he says because
he

believes the singular proposition he thereby
expresses; that very
proposition was directly involved in the deliberations
that led him to
use the sentence he used.

According to the Russellean view, when such

a

speaker uses

a

sentence, he thereby expresses seme qualitative proposition,
not
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name
a
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singular proposition,

Also according to
the Russe Hean
picture, such a
speaker says what he says
because he believes
the Qualitative
proposition
he thereby expresses.
I

hold that when such

a

speaker nses a name
sentenoe, he thereby
expresses a singular
proposition partly constituted
by the objects
designated by the name(s)
contained In the sentence
he uses.
I„
addition, I hold that such
a speaker says
what he says because
of his

qualitative and personal
beliefs*
IS and not
nnf because he
believes the
singular proposition he
thereby
*

y

ex
expresses
P resses *

th* singular
«
The
proposition he
•

®^P*"®sses played no role in tho
the deliberations,
reasonings, or thought
,

.

processes that led him to use
the sentence he used.
The naive view and the
Russellean view are at odds
over both the

propositions speakers express by
their uses of name sentences
and the
propositions on the mind of speakers
when they use name sentences.
I
agree with the naive picture
about the propositions speakers
express by
their uses of name sentences,
and I agree with the Russellean
picture
about the beliefs on the minds
of speakers when they use name
sentences . 2
Note that, despite their
disagreement over both the propositions

speakers express by their uses of name
sentences and the propositions on
the mind of speakers who use
name sentences, the naive view and
the

Russellean view agree about this:

when a speaker uses a name sentence
he

does so because he believes the
proposition he thereby expresses.

Against the naive view and the Russellean
view,

generally not the case that when

a

I

hold that it is

speaker uses a name sentence, he does

so because he believes the proposition he
thereby expresses.
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Kecan

that, in Chapter I.

I

said that our uses of
nane sentenoes

generate two distinct
questions:

First, what hind of
proposition,

singular or qualitative, is
expressed by an ordinary
use of a sentence
that contains a proper
name?
Second, what hind of
belief is ordinarily
on the mind of a speaher
when he uses a sentence
that contains a proper
name?
Each of the three views
offers its own answer to
each of these

questions.

Recall that

I

also maintained that we have
been ill-served by

our failure to observe the
distinction between the two
questions and

misled by the assumption that when
we answer the first question
we have,
thereby, also answered the
second
question.

carefully preserved under the view

I

That distinction is

favor, and

I

have explicitly denied

that when we answer the first
question we have, thereby, answered
the
second question.
Our tendency to conflate the two
questions is what gives force to at

least two of the major problems for
the Millian theory of names.

These

are the problem of significant,
true, identity sentences and the
problem
of the apparent failure of the
substitutiv ity of codesignating names.

Section Two

The problem of significant, true,
to us for two reasons.

First,

it

identity sentences is of interest

is one of the major problems

confronting the Millian theory of names.

Second, when Kripke raised his

puzzle about belief, he explicitly linked the puzzle to the
general
problem of the apparent failure of substitutiv ity of codesignating
names

—which

problem may be regarded as the genus of which the problem of

174

significant,

true.

Identity sentences is a species.3

A solution to
Kripke's puzzle might, therefore,
be expected to have application
to

these problems.

Suppose that Smith is our speaker,
and that Smith assents to
(1)

Hesperus is Hesperus

but dissents from, or withholds assent
to,
(2)

Hesperus

-is

Phosphorus.

According to the Millian theory,
codesignate,
(2)

(1)

and

(2)

since 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus'

express the same proposition.

seem to differ in cognitive significance.

cognitively insignificant, or trivial, whereas
significant, or non-trivial.

(1)

(2)

Still,

and

(1)

is (nearly)

is cognitively

Even one so sympathetic to the Millian

theory as Kripke concedes as much,

when he writes:

My view [is] that the English sentence 'Hesperus is
Phosphorus' could sometimes be used to raise an empirical issue
while 'Hesperus is Hesperus' could not.
(1 980a,
p. 20)
The problem confronting the Millian is this:

to explain how two

sentences which express the same proposition can differ in cognitive
significance.
This problem is especially acute when the Millian theory is teamed
with the naive picture of the connection between belief,

behavior, and propositional content.

linguistic

According to the explanation most

naturally recommended by the naive picture, when Smith assents to
does so because he believes the singular proposition that
and,

(1)

(1),

he

expresses;

also according to the naive picture, when Smith dissents from, or

withholds his assents to
singular proposition that

(2),
(2)

he does so because he does not believe the

expresses.

This sort of explanation seems
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adequate when the sentences
involved
ea express diff
different propositions;
however, it collapses
when
wuen, as in the
t'
-ho case
of (1) and
-u
an d to\
the
sentences
ln qUeStl °" 6XPreSS
the
«.

4

4

The

HiHian

needs a better

explanation.
A better explanation
is offered by my
view.

two sentences can express
the

s

Me

propositional content, -even

According to my view

singular proposition. Qr

_^_

the reasons sufficient
for a speaker to

ent to the one are not
sufficient for the same
speaker to assent to
the other. Smith need only
acquire the nearly trivial

qualitative belief
that the celestial body
called 'Hesperus' is the
celestial body called
'Hesperus* to be ready to
assent to v(1 ). DU1:
But he
ne will
wil l nni
not assent to (2)
until he acquires such a
qualitative belief as the belief
that the

celestial body called -Hesperusis identical with the
celestial body
called -Phosphorus.' This second
qualitative belief is far more
significant than the first one.

When we understand that we
assent to

sentences which express singular
propositions only because of our

qualitative
Mil
(2)

1

(or personal) beliefs,

we can see our way toward
being

ians while at the same time
acknowledging that sentences like

differ in cognitive significance.

(1)

and

The cognitive significance of

sentences that express singular propositions
is to be understood in terms

of the qualitative (or personal) beliefs
required for sincere, reflective
assent.

The qualitative (or personal) beliefs
required for sincere,

reflective assent to

(1)

are far less significant than the qualitative

(or personal) beliefs required

My view suggests
true,

a

for sincere,

reflective assent to

(2).

promising approach to the problem of significant,

identity sentences.

Let us now see how it applies to the general

.
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problem of the apparent faUuce
of subsUtutivity of
codes lg „a tlng
Sxnce the problem of
significant,

„

Me ,

true, identity sentences
is a

special case of the problem
of the apparent failure
of substitute ity, it
is reasonable to expect:
(i) that the phenomena
involved in the two
hinds of cases is similar; (ii)
that the explanation offered
by the naive
pioture fails for similar reasons;
and (Hi) that the
explanation given
in terms of my view is similar
to the one already given
in the case of
significant,

true,

identity sentences.

Let us suppose that Smith is our
speaker and that Smith is disposed
to assent to
(3)

Hesperus is visible,

but disposed to dissent from, or
withhold assent to,
(4)

Phosphorus is visible.

According to the Millian theory,
the same thing,

(3)

and

since 'Hesperus* and 'Phosphorus* name

express the same proposition.

(4)

facing the Millian is this:

The problem

to explain how two sentences which
express

the same proposition could be such that
a speaker who is disposed to

assent to the one is not disposed to assent
to the other.

Clearly, this

problem is similar to the problem posed by significant,
true, identity
sentences
The explanation most naturally suggested by the
naive picture goes as

follows.

Smith is disposed to assent to

singular proposition that
(4)

(3)

expresses.

(3)

because he believes the

He is not disposed to assent to

because he does not yet believe the singular proposition it

expresses.

As in the case of significant, true,

identity sentences, this

explanation gets by when the sentences involved express distinct singular
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propositions.
sentences,

But.

as
3 in
ln +-k~
the ° ase of s i6nif
leant,

the explanation
collapses when

true,

Identity

as in the case of
(3) and (4),
the sentences involved
exnrass
express the same
proposition. Again, the
Millian
is in the market for a
’

better explanation.

Such an explanation is
provided by my view.
person's reasons for assenting
to

assenting to

(4),

(3)

According to my view, a

may differ from his
reasons for

despite the fact that

(3)

and

(4)

express the same

proposition.

Once Smith acquires the
qualitative belief that the
celestial body called -Hesperus'
is visible, he will be
ready to assent
to (3); still, he need not
be ready to assent to
(4).
Smith will
withhold his assent to (4) until he
acquires such a qualitative belief
as
the belief that the celestial
body called 'Phosphorus' is
visible.

Certainly,

a

person could cone to believe that
the celestial body called

’Hesperus' is visible without thereby
coming to believe that the

celestial body called 'Phosphorus' is
visible.

The view adopted here

allows us to explain apparent failures
of substitutivity without
forsaking the Millian theory.
a pparent ,

Such apparent failures are merely

and not genuine , failures of the
substitutivity of

codesignating proper names.
The view

I

hold points the way toward solutions of the
problems

raised by significant, true, identity sentences
and by apparent failures

of substitutivity.

My view suggests that certain well-known puzzles

involving belief and proper names result from our failure
to realize that
we use belief ascription sentences to perform two
distinct, though

related, functions.

First we use belief ascription sentences to

characterize the mental state of the (alleged) believer, to name the
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propositions he has before hi
lus mind,

the propositions he
reasons with.

This is the normal function
of belief ascription
sentences whose thatc lauses name q ualitative
proposition, Second, we use
belief ascription
sentences to say something
about the way in which
the (alleged)
believer's mental state connects
with, hooks into, or
matches up to
objects in the world. This is
the normal function of
belief ascription
sentences whose that-clauses
name singular propositions.
We have shown a tendency to
let our thinking about beliefs
whose

objects are qualitative (or
personal) propositions influence
our thinking
about beliefs whose objects are
singular (non-personal)
propositions.
For example, we think that a
person who has inconsistent
qualitative (or

personal) beliefs is, at least in
principle, in
inconsistency.

a

position to detect the

This influences our thinking
about beliefs whose objects

are singular (non-personal) propositions.

Hence, when a speaker affirms

both that Hesperus is visible and
that Phosphorus is not visible and
we
think he is not, even in principle,
in a position to see that he
has

inconsistent beliefs, we conclude that he
does not have inconsistent
beliefs.

This, in turn,

leads us to conclude that, contrary to the

Mill ian theory of the meaning of proper names,
different propositions.

a

and

(4)

express

If, however, my view is correct, we need
not

accept either conclusion.

performs

(3)

speech act using

For, according to my view,
a

sentence that expresses

when a speaker
a

singular

proposition, he does so because of his qualitative (or personal)
beliefs.
If the position developed here is correct, then some
of what has been

taken for data that decisively refutes the Millian theory can be
regarded
as data that must be taken into account in reforming our views about
the
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connection between belief
content.

,

l

ncm-i
„ K
~u
inguistic
behavior,
and propositional
i

We must not take it for
granted that when speakers
use

sentences that contain proper names,
they do so because they
believe the
Singular propositions they thereby
express. The belief on the mind
of a

speaker when he uses
ever,

a

sentence that contains a proper
name is rarely, if

belief whose object is the singular
proposition he thereby
expresses.
a

Section Three

In Chapter

IV,

we considered two radically opposed
views about what

kinds of propositions people believe and the
function of belief
ascription sentences whose that-clauses contain
proper names.
to the view (apparently)

According

favored by Lewis, the objects of beliefs are

qualitative propositions and such belief ascription sentences
are
ordinarily used to attribute qualitative beliefs.

In my view, we

believe

both personal and non-personal singular propositions, in addition
to

qualitative propositions, and such belief ascription sentences are
ordinarily used to attribute non-qualitative (non-personal) beliefs.
this section,
I

I

will explain why

prefer my view to its rival.

I

have the following intuition

:

that there are two possible worlds

W 1 and w 2 » and a person, x, such that:
wi and w 2 are

W
1

is true at

x

inhabits both

w-,

qualitatively indistinguishable; everything
w-j

;

In

but not everything

x

x

and w 2 ; for

believes at

believes at w 2 is true at w 2

.

I

prefer my view over its rival in part because my view does, whereas its

rival does not, preserve this intuition.

x,

180

Because w, and w are
qualitatively Indistinguishable
2
for x,
all and only the same
qualitative beliefs in w
and
slnoe
,

^

x

^

are qualitatively
indistinguishable for x, and
every qualitative

proposition

x

believes at w
w

•

is true at wi

i

i

2 is true

at w 2 .

^

,

(recall that everything
^recall

believes at w, is true at w,>.
every qualitative
at w

has

x

proposi^TT^Tieves

If the view Lewis
prefers were correct,

then, since
could believe only qualitative
propitious, and every qualitative
proposition x believes at w
2 ls true at w 2 , everything x believes
at w 2
x

is t ru 6 st
In this way the view Lewis
prefers is hostile to my
reported

intuition.

My view is not.

It

allows that

non-personal singular propositions.

q ualitative believes are true
believes at W is true at W
2
2
I

x

believes both personal and

Therefore, while all of x's

at w 2 it does not follow that
everything

x

.

also have an intuition about the
role played by singular

propositions in our understanding and
evaluation of uses of belief

ascription sentences whose that-clauses
contain proper names.

Suppose

that Jones uses this sentence:
(5)

Smith believes that Hesperus is visible,

to issue a report on Smith’s doxastic
state.
.in tuition

about Jones’s use of

(5):

I

have the following

when Jones used

(5),

what he said is

true if and only if Smith has as an object of
one of his beliefs

a

proposition which is true if and only if the singular
proposition that
Hesperus is visible is true.

My intuition assigns the singular

proposition that Hesperus is visible
and evaluation of Jones’s use of

(5).

a

central role in our understanding
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This is not to deny that
when so understood such
reports may be
either -Heading or Incomplete.
They may be misleading
in that they
give rise to false expectations.
They may be inc^plete
in that they
leave out some significant
information.
For example, suppose that
Jones is speaking to Brown
when Jones uses
(5).
In my view. Jones thereby
attributes to Smith a belief
whose object
is the singular proposition
that Hesperus is visible.
If Brown

understands and accepts what Jones
had said. Brown will attribute
the
same belief to Smith.
'Hesperus'

and

Suppose that Smith does not believe
that

'Phosphorus'

codesignate,

and

that he is disposed to

assent to
(3)

Hesperus is visible

but not to
(4)

Phosphorus is visible.

Brown knows that the two names codesignate;
however, he does not know

that Smith does not believe that they
codesignate.
be disposed to assent to
In this way,

There is

a

(3)

and to

He expects Smith to

(4).

Jones's report has given rise to

a

false expectation.

sense in which the report is misleading.

If Jones is aware

that Smith does not believe that the two names codesignate
and also

believes that Brown is not, then Jones should complete his report by
adding that information.

This in no way suggests that my intuition about

our understanding and evaluation of Jones's use of

(5)

is defective.

Any

information Jones adds to fill in his report will be consistent with his
attributing to Smith

a

belief that has as its object

a

proposition that

.
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is true if and only
if the singular
proposition that

is true.

1
*

It is by no me ans

dear

that my view's rivai
can he developed in
a

way that preserves this
intuition.
is another reason why

I

Hesperus is visible

M y view preserves it
directly.

This

prefer my view.

It is far from clear that
my view's

rival can he developed

in a way

that avoids every version of
the Attitude-Context
Objection.5 flny number
of qualitative beliefs might
give rise to a person's
linguistic behavior.
The view Lewis favors must
be developed so that a
person who attributes a
belief somehow selects £nd expresses
(one of) the correct qualitative

propositions) among the many that might
have given rise to the behavior
which is the attribution's basis.

Pertaes

a

bit of semantic machinery

can be devised to make the
truth-conditions of a belief ascription
made

m

a

carefully described situation dependent
on (one

qualitative proposition s).

But,

of) the correct

if the view Lewis favors were
correct,

people who report on the beliefs of others
would somehow manage to select
and express (one of) the correct
qualitative propositions.

A semantic

device which succeeded in identifying (one of)
the correct qualitative
proposition(s) would not thereby explain how we
do

it.

Yet,

if the view

Lewis favors is correct, we do it often and with
little effort.

I

favor

my view over its rival in part because (unlike
its rival) my view clearly

avoids the Attitude-Context Objection, and also in part,
because (unlike
my view) its rival requires that we frequently exercise
skills

I

think we

lack

The final reason

I

favor my view over its rival is that unlike its

rival, my view admits solutions to Kripke’s puzzle and related problems

l
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which preserve the Hll

lan theory of proper

»

1

cull

CO •

theory is false— and we
have reasons to think It

description

Is— then, until a new
theory cotes along, the Millian
theory is the only theory
we have.
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Notes

1 -

The naive view is discussed
in some detail in
Stalnaker

( 1

97 9,

a
a

proper

p.

i_

5).
‘In

this regard, Russell wrote:
.
the thought in the mind
of a Pperson” usln
usimrS
name correctly can generallv nniv
replace the proper name by a
[definite]"^
.

3

.

See Kripke (1980a,

p. 251,

^

W6

253-259, and 267).

“An opponent might counter
that Jones could very well
follow his use

of (5) with
(6)

a

use of
But Smith does not believe
that Phosphorus is visible.

My intuition is so strong that

I

would conclude either that Jones
has

inferred too much from Smith’s withheld
assent to

should be interpreted non- literally.

hope that he would not say,
5 See

Chapter

I,

page

1

1.

'

I

I

(4)

or that Jones's

would ask him what he meant, and

meant just what

I

said.’
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